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These tough men had to rely so much on this quiet, gentle woman who could
translate, who could find medicinal herbs, who could look for landmarks....
Americans today could probably use such a level-head guide .... We exist in
uncertain times, times of change, times of danger.... Maybe our Native Amer-
ican culture will be needed again to help lost Americans survive when the tele-
vision lights dim and the oil runs out. That is the Indian strength-we know
how to survive.
- Randy'L He-dow Teton, Shoshone Bannock1
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 20, 1805, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark took a
break from their travels along the rapids of the Columbia River to sat-
isfy their curiosity about the burial practices of the local people with
whom they had been trading and socializing. 2 Entering a sixty-foot-
1. Colin Nickerson, Disquiet on an American Trail: Along Lewis and Clark's Route,
Pride in Nation Mixed with Anxiety, BOSTON GLOBE, July 4, 2004, at Al.
2. See THE JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND CLARK 257 (Bernard DeVoto ed., Houghton Mif-
flin 1997) (1953) [hereinafter LEWIS AND CLARK]. The previous day, the "Corps of
Discovery" had visited the residents of a group of lodges and were well received
after their traveling companion Sacagawea's presence in the party was made
known. Id. at 256. Later in the evening, they encountered about 100 Indians.
Id. at 257. Members of the Corps smoked with the Indians, who had brought the
Corps needed wood, and Corps members Peter Cruzatte and George Gibson en-
tertained by playing the violin, "which delighted them greatly." Id. Cruzatte was
the "son of a French father and Omaha mother"; he was able to converse in sign
language and Omaha. STEPHEN AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE: MERIWETHER
LEWIS, THOMAS JEFFERSON, AND THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WEST 138 (1996).
Sacagawea's role in the expedition was ultimately commemorated by the govern-
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long "Indian Vault" constructed of planks of wood and pieces of canoes,
they found large numbers of piled bones, a circular arrangement of
skulls on mats, and more recently deposited bodies wrapped in leather
robes. The remains were accompanied by fishing nets, baskets, skins,
horses' skeletons, and other funerary objects.3
Lewis and Clark's investigation of this burial site was but one in-
stance of the many un-consented Euro-American entries into Native
American graves that were to occur in the lands over which the
United States claimed authority by virtue of the Louisiana Purchase.
While Lewis and Clark apparently took nothing with them from the
burial chamber that they had encountered, those who came after them
usually lacked such scruples. Indeed, to the American anthropologists
and other similarly minded social scientists whose profession was tak-
ing shape as the nineteenth century progressed, grave robbing was
precisely the reason for the burial explorations in which they engaged.
They were committed to "proving" the inferiority of Native Americans
to Euro-Americans through physical comparisons, which required ex-
amination of Native American skeletal remains. They were convinced
that the indigenous inhabitants of the continent, burdened by their
innate inferiority compared to European-derived American civiliza-
tion, could not long survive, and therefore were a "dying race." This
belief precipitated a flurry of activity aimed at documenting Native
Americans' presence through anthropology, ethnology, and similar
fields while some of them still remained. Eventually, it was believed
study of Native Americans would be within the purview of only those
who studied extinct cultures.
That they were a doomed people would not have crossed the minds
of the members of the Nez Perce Tribe who had welcomed Lewis and
Clark and their "Corps of Discovery" to Nez Perce territory in the Fall
of 1805. If the Nez Perces had speculated about anyone's chances of
survival at that point, it would probably have been the survival odds
of Lewis, Clark, and their party that occupied their thoughts. First of
all, the Nez Perces would have known that the Corps of Discovery had
had very little success in hunting in recent weeks, and that the fish,
roots, and berries that they were able to purchase from the Nez Perces
ment by the inclusion of a representation of Sacagawea and her infant son on the
"Golden Dollar." See U.S. Mint, Design Specifications for Golden Dollar, at http:l
www.usmint.gov/mint-programs/golden-dollar-coin/index.cfm?action=golden-
dollar-specs (last visited Aug. 5, 2005); see also generally Richard R. Holey III,
Dueling Dollars: The Story of Sacagawea's Journey, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 579
(2001). The expedition of the Corps of Discovery is commemorated on the Mis-
souri quarter, which was issued as part of the "50 State Quarters Program." See
U.S. Mint, Missouri, at http://www.usmint.gov/mint-programs/50sq-program/
states/index.cfm?state=MO (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
3. See LEWIS AND CLARK, supra note 2, at 257-58.
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saved the Corps from starvation.4 Also, the Corps had been forced to
linger on Nez Perce land because many of its members were critically
ill from dysentery and too weak to ride a horse or walk;5 they could
hardly have inspired awe as the emissaries of a superior civilization.
Indeed, at this point the very survival of the Corps and their mission
rested in the hands of the Nez Perces. They could easily have overpow-
ered the weakened party and seized the Corps's weapons, which at
that time amounted to the biggest arsenal west of the Mississippi
River. They did not. Nez Perce oral history reveals that when mem-
bers of the tribe first encountered ill members of the Corps, they did
consider killing them for their weapons. The party was spared
through the intervention of Watkuweis ("Returned from a Far Coun-
try"), who had lived with white traders in Canada for several years
following her capture by Blackfeet Tribe members. 6 The Corps even-
tually recovered sufficiently to travel, guided along part of the way by
Nez Perces, who at times even piloted the Corps's boats through
rapids. 7 Continuing along the Snake and Columbia River system, the
party encountered Yakimas, Wanapams, and Walla Wallas, hospita-
ble relatives of their Nez Perce guides.8 The amicable reception they
received did not, however, deter Lewis and Clark from finding a mo-
ment to satisfy their curiosity about "the method those nativs [sic]
practiced in depos [it] eing [sic] the dead"9 by visiting the burial cham-
ber on October 20.
A handful of days before their visit to the burial chamber, Lewis
and Clark and their party would have passed near the site of another
burial, one which was to lie undisturbed for the next one hundred and
ninety-one years. On July 28, 1996, the human remains of the man
dubbed "Kennewick Man" by the popular press were found by chance
scattered a few meters offshore in Lake Wallula, a lake formed behind
a dam on the Columbia River, near Kennewick, Washington. The dis-
covery area is under the management authority of the Army Corps of
Engineers, which determined that the remains were Native American
and, pursuant to the Native American Graves Protection and Repatri-
4. See id. at 240-43; AMBROSE, supra note 2, at 289, 294, 296.
5. See LEWIS AND CLARK, supra note 2, at 241-43; AMBROSE, supra note 2, at 294-96.
Their illness, apparently brought on by an abrupt change in diet from eating only
meat to consuming only roots, berries, and dried fish, caused "acute diarrhea and
vomiting." LEWIS AND CLARK, supra note 2, at 241; AMBROSE, supra note 2, at
294.
6. See AMBROSE, supra note 2, at 295.
7. See LEWIS AND CLARK, supra note 2, at 249.
8. See AMBROSE, supra note 2, at 298. These tribes spoke Shahaptian languages,
like the Nez Perces the expedition had already encountered, and the expedition's
Nez Perce guides could speak to them and vouch for the party. See id. at 298.
9. LEWIS AND CLARK, supra note 2, at 257 (alteration in the original).
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ation Act ("NAGPRA"),1O were required to be transferred to a group of
area tribes, who had acknowledged the "Ancient One" 11 as an ances-
tor. The tribal coalition included the Nez Perce Tribe, on which the
Corps of Discovery had depended for survival almost two hundred
years before. The tribes sought to repair the damage done by erosion
along the river by returning the Ancient One to the place where mem-
bers of his community had buried him thousands of years before.
This reburial might have been a routine matter under NAGPRA
were it not for two factors. Portions of the remains were radiocarbon
dated to be over 8,000 years old, and a misleadingly photographed and
heavily publicized artistic reconstruction of the skull "did not look Na-
tive American" to at least some non-Native American readers of TIME
magazine and similar popular publications. These factors sparked
widespread interest in the remains, and also suggested to interested
anthropologists that there might be a way to pry the remains out from
under NAGPRA's protection. Those who demanded access argued
that Kennewick Man, the name preferred by those who opposed the
government's NAGPRA ownership determination, should not be rec-
ognized as Native American, and was therefore within NAGPRA's cov-
erage. Rather than being recognized as an ancestor of contemporary
tribal members, Kennewick Man was depicted as a genetic "dead
end"-an early "American" who had left no biological descendants to
rightfully lay claim to him and thus frustrate academics' demands for
access. In other words, Kennewick Man was presented as an embodi-
ment of the "dying race" theory of nineteenth century anthropologists;
he had just been more obliging than the tribes studied by the anthro-
pologists, who had continued to survive despite the predictions of their
imminent extinction. In the late twentieth century, the contemporary
members of tribes whose continued survival had proved the anthropol-
ogists wrong were threatening to disrupt access to the kind of "re-
source" that anthropologists had long claimed as their own. And the
tool that the tribes had at their disposal was NAGPRA, which had
10. Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013
(2000)).
11. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004); Bonnichsen v.
United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Or. 2002); Bonnichsen v. United States,
969 F. Supp. 628 (D. Or. 1997); Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 614 (D.
Or. 1997). These cases represent the Bonnichsen litigation. This article refers to
the individual whose remains are at issue in the Bonnichsen litigation as the
Ancient One, in keeping with the respect for the tribal perspective that is re-
flected in NAGPRA. The physical remains themselves are also referred to as the
"Kennewick remains," in recognition of the proximity of the burial site to Ken-
newick, Washington. The past and present members of the tribes residing in the
area known today as the United States are referred to in this article as "Native
Americans," in keeping with the use of that term in the title of the statute under
consideration herein.
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already been responsible for the repatriation of other Native American
remains from museum collections.
The result was the Bonnichsen litigation, which pitted a group of
anthropologists, who claimed what they termed a "right" to have ac-
cess to and to re-analyze the Kennewick remains, against the federal
government and the tribal coalition. Following the review of results of
dozens of scientific tests and hundreds of pages of documents prepared
by qualified experts, the Department of the Interior ("DOI") concluded
that NAGPRA considered such remains to be Native American and
required their return to the tribal coalition. The disappointed anthro-
pologists continued to demand access through litigation. The Oregon
district court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately sided
with the plaintiffs, concluding that not only were the tribal claimants
not entitled to control of the remains, but that the remains were not
even Native American, and were therefore not protected by NAGPRA.
This result was achieved by grafting a new requirement onto the stat-
utory "Native American" definition, contrary to the text of the statute,
the history behind its enactment, and underlying congressional
intent.
This Article examines the Bonnichsen case and the Ninth Circuit's
controversial and fundamentally flawed rewriting of NAGPRA, in
light of the history of Native Americans' encounters with anthropolo-
gists and of the goals that NAGPRA was intended to achieve. The
focus is on what the Bonnichsen decision reveals about the court's un-
derstanding of and attitudes toward Native Americans and Native
American claims on the one hand, and anthropologists' claims on the
other, and on how this understanding echoes the nineteenth century
depiction of Native Americans as a dying race without valid claims to
the human remains that seemed, as a matter of common decency and
basic human rights, to belong to them. This understanding is also tied
to the court's views on whose knowledge and what kinds of knowledge
are worthy of judicial respect. In addition, the Bonnichsen opinion
echoes nineteenth century assimilation advocates' efforts to suppress
Native Americans' "backward" notions of kinship and to replace them
with a focus on the nuclear family, bound together by close biological
ties, as the unit on which a civilized society is built. The court's un-
derlying perspective and its decision suggest the same kind of failure
to understand and respect Native American perspectives and rights
that has long plagued relations between tribes and the dominant soci-
ety in general, and between tribes and anthropologists in particular.
Part II discusses the history of anthropologists' activities involving
Native Americans and the remains of their deceased kin, revealing the
longstanding practices that NAGPRA was enacted to redress. This
historical background provides the context in which NAGPRA must be
understood and interpreted, and in light of which decisions under the
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statute should be made. Moreover, while contemporary anthropolo-
gists may claim that this history should be forgotten because it re-
flects attitudes that they believe their profession has repudiated, for
tribal members who continue to be subjected to anthropologists'
claims to the remains of their ancestors, this past is still very much a
part of the present. Part III examines NAGPRA itself and the key
determinations that need to be made when the statute is applied to
human remains. Part III also discusses the DOI's application of the
statute to the Kennewick remains. Part IV examines the views of the
plaintiffs and the defendants in the Bonnichsen case and critiques the
Ninth Circuit's 2004 decision in favor of the plaintiffs. A careful anal-
ysis of the court's language reveals much about the underlying atti-
tudes and sympathies that shaped the outcome. This analysis also
demonstrates how the court's approach to the case and the case's out-
come both reflect continuing rejection and subordination of the Native
American perspective that Congress, in enacting NAGPRA, estab-
lished as being entitled to respect, and thus perpetuate the assimila-
tionist attitude that for so long characterized government policy
toward Native Americans. The Conclusion offers some final thoughts
on the Bonnichsen decision and the future treatment of Native Ameri-
can remains, and on the continuing survival of the "dying race,"
against seemingly great odds.
II. DOCUMENTING THE DYING RACE: IMPERIAL
ANTHROPOLOGY ENCOUNTERS
NATIVE AMERICANS
The fundamental thesis of the anthropologist is that people are objects for ob-
servation, people are then considered objects for experimentation, for manipu-
lation, and eventual extinction. The anthropologist thus furnishes the
justification for treating Indian people like so many chessmen available for
anyone to play with. 12
NAGPRA was enacted in 1990, after a lengthy quest by Native
Americans to obtain legal protection against grave desecration and
the theft of objects of religious and cultural significance, and to re-
cover possession of human remains and objects that had been improp-
erly taken in the past. Senator Daniel Inouye, one of the statute's
sponsors, highlighted how much was at stake in obtaining the passage
of NAGPRA by identifying the statute as human rights and civil
rights legislation, and Senator John McCain described it as establish-
ing "a process that provides the dignity and respect that our Nation's
first citizens deserve."13 Indeed, NAGPRA may be understood as a
12. VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 81 (The
Macmillan Company 1969).
13. 136 CONG. REC. S17,173-02 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Inouye);
136 CONG. REC. S17, 173-02 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. McCain).
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final legal recognition of the very humanity of Native Americans. In
other words, NAGPRA embodies a recognition that the remains of Na-
tive Americans are human remains, and that they are therefore
equally entitled to the respectful treatment that the law already af-
forded to the remains of Euro-Americans. Native American human
remains-or at least those excavated on federal and tribal lands or
already housed in the collections of federally funded institutions-
were no longer to be treated as mere objects to be made freely availa-
ble to satisfy the curiosity of academics or the public at large.
At the time that NAGPRA was enacted, all fifty states, as well as
the District of Columbia, had statutes that regulated cemeteries and
sought to protect graves from vandalism and desecration.14 Grave
robbers and those who mutilated the dead could be subjected to crimi-
nal penalties. Most states guaranteed that all persons, including the
indigent, prisoners, and unidentified persons, were entitled to a de-
cent burial, and disinterment of the dead was permissible only in very
limited circumstances. 1 5 In short, existing state law reflected a deep
respect for the remains of deceased human beings, and a conviction
that human remains should be properly buried and thereafter left
undisturbed.
These legal protections had not, however, prevented the remains of
many thousands of deceased Native Americans-perhaps as many as
two million' 6-from being wrenched from their resting places and
taken away by government agencies, museums, educational institu-
tions, and operators of tourist attractions. The remains were obtained
by a wide variety of people-soldiers, other government employees,
private collectors, museum collectors, and academics-acting from a
variety of motivations, including profit-seeking, entertainment, and
scientific curiosity.17 To these collectors, the remains of deceased Na-
14. See Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protec-
tion and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
35, 39 (1992); see also generally Catherine Bergin Yalung & Laurel I. Wala, A
Survey of State Repatriation and Burial Protection Statutes, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 419
(1992) (observing that the protection afforded to cemeteries and grave sites "var-
ies widely"). For a discussion of contemporary state laws relating to protection of
Native American burial sites and unmarked graves in general, see Christopher
A. Amato, Digging Sacred Ground: Burial Site Disturbances and the Loss of New
York's Native American Heritage, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 24-33 (2002).
15. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 14, at 39.
16. See id. (noting that estimates of the deceased Native Americans whose remains
had been taken ranged from 100,000 to 2,000,000). Native American burial sites
continue to suffer from inadequate legal protection and thus the risk of remains
being taken from their graves continues to be a serious concern. See generally
Amato, supra note 14. According to one source, "[tihe sale of artifacts plundered
from Native American burial sites ... has been estimated as a billion dollar per
year business." See id. at 2 n.2.
17. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 14, at 40.
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tive Americans were not worthy of the respect given to the remains of
deceased Euro-Americans. This attitude allowed the collectors to
treat the remains in a way that undoubtedly would have appalled
them if it had been applied to the remains of their own family and
friends. This point is made forcefully at the beginning of Tony Hil-
lerman's 1989 mystery novel Talking God, in which a Smithsonian
Institution conservator receives a box filled with the recently un-
earthed bones of her grandparents, which had been sent to her to pro-
test the museum's failure to repatriate Native American remains.1 8
This cavalier attitude toward Native American remains arrived
with the earliest settlers. In an incident that is left out of the stan-
dard grade school depiction of Pilgrim-Native American relations
leading up to the first Thanksgiving celebration, the first Pilgrim ex-
ploring party returned to the Mayflower with not only corn taken from
Native American storage pits, but also with some of "the prettiest
things" that they had uncovered, along with a corpse, in a Native
American grave.19
Native American burials also excited the curiosity of prominent
Americans like Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson thoroughly excavated a
Native American burial mound near Monticello, Virginia, 20 uncover-
ing tiers of burials, "separated by layers of gravel and stone,"21 in
which rested the remains of about 1,000 men, women, and children. 2 2
He concluded that the burials had been made by the ancestors of pre-
sent day Native Americans. 2 3 He knew that a group of tribal mem-
bers had visited the burial mound only about thirty years before his
excavation, but their interest in these graves did not prompt him to
seek permission from possible descendants of those buried there
before beginning his excavations.24 The participation of someone of
Jefferson's stature in Native American grave desecration gave an im-
primatur of respectability to the practice. 2 5 Jefferson's excavation of
the Virginia grave provides an early example of the involvement of
federal government officials in the desecration of Native American
burial sites and of the willingness of prominent Americans who gener-
18. TONY HILLERMAN, TALKING GOD 4-6 (1989).
19. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 14, at 40 (quoting DWIGHT B. HEATH,
MoURT's RELATION: A JOURNAL OF THE PILGRIMS AT PLYMOUTH 27-28 (1986) ("We
brought sundry of the prettiest things away with us, and covered up the corpse
again.")).
20. James Riding In, Without Ethics and Morality: A Historical Overview of Imperial
Archaeology and American Indians, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11, 15 (1992). This article's
title inspired the title of Part II of this Article.
21. See J.M. ADovAsIo & JAKE PAGE, THE FIRST AMERICANS: IN PURSUIT OF ARCHAE-
OLOGY'S GREATEST MYSTERY 15 (2002).
22. See Riding In, supra note 20, at 16.
23. See ADovAsio & PAGE, supra note 21, at 15.
24. See Riding In, supra note 20, at 16.
25. See id. at 17.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ally have been regarded as enlightened thinkers to set aside their
usual sensibilities where Native American remains are concerned.
Moreover, Jefferson's actions were at odds with his stated beliefs
about Native Americans: "I believe," he wrote in 1785, "the Indian to
be in body and mind equal to the whiteman."26 Although he professed
a belief in Native American equality, he did not see the need for equal
treatment where burials were concerned. In keeping with his interest
in Native Americans, when Jefferson sent Lewis and Clark on their
expedition to explore the land covered by the Louisiana Purchase, he
instructed them to take note of the traditions and customs of the na-
tives they encountered, an instruction that Lewis' medical adviser, Dr.
Benjamin Rush, elaborated on in a detailed questionnaire covering
(among other matters) tribal burial practices. 2 7 Perhaps, then, Lewis
and Clark were just following instructions when they entered a Native
American burial chamber in the Pacific Northwest in October of
1805.28
More extensive and systematic collection of Native American re-
mains geared up in the nineteenth century, spurred by the populariza-
tion of craniology, the study of brain size and skull shape, by Samuel
G. Morton. Morton, a physician who was a seminal figure in the de-
velopment of American physical anthropology, collected large num-
bers of Native American skulls, to support his argument that
measurements of the skulls of Native Americans proved that they
were racially inferior.29 Morton believed that cranial measurements
could be used for race classification and for measuring mental capabil-
ity and a race's level of development. 30 This belief was related to the
26. See AMBROSE, supra note 2, at 55.
27. See President Thomas Jefferson, Instructions to Captain Meriwether Lewis (June
20, 1803), available at http://www.library.csi.cuny.edu/dept/history/lavender/jef-
flet.html (last visited June 2, 2005). See AMBROSE, supra note 2, at 90 (citing I
LETTERS OF THE LEWIS AND CLARK EXPEDITION, WITH RELATED DOCUMENTS:
1783-1854, at 1 (Donald Jackson ed., 1978)).
28. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. Lewis and Clark thus launched the
role of the government in claiming dominion over Indian remains in service of the
imperialist ambitions of the emerging fields of archaeology and anthropology, in
addition to "open[ing] the road to the domination of Indian tribes and to bringing
them and their lands into the American empire." Robert J. Miller, Agents of Em-
pire: Another Look at the Lewis and Clark Expedition, 64 OR. ST. B. BULL. 35
(Feb.-Mar. 2004).
29. See ROBERT E. BIEDER, SCIENCE ENCOUNTERS THE INDIAN, 1820-1880, at 63-64
(1986). Physical anthropology, according to the American Association of Physical
Anthropologists, is "a biological science that deals with the adaptations, variabil-
ity, and evolution of human beings and their living and fossil relatives. Because
it studies human biology in the context of human culture and behavior, physical
anthropology is also a social science." American Association of Physical Anthro-
pologists (Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://www.physanth.org. Physical anthro-
pology is also referred to as biological anthropology.
30. See BIEDER, supra note 29, at 64, 70.
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theory of polygenesis, or "multiple creations," which held that since
the creation of the world there had existed certain varieties of
humans-in effect, separate species-with certain inalienable traits
(including skull forms), that rendered them superior or inferior to
other types of mankind.31
Morton was able to enlist the support of physicians in the western
United States, both those in civilian and in military practice, by hav-
ing them send to him Native American crania, and as a result of the
enthusiastic support that he received Morton was able to build the
largest collection of crania in the United States. 32 Morton and his al-
lies were aware of but indifferent to Native American opposition to the
robbing of their graves, an attitude made abundantly clear in a letter
from a field collector to Morton:
It is rather a perilous business to procure Indians' skulls in this country-
-- The natives are so jealous of you that they watch you very closely
while you are wandering near their mausoleums & instant & sanguinary ven-
geance would fall upon the luckless who would presume to in-
terfere with the sacred relics .... There is an epidemic raging among them
which carries them off so fast that the cemeteries will soon lack watchers-
I don't rejoice in the prospects of death of the poor creatures cer-
tainly, but then you know it will be very convenient for my purposes. 3 3
Morton concluded, after manipulating the data gathered from his
examinations of plundered skulls,34 that Native American crania were
smaller in volume than those of other groups. 35 Because he believed
(incorrectly) that cranial volume directly indicated intelligence, 36 he
opined that Native Americans were less intelligent than members of
groups with larger cranial volumes.3 7 Moreover, he argued that Na-
tive Americans' alleged mental capacity showed them to be at a "low
state of development" that condemned them to "savagery,"38 made
them unable to become part of the civilization with which they had
31. See BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE ATTITUDES AND U.S. IN-
DIAN POLICY 82 (1982). For additional discussion of polygenesis and the compet-
ing theory, monogenesis, see BIEDER, supra note 29, at 89-91, 99-100.
32. See BIEDER, supra note 29, at 64. In addition to army doctors, regular soldiers in
the West and participants in western military expeditions also desecrated graves
and sent Native American crania to interested individuals, including Morton.
See Riding In, supra note 20, at 19.
33. Letter from John Townsend to Samuel G. Morton (Sept. 20, 1835), in BIEDER,
supra note 29, at 66.
34. See BIEDER, supra note 29, at 69 n.28 (citing Stephen J. Gould, Morton's Ranking
of Races by Cranial Capacity: Unconscious Manipulation of Data May be a Scien-
tific Norm, SCIENCE, May 5, 1978, at 503-09) (discussing Stephen J. Gould's ex-
planation of how Morton manipulated his data to reach his conclusion).
35. See id. at 69.
36. See id. at 73 (noting that this view was erroneous).
37. See id. at 69-70.
38. See id. at 70.
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been in contact for over two hundred years, 39 and doomed them to
ultimate extinction.40 Morton believed that God had "retarded [the]
dark races" and accordingly given the white race a superior position,
not only in the United States but around the world:
Was it not for this same mental superiority, these happy climes which we now
inhabit would yet be possessed by the wild and untutored Indian, and that soil
which now rejoices the hearts of millions of freemen, would be yet overrun by
lawless tribes of contending Barbarians. Thus it is that the white race has
been able to plant and sustain its colonies in every region of the habitable
earth. 4 1
Morton's work was widely viewed as giving scientific validity to
white claims of racial superiority, and government policymakers saw
Morton's findings as supporting the relocation of the tribes and the
taking of the land of this dying race.4 2 Relocating Native Americans
to lands west of the Mississippi got them out of the way of settlement
while Euro-Americans waited for "nature to take its course."43 Like
the Puritans who had viewed the diminution in the New England na-
tive population as a sign of God's favoring of their endeavors,4 4 nine-
39. See id. at 70, 73. These sentiments were made clear in a speech that Morton
made before the Boston Society of Natural History in which he offered the follow-
ing analysis of Native Americans:
Their minds seize with avidity on simple truths, while they reject
whatever requires investigation or analysis. Their proximity for more
than two centuries to European communities, has scarcely effected an
appreciable change in the manner of life; and as to their social condition,
they are probably in most respects the same as at the primitive epoch of
their existence.
Id. at 85 (quoting SAMUEL G. MORTON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE DISTINCTIVE CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF THE ABORIGINAL RACE OF AMERICA 13-14 (1842)).
40. See BIEDER, supra note 29, at 85-86. Morton scoffed at those who "influenced
more, perhaps by feeling more than reflection, are unwilling to admit these dif-
ferences among the several races of men" and who refused to accept Indians' "in-
aptitude" for civilization. See id. at 86 (quoting SAMUEL G. MORTON, BRIEF
REMARKS ON THE DIVERSITY OF THE HUMAN SPECIES, AND ON SOME KINDRED SUB-
JECTS 6 (1842) [hereinafter MORTON, BRIEF REMARKS]); id. at 76 (quoting Samuel
G. Morton, Crania Americana: or a Comparative View of the Skulls of Various
Aboriginal Nations of North and South America, 38 AM. J. ScI. & ARTS 341-75
(1840)) ("However much the benevolent mind may regret the inaptitude of the
Indian for civilization, the affirmative of this question seems to be established
beyond a doubt. His moral and physical nature are alike adapted to his position
among the races of men, and it is as reasonable to expect the one to be changed as
the other. The structure of his mind appears to be different from that of the
white man, nor can the two harmonise in their social relations except on the most
limited scale.").
41. Id. at 86 (quoting MORTON, BRIEF REMARKS, supra note 40, at 21-22).
42. See id. at 80; Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 14, at 40.
43. See BIEDER, supra note 29, at 99.
44. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 56-57
(4th ed. 1998) (quoting Chester H. Eisinger, The Puritan's Justification for Tak-
ing the Land, 84 ESSEX INSTITUTE HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 131, 135-43 (1948)
(quoting letter from John Winthrop, Governor, to Roger Williams (1633))).
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teenth century Americans could take comfort in Morton's findings by
reading them as evidence that the expected extinction of the Native
American population was part of a divine plan rather than a result of
their own actions.4 5 In this instance, science (or at least what passed
as science at the time) and religion went hand in hand to support the
seizure of tribal lands, including lands on which tribes' deceased an-
cestors had been at rest for generations.
In addition to promoting policies aimed at taking possession of tri-
bal lands in the East and relocating tribes to lands west of the Missis-
sippi on the basis of views supported by Morton's work, the federal
government also sought to promote the work of Morton and his col-
leagues by making the collecting of Native American crania part of
government policy. In 1868, the Surgeon General of the Army issued
an order that directed army personnel, who had already been collect-
ing skulls on a less formal basis for Morton and others since the early
1800's,46 to obtain Native American skulls and other body parts for
the Army Medical Museum 4 7 for the purpose of aiding "the progress of
anthropological science by obtaining measurements of a large number
of skulls of the aboriginal races of North America."48 The response to
the order was so enthusiastic that over 4,000 heads were collected
pursuant to the order in the following decades. 49 These skulls eventu-
ally became part of the Smithsonian Institution's collection of about
18,500 bodies.50 While some skulls were taken from fresh graves, bur-
ial scaffolds, and burial grounds, in other cases, skulls were taken by
decapitating Native Americans who had never been buried, such as
those who were killed on battlefields or in massacres or who died in
POW camps or army hospitals. 5 1
Anthropologists and ethnologists were not the only academics who
were interested in collecting Native American crania; researchers
45. See BIEDER, supra note 29, at 98. In contrast to Morton's theory, some Christians
espoused monogenesis, believing that all human beings were created together as
part of the same species, and argued that it was therefore possible to "save" Indi-
ans from extinction through "education and Christianity." See, e.g., id. at 91.
46. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
47. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 14, at 40.
48. Riding In, supra note 20, at 19 (quoting Memorandum from C.H. Crane, Assis-
tant Surgeon General, United States Army, to Medical Officers (Sept. 1, 1868)).
49. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 14, at 40.
50. See Riding In, supra note 20, at 23; see also 80 U.S.C. § 80(q)(6)-(7) (2000) (con-
gressional finding, in the National Museum of the American Indian Act, that ap-
proximately 4,000 Native American remains were gathered from battlefields and
burial sites pursuant to the order of the Surgeon General of the Army and even-
tually transferred from the Army Medical Museum to the Smithsonian Institu-
tion, and that the Smithsonian had acquired approximately 14,000 additional
remains through archaeological excavations and individual and museum
donations).
51. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 14, at 40-41; Riding In, supra note 20, at
19-20.
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from other fields also collected skulls as opportunities arose. For ex-
ample, Edward Drinker Cope, a prominent nineteenth century Ameri-
can paleontologist, was not above desecrating Native American
burials during his dinosaur fossil-hunting expeditions on tribal lands.
His description of one incident provides insight into the attitudes of
collectors like Cope toward the remains of Native Americans:
[A] day or so ago I gathered a number of skulls and skeletons of Sioux with a
bag of tools buried with a chief, and brought them to the boat [on the Missouri
River] and boxed them. The uproar it created among the poor white element
that run the lesser offices scared the captain so that he ordered them all taken
back to the place where I obtained them. He . . . said that I had "immolated
the graves of the dead." . . . [Tihe bones had to go. But I have a little bill of
$120 for the bones .... It is not a nice job, taking dirty skulls from skeletons
not carefully prepared, and it is done at some risk to life. So I am indignant
.... 52
Cope's description of this incident highlights not only his vision of Na-
tive American graves and remains as ripe for the picking and not enti-
tled to the respectful treatment afforded Euro-American burials, but
also the elitist undertones of his attitude. The "poor white element"
for whom Cope expressed such contempt apparently recognized the
humanity of the recently disinterred remains that he sought to bring
on the boat and were appalled by the desecration of their resting
place. They were unable to share in the dehumanization and objectifi-
cation of Native American remains that was part and parcel of the
work of Cope and his colleagues.
For many other Americans, however, the collecting of Native
American skulls in the name of science legitimized the desecration of
tribal burial sites and the mutilation of Native American remains, and
led them to envision deceased Native Americans as objects of curiosity
to be collected by those whose careers so required.5 3 This spawned a
tradition of grave-looting and collecting of remains and burial offer-
ings by amateurs, often referred to as "pothunters," which continues
to this day. 54 In addition to these amateur collection efforts, universi-
52. HENRY F. OSBORN, COPE: MASTER NATURALIST: THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF ED-
WARD DRINKER COPE WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF His WRITINGS CLASSIFIED BY SUB-
JECT 230-31 (1931) (quoting letter from Edward Cope to his sister (Oct. 21, 1876))
(emphasis added). Cope was apparently more fortunate with "about a dozen
other skulls that [he had] packed in with the fossils" that he had collected. See
CHARLES H. STERNBERG, THE LIFE OF A FOSSIL HUNTER 95 (photo. reprint 1978)
(1909) (citing conversation between Edward Cope and Charles Sternberg).
53. See Riding In, supra note 20, at 20.
54. See, e.g., Julie Cart, Feds Fight Back Against Looters; Market Hot for Indian Arti-
facts, DENVER POST, May 25, 2001, at A34. One long-term "pothunter" was Earl
K. Shumway, who claimed to have "been digging artifacts from public lands ever
since he was a child" and to have "looted sites thousands of times." He was con-
victed of violating the Archaeological Resources Protection Act. See Joe Co-
stanzo, Appeals Court Orders Resentencing of Artifact Hunter, DESERET NEWS,
May 7, 1997, at B04. For a discussion of the difficulty of monitoring archaeologi-
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ties and state historical societies sent out collecting parties of archae-
ologists to survey and excavate Native American ruins and burial
sites, and took away "thousands of human remains [and] innumerable
burial objects" to build their collections.55 The development of univer-
sity classes and degree programs in archaeology meant that increas-
ing numbers of would-be collectors were sent out for the express
purpose of desecrating Native American graves and collecting Native
American remains, all in the name of science and without any concern
that such a practice was immoral or unethical.56
Systematic desecration of Native American graves by archaeolo-
gists, anthropologists, and others, oblivious to the objections of Native
Americans, continued unabated into the twentieth century. Moreover,
as was the case with Samuel Morton, recognized leaders in these
fields were particularly active and unapologetic collectors. Franz
Boas, considered to be the father of cultural anthropology, complained
that stealing bones from graves is unpleasant work, but concluded
that he had to be philosophical about it: "[W]hat is the use, someone
has to do it."57 While visiting British Columbia in the 1880s, Boas pro-
fessed friendship for the Native Canadians he met and an interest in
their oral traditions, while secretly stealing corpses, which he hoped to
sell for profit. 58
Some of the most chilling incidents involving the taking of Native
American bodies from burial sites were generated by the activities of
the Smithsonian Institution's own Ales Hrdlicka, as he was building
his reputation as the "patriarch" of American physical anthropology.5 9
Hrdlicka spent forty years at the Smithsonian, during which time he
served as Curator of the Division of Physical Anthropology, founded
the American Journal of Physical Anthropology, and amassed the
world's most complete collection of human bones.6o He collected Na-
cal sites on federal lands and of the magnitude of the looting problem, see gener-
ally Carol Carnett, Brief 11: Legal Background of Archaeological Resources
Protection, DOI Departmental Consulting ArcheologistlNPS Archeology and Eth-
nography Program (1991), available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/PUBS/
TECHBR/tchllpr.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
55. See Riding In, supra note 20, at 21.
56. Id. at 21-22.
57. See id. at 22 (quoting THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF FRANz BOAS 88 (Ronald P. Rohner
ed., 1969)).
58. See id.
59. See Thomas W. Killion & Tamara L. Bray, Looking Toward Larsen Bay: Evolving
Attitudes at the Smithsonian Institution, in RECKONING WITH THE DEAD: THE LAR-
SEN BAY REPATRIATION PROJECT AND THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION 3, 3 (Tamara
L. Bray & Thomas W. Killion eds., 1994) [hereinafter RECKONING WITH THE
DEAD].
60. See Minnesota State University, Mankato, Ales Hrdlicka, 1869-1943, available
at http:/www.mnsu.edu/emuseum/informationlbiography/fghij/hrdlickaales.
html (last visited Aug. 5, 2005); see also ADovAsio & PAGE, supra note 21, at
95-97 (discussing Hrdlicka's background and career).
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tive Alaskans' remains during the 1920s and 1930s,61 in pursuit of
evidence, which he believed could be derived from human crania's
physical characteristics, to support his personal theory as to the arri-
val of humans in the Americas. 6 2 He was almost exclusively inter-
ested in collecting crania, and was "generally unconcerned with the
archaeological history of the places he excavated."63 Hrdlicka's deter-
mination to collect remains was so great that in one of his projects
alone, the Larsen Bay project on Kodiak Island, he collected the re-
mains of about 1,000 individuals.64
Hrdlicka excavated not only old burial sites, but also carried off
recently buried bodies, such as those of the victims of a 1918 influenza
epidemic, 65 without permission and despite community opposition.66
While plundering one grave, for example, he noticed "an old woman
who appeared to be provoked at something and was talking rather
loudly," and learned that "the old woman claimed the bones to be
those of her long departed husband."67 This kind of encounter simply
prompted Hrdlicka to better conceal his activities, as his description of
a 1926 Yukon River excavation demonstrates:
Some of the burials are quite recent. Open three older ones. In two the re-
mains are too fresh yet, but secure a good female skeleton, which I pack in a
practically new heavy pail, thrown out probably on the occasion of the last
funeral. Then back, farther out, to avoid notice, through swamps and over
moss ... "68
His concealment efforts were not always successful, as he noted in re-
counting another 1926 excavation. He had tried to hide bones that he
had just dug up in his boat and to "strike off as far as possible from the
shore so none could see what is carried," but noticed that an "old In-
61. See Gordon L. Pullar, The Qikertarmiut and the Scientist: Fifty Years of Clashing
World Views 21, in RECKONING WITH THE DEAD, supra note 59, at 15, 21.
62. See Killion & Bray, supra note 59, at 3.
63. See id. at 4.
64. Id. at 6. The Larsen Bay remains, which the people of Larsen Bay sought to have
repatriated from the Smithsonian's Department of Anthropology beginning in
1987, "included 756 sets of skeletal remains, comprising an estimated 1,000 indi-
viduals, and 95 lots of associated funerary objects." See id. at 5-6. The remains
ranged in age "from one to several thousand years old." Id. at 5. They were even-
tually returned to Kodiak Island and reburied, with Russian Orthodox rites, in
1991. Id. at 6. For the struggle for the repatriation of the remains, see generally
RECKONING WITH THE DEAD, supra note 59.
65. See Pullar, supra note 61, at 21.
66. See Henry J. Sockbeson, The Larsen Bay Repatriation Case and Common Errors
of Anthropologists, in RECKONING WITH THE DEAD, supra note 59, at 158, 160.
67. Pullar, supra note 61, at 21 (quoting Ales Hrdlicka, The Ancient and Modern In-
habitants of the Yukon, in SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, EXPLORATIONS AND FIELD-
WORK OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION IN 1929, at 137, 139 (1930)).
68. Pullar, supra note 61, at 22 (quoting ALES HRDLICKA, ANTHROPOLOGICAL SURVEy
IN ALASKA 76 (1930)).
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dian and his crone nevertheless stand on the bank and look at us.
They know already."69
Hrdlicka had no qualms about examining even the remains of indi-
viduals whom he had known in life. In 1897, he met and examined six
Inuits7 O whom Polar explorer and entrepreneur Robert Peary had just
brought from Greenland to New York City, where they were initially
housed in the American Museum of Natural History's basement. 7 1
When four of them died within a two-month period in 1898, Hrdlicka
was able to examine the corpse of one of them, a man named Qisuk,
and to obtain the deceased man's brain for study.72 For men like Hr-
dlicka, "one brief but final breath separate[d] a human curiosity from
a scientific specimen," 73 and whether alive or dead the Inuits did not
receive the degree of respect to which Euro-Americans were entitled.
Despite a state statute requiring that all dead human bodies "be de-
cently buried within a reasonable period of time after death,"74
Qisuk's skeleton was exhibited in the museum, as his son Minik, who
had accompanied Qisuk to New York City and had been eight years
old when his father died,75 was horrified to learn ten years after his
father's death.76 In short, museum officials refused to treat the body
69. Pullar, supra note 61, at 21-22 (quoting ALES HRDLICKA, ALASKA DIARY
1926-1931, at 56 (1943)).
70. See KENN HARPER, GIvE ME My FATHER'S BODY: THE LIFE OF MINIK, THE NEW
YORK ESKIMO 91-92 (Washington Square Press 2001) (1986).
71. See id. at 15-20 (describing the six Inuits), 21-23 (describing their arrival in New
York City in 1897 and Peary's reasons for bringing them), 29 (noting they were
first housed in the basement), 68 (describing Peary's lucrative trading activities).
Peary was also comfortable with collecting the bodies of Inuit men, women, and
children whom he had met, including ones "he knew by name." See id. at 22, 27,
69.
72. See id. at 91-92. The brain was the subject of an article that Hrdlicka published
in 1901, entitled "An Eskimo Brain." See id. at 92, 246 (citing Ales Hrdlicka, An
Eskimo Brain, 3 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 454 (1901)).
73. Id. at 91.
74. See id. at 95. When an 11-year-old Inuit girl, who had been brought to New York
City by a fur trader, died and the New York Tribune announced that her body
would be preserved and donated to the Museum of Natural History "as a speci-
men of the race," a letter to the editor "questioned the legitimacy" of this plan in
light of the New York statute. See id. at 95 (citing NEW YORK TRIBUNE, June 15,
1899, at 10; NEW YORK TRIBUNE, June 14, 1899). The response from the scientific
community was simply that the child's body would be "an interesting study" and
that they were free to do what they pleased with it. See id. at 95 (citing NEW
YORK TRIBUNE, June 17, 1899, at 16).
75. See id. at 96. A newspaper account at the time explained that the body would be
dissected by students at Bellevue Hospital and then the skeleton would be
mounted and preserved in the American Museum of Natural History. See id. at
85.
76. See id. at 83-85 (quoting Minik, the Esquimau boy, WORLD, Jan. 6, 1907, at 3),
96-97 (describing the conflicting accounts of Minik and his foster father, William
Wallace, as to how Minik learned of the fate of Qisuk's body). Minik was shocked
not only because of the disrespect that was shown by this display of his father's
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of Qisuk, or of any of the other deceased Inuits, 77 as that of a human
being, whose fundamental dignity in death would be protected by the
statutory burial requirement. If prominent anthropologists treated
recently deceased Native Americans with so little dignity, then it is
small wonder that it became accepted practice within the profession to
treat the skeletal remains of earlier Native Americans, including
those dating to antiquity, with little respect.
This, then, is the backdrop against which the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, commonly referred to as
NAGPRA, was proposed and became law. From the earliest contacts
between Native Americans and Euro-Americans, the bodies of de-
ceased Native Americans were treated as mere objects to be used to
satisfy Euro-American curiosity. In the name of science, they were
denied the respectful treatment that the law, as well as basic human
decency, required to be afforded to the physical remains of deceased
human beings. Moreover, these practices were bound up with the be-
lief that the racial inferiority of Native Americans condemned them to
extinction. They were a dying race, anthropologists were convinced,
and this view was shared by others, from government officials to
would-be settlers. As a result, everything that belonged to Native
Americans, from their land to the very bodies of their deceased family
members, was available for taking.
NAGPRA was designed to put a stop to the theft of Native Ameri-
can remains and cultural objects on federal and tribal lands that was
being carried out in the name of science, and to return remains and
objects that had previously been taken to those to whom they right-
fully belonged. NAGPRA's fundamental task was, in effect, to elevate
the remains of deceased Native Americans to the level of humanity,
that they might no longer be subjected to the kind of treatment that
American law generally permitted for only non-human remains.
Moreover, NAGPRA represented an acknowledgment that the stories
of the Native Americans' imminent demise had been greatly exagger-
body, but also because museum scientists had staged a fake funeral, complete
with a body-sized log draped with a cloth and mask, for Minik's benefit at the
time of Qisuk's death, so Minik believed that Qisuk had been buried. See id. at
86-87. This was done, according to anthropologist Franz Boas, to keep Minik
"from discovering that his father's body had been chopped up and the bones
placed in the collection of the institution." Id. at 88 (quoting Prof. Boas Defends
the Fake Funeral, THE EVENING MAIL, Apr. 24, 1909, at 4). Attempts by Minik
and his foster father to recover Qisuk's body were rebuffed by museum officials.
See id. at 111-16. In 1993, the remains of Qisuk and the other four Inuits were at
last returned to Greenland and buried. See id. at 227-28. Minik himself died in
New Hampshire in 1918 and was buried there. See id. at 229.
77. The bodies of all four of the Inuits were dissected and then added to the collection
of the American Museum of Natural History, following maceration of the bones.
See id. at 89-90 (describing the disposition of the bodies), 58-59 (describing the
maceration process).
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ated. They were not a dying race. Rather, they had survived, as Na-
tive Americans, despite the ravages of war, disease, relocation, and
forced assimilation efforts. Moreover, they had survived as tribes, de-
spite efforts to destroy tribalism and tribes' political authority through
various government policies, including outright termination. The
choice of the term "repatriation" in NAGPRA is itself significant, as it
literally refers to a return to a country of birth or citizenship; the same
term can be used to refer to the return of living prisoners of war.
Under NAGPRA, Native Americans were at last recognized, as indi-
viduals and collectively as tribes, as having the legal right to claim
the human remains and cultural objects that, as history showed,
Euro-American anthropologists and other collectors had so long re-
garded as their own. This history, which NAGPRA sought to repudi-
ate, must be kept in mind when analyzing the opinion of the Ninth
Circuit panel in Bonnichsen.
Finally, it is only in light of this history that contemporary tribes'
views of the work, and of the intentions, of anthropologists, archaeolo-
gists, and other researchers can be understood. Today's anthropolo-
gists and archaeologists may well argue that the history of their
professions' highhanded and racist treatment of indigenous peoples
and their remains has no relevance today, and should not be held
against contemporary practitioners in these fields. It is indeed true
that these disciplines have made strides in seeking to gain some un-
derstanding of, and in demonstrating some respect for, Native Ameri-
can perspectives and rights with respect to human remains.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Native Americans continue to live
with the legacy of this history, as they fight for repatriation of wrongly
taken remains and cultural objects. And as they encounter contempo-
rary claims like those of the Bonnichsen plaintiffs, from their perspec-
tive it may well appear that some fundamental aspects of the dealings
between Native Americans and anthropologists and archaeologists
have changed little since the eighteenth century. Members of these
same professions still claim to be entitled to access to remains of
human beings whom Native Americans regard as their kin, in order to
handle and measure them, and still argue that Native Americans' per-
spectives and claims should be subordinated to their own. In short,
Native Americans may not be able to discern that any profound
change has occurred to distinguish today's anthropologists and ar-
chaeologists from their professional forbears. From the perspective of
those who must continue to try to defend ancestral remains against
the demands of "science," Lewis and Clark in the early nineteenth
century, Morton later in the nineteenth century, Hrdlicka in the twen-
tieth century, and the Bonnichsen plaintiffs of today can be seen as
having much more in common than the plaintiffs are ever likely to
appreciate and acknowledge.
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III. LET MY PEOPLE GO: THE NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVES
PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION ACT AND ITS
APPLICATION TO THE ANCIENT ONE
The initial viewing of the remains was shocking. The majority of these re-
mains consisted of skulls stained with dried blood .... A long moment of
silence-broken by sounds of crying-took place prior to the actual preparation
of each human remain for burial.... [Tihough not an elder, [I] was selected to
handle the remains of a young female victim .... I hugged and kissed the
remains of that young girl prior to placing her in the cedar box .... By late
afternoon, the last cedar box was sealed.... Our people were finally coming
home. After 100 years of unrest, they would be given back to the Mother Earth
and allowed to complete their journey to the spirit world.78
A. Understanding NAGPRA and its Key Goals
NAGPRA was enacted in 1990 after the consideration of several
related bills by both the House of Representatives and the Senate and
following the conclusion of a process that involved extensive hearings,
in which many pages of testimony were taken from Native Americans,
museum officials, and other interested parties in the scientific commu-
nity. 7 9 Several key goals and characteristics of NAGPRA must be ac-
knowledged in order to understand the statute and how it should be
interpreted and implemented. The more judges, agency officials, and
others lose sight of what NAGPRA was designed to respond to and to
accomplish, the greater the risk of misinterpretations of the text of,
and mistakes in implementation of, the statute.
First, NAGPRA represented a repudiation of the objectification of
Native American remains and of the practice of treating Native Amer-
ican remains and cultural items as objects that were, in essence, avail-
able for plunder. It was also an attempt to repair some of the damage
that had resulted from this practice, by requiring the return of re-
mains and cultural items from federal and federally funded institu-
tions to the appropriate Native American individual or tribe.
NAGPRA therefore must be understood as remedial legislation, which
must be construed broadly in order "to give full effect to its purpose."8 0
78. Connie Hart Yellowman, "Naevahoo'Ohtseme'--We Are Going Back Home: The
Cheyenne Repatriation of Human Remains-A Woman's Perspective, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 103, 110-11 (1996) (describing the repatriation to the Cheyenne
of victims of the 1864 Sand Creek Massacre).
79. For example, in the May 14, 1990 hearing on two Senate bills, S. 1021 and S.
1980, the Committee on Indian Affairs heard testimony "from several profes-
sional associations of archaeologists and anthropologists, representatives of sev-
eral museums with Native American collections, private art dealers and tribal
leaders." S. REP. No. 101-473, at 3 (1990).
80. See Maura A. Flood, "Kennewick Man" or "Ancient One"?-A Matter of Interpreta-
tion, 63 MoNT. L. REv. 39, 71-73 (2002) (discussing the remedial purpose canon of
statutory construction and its role in interpreting NAGPRA).
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Secondly, NAGPRA must be understood as the human rights legis-
lation, and civil rights legislation, that those who contributed to its
drafting and its supporters intended it to be. It was intended to pro-
vide Native Americans with the respectful, dignified treatment for
their dead that was given as a matter of course to Euro-Americans,
and with legal rights equal to those of Euro-Americans with respect to
their dead.81 NAGPRA did not give special treatment to Native Amer-
icans, but rather endeavored to give them the equal treatment that
had long been denied them.
Thirdly, NAGPRA is undeniably Native American, or, in other
words, Indian, legislation. The Act's very title demonstrates this. The
inclusion of the statute in Title 25 of the U.S. Code, entitled "Indians,"
indicates this common understanding. The Act also explicitly states
that it "reflects the unique relationship between the Federal Govern-
ment and Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations."82 It was
enacted to protect Native American graves, and to require the repatri-
ation of Native American human remains and other items, to Native
Americans, in recognition of Native American rights. Unlike statutes
like the Antiquities Act of 1906 and the Archaeological Resources Pro-
tection Act ("ARPA"), which establish procedures to allow access by
researchers and are codified in Title 16, the "Conservation" section of
81. The Senate Report explained that the Panel for a National Dialogue on Museum/
Native American Relations had found that "the process for determining the ap-
propriate disposition and treatment of Native American human remains . ..
should be governed by respect for Native human rights" and stated that "human
remains must at all times be accorded dignity and respect." S. REP. No. 101-473,
at 2. Tribal witnesses testified that when they tried to reclaim human remains
and other items that had been improperly alienated from their tribes, they met
"resistance from museums." Id. at 3. Also, illegal excavation of graves on federal
and tribal lands and looting of their contents continued. Id. at 4. Testimony was
also given about instances in which Native American human remains and funer-
ary objects were treated differently from how other human remains were treated
by museums. Id. at 5. See Sherry Hutt & C. Timothy McKeown, Control of Cul-
tural Property as Human Rights Law, 31 ARiz. ST. L.J. 363, 366 (1999) (noting
that until the late 1980s, unmarked graves and burials outside established ceme-
teries "of European religious institutions generally did not receive protection
from state burial laws"); Christopher Smith, Attorney General's Office Incensed by
'Racist' Grave-Robbing Ruling; Anasazi Graves No Different, State to Argue, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Aug. 31, 1997, at Al (describing the Utah Attorney General's Office's
incredulous reaction to a Utah judge's ruling that Utah's grave-robbing statute
did not protect ancient Indian remains); see also Hutt & McKeown, supra, at 372
(explaining that the rights recognized in NAGPRA are consistent with existing
rights that were already enjoyed by non-Native Americans and that "[w]hen a
law confers no special benefit, but rather equalizes the legal landscape, it is rec-
ognized as civil rights legislation"); Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the
Past: Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary Cultural Values, 31 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 583, 641-42 (1999) (discussing the "equal protection argument" supporting
the enactment of NAGPRA).
82. 25 U.S.C. § 3010 (2000).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the U.S. Code,83 NAGPRA focuses on protecting Native American
tribes and individuals against the past and present conduct of re-
searchers and other collectors of human remains and cultural items.
As Indian legislation, enacted in the context of the trust relationship
described below, NAGPRA must be interpreted and applied in light of
the canons of construction that the U.S. Supreme Court and lower
courts have long utilized in Indian law decisions. Thus, NAGPRA is to
be construed liberally in the Indians' favor, any ambiguities are to be
resolved for their benefit, and the statute should be interpreted as In-
dians would understand it. These canons-the liberal construction,
ambiguity, and Indian understanding canons-are of long standing
and the Supreme Court and lower courts continue to rely upon
them.84
Fourthly, NAGPRA must be construed in light of the trust relation-
ship between tribes and the federal government, and the federal re-
sponsibilities that it entails. It is to the trust relationship that
NAGPRA refers when it speaks of the "unique relationship" between
tribes and the federal government. In the past, the government has
not fully honored this relationship where human remains and cultural
objects were concerned. As Part II revealed, the government not only
failed to protect tribal rights with respect to remains, funerary objects,
and other items, but itself participated in actions that violated those
rights, such as takings from tribal lands without consent. Indeed, the
government amassed its own considerable collection of the kinds of
items that NAGPRA acknowledged should be subject to tribal con-
trol.85 NAGPRA embodied a commitment by the government to recog-
nize its protective responsibilities in this area and to try to undo at
83. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2000) (Antiquities Act); id. § 470aa-mm (Archaeologi-
cal Resources Protection Act).
84. For a brief discussion of these canons, which were developed in the context of
construing Indian treaties, see GETCHES ET AL., supra note 44, at 129-31 (quoting
Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Ab-
rogation: "As Long as the Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How
Long a Time is that?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 608-19 (1975)). The Supreme Court,
for example, relied on the three canons in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chip-
pewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 194 n.5, 196, 200 (1999), and the liberal construction
canon was applied to NAGPRA by a federal district court in Yankton Sioux Tribe
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1056 (D.S.D.
2000). See Flood, supra note 80, at 60, 73-74 (discussing the use of the canons in
construing NAGPRA).
85. NAGPRA exempted the government's considerable collection in the Smithsonian
from the Act's coverage. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(4) (excepting the Smithsonian from
the definition of the term "federal agency"). This collection was, however, subject
to inventory and repatriation provisions in a previously enacted statute. Na-
tional Museum of the American Indian Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-185, 103 Stat.
133b (1989) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q-1 to 80q-15 (2000 & Supp. II
2001-2003)).
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least some of the damage that had resulted from its past failure to
carry them out.
Finally, it must be understood that the DOI was given the key ad-
ministrative role with respect to the implementation of NAGPRA, as
indicated by the statutory instruction to "promulgate regulations."8 6
This preeminent role for the DOI seems altogether fitting, given the
key role that the DOI plays in Indian affairs and policy within the
federal government. The Bureau of Indian Affairs is housed within
the DOI, and the DOI thus has the most active role in carrying out the
trust responsibility among the executive branch departments. Moreo-
ver, much of the federal land covered by NAGPRA on which Native
American remains might be found is subject to the authority of the
DOI and its sub-agencies, such as the National Park Service and the
Bureau of Land Management. The DOI's special role in this area was
recognized in the decision of the Army Corps of Engineers to transfer
decision making authority as to the Kennewick remains to the DOI.87
B. Parsing the Statute-The Who, What, When, and Where
of NAGPRA
The Bonnichsen litigation has focused not only on the actions re-
quired, and actions prohibited, by NAGPRA, but also on the more fun-
damental question of whether the Act applies at all. Answering this
question requires careful focus on the definitions included in NAG-
PRA. NAGPRA establishes ownership priorities and excavation per-
mission requirements for "Native American cultural items" that are
excavated or discovered on "Federal or tribal lands" after November
16, 1990.88 Thus, in order to be protected by these NAGPRA provi-
sions, items discovered after the statute's effectiveness date must: (1)
be found on land that is subject to the statute; (2) fall within the defi-
nition of "cultural items"; and (3) be "Native American."
1. Definitions and Coverage
NAGPRA protects covered items that are found on "Federal lands,"
defined to include any land (other than tribal land) that is controlled
or owned by the United States,8 9 and tribal land,90 which includes all
86. 25 U.S.C. § 3011.
87. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
88. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a).
89. Id. § 3001(5). The NAGPRA regulations state that lands under federal control
refers to "those lands not owned by the United States but in which the United
States has a legal interest sufficient to permit it to apply these regulations with-
out abrogating the otherwise existing legal rights of a person." 43 C.F.R.
§ 10.2(f)(1) (2004).
90. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (referring to ownership or control of Native American cul-
tural items that are excavated or discovered on federal or tribal lands).
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lands within Indian reservation boundaries. 9 1 The Ancient One's re-
mains were discovered in an area that was under the management
authority of the Army Corps of Engineers,9 2 and therefore were found
on land subject to NAGPRA.
The term "cultural items" refers to human remains, along with
funerary objects, sacred objects, and cultural patrimony.93 "Funerary
objects" are objects that are believed to have been placed with human
remains as part of a death rite or ceremony. 94 "Sacred objects" are
ceremonial objects that "are needed by traditional Native American
religious leaders for the practice of traditional Native American reli-
gions by their present day adherents." 95 NAGPRA thus requires that
there be a link between sacred objects and contemporary Native
Americans in order for them to be covered by the statute, while not
stating that a similar link must be established for human remains or
funerary objects. The House Report indicated that Congress was
aware that certain ceremonies may not have been performed for some
91. Id. § 3001(15)(A). The term "tribal land" also includes "all dependent Indian com-
munities . . . [and] any lands administered for the benefit of Native Hawaiians
pursuant to the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, and section 4 of Public
Law 86-3." Id. § 3001(15)(B)-(C); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) (including de-
pendent Indian communities in the definition of "Indian country"). For a discus-
sion of the means that are available to provide at least some protection for human
remains and cultural resources that are found on privately owned land, see gen-
erally Constance M. Callahan, Warp and Weft: Weaving a Blanket of Protection
for Cultural Resources Found on Private Property, 23 ENVTL. L. 1323 (1993).
92. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 614, 618 n.2 (D. Or. 1997). NAG-
PRA provides that when a person "knows, or has reason to know" that he or she
has discovered Native American human remains on federal lands, the discoverer
must notify in writing the head of the department, agency, or other instrumental-
ity with "primary management authority" with respect to the lands in question.
25 U.S.C. § 3002(d)(1).
93. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3). The statute offers definitions for two kinds of funerary ob-
jects (namely, associated and unassociated funerary objects, which are distin-
guished on the basis of whether or not the remains with which the objects were
placed are in the possession of a federal agency or museum), sacred objects, and
cultural patrimony. See id. The statute itself does not define the term "human
remains," presumably because it was considered to be largely self-explanatory,
but the NAGPRA regulations do provide a definition: "Human remains means
the physical remains of the body of a person of Native American ancestry." 43
C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(1). The regulation excepts from the definition "remains or por-
tions of remains that may reasonably be determined to have been freely given or
naturally shed by the individual from whose body they were obtained, such as
hair made into ropes or nets" and provides that "human remains incorporated
into a funerary object, sacred object, or object of cultural patrimony ... must be
considered as part of that item" for the purpose of making a "cultural affiliation"
determination. 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(1).
94. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(A)-(B). Funerary objects are termed "associated funerary ob-
jects" if the human remains with which they were placed are held by a federal
agency or museum. See id. § 3001(3)(A).
95. Id. § 3001(3)(C).
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time because of government coercion, social upheaval, or unconsented
loss of sacred objects, but this gap in ceremonial performance and us-
age was not to be a basis for refusing to return sacred objects to pre-
sent day religious practitioners.96 Finally, "cultural patrimony"
embraces objects with an "ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural
importance to the Native American group or culture itself," which
therefore "cannot be alienated by any individual."9 7
The Ancient One's remains unquestionably belong to a human be-
ing and they thus fit within the statutory definition of cultural items.
The more contentious issue, as discussed below, 98 turned out to be
whether the remains would be considered "Native American" for pur-
poses of NAGPRA-in other words, whether they were related to "a
tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the United States."99
The term "indigenous" is not defined in either the statute or the regu-
lations, and is not discussed in the House and Senate reports. As dis-
cussed below, on the basis of radiocarbon dating of bone samples
(indicating a clearly pre-Columbian date), other information about,
and analyses of, the remains, and sedimentary, lithic, and geomorpho-
logic analyses, the DOI concluded that the Kennewick remains were
"'Native American,' as defined by NAGPRA."100 This conclusion has
been supported by the Society for American Archaeology ("SAA"), the
leading professional society of archaeologists focusing on archaeology
in the Americas. 10 1 The courts in the Bonnichsen case, however, de-
cided otherwise.102
2. Ownership and Control Priorities
In situations in which human remains (and other cultural items)
are determined to be Native American and are excavated or discov-
ered on federal lands, they are subject to the ownership and control
priorities of section 3002 of NAGPRA.103 The first ownership priority
96. H.R. No. 101-877, at 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4376.
97. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D).
98. See infra subsection IV.B.3.
99. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9).
100. Letter from Francis P. McManamon, U.S. Department of Interior Consulting Ar-
chaeologist, to Donald J. Barry, Assistant U.S. Secretary of the Interior for Fish
and Wildlife and Parks (Jan. 11, 2000) (determining that the "Kennewick Human
Skeletal Remains are 'Native American' for the [plurposes of the Native Ameri-
can Graves Protection and Repatriation Act"), at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/ken-
newick/cl4memo.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter DOI Final
Determination].
101. See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Society for American Archaeology's
Amicus Curiae Submission at 1, Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp.2d
1116 (D. Or. 2002) (CV 96-1481-JE) [hereinafter SAA Brief].
102. See infra subsection IV.B.3.
103. NAGPRA seems to intend the term "control," in the phrase "ownership and con-
trol," to refer to rights in human remains, while using both the terms "control"
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belongs to "the lineal descendants of the Native American"l0 4 whose
remains are at issue. If lineal descendants cannot be identified, then
the next priority for ownership is given to the Indian tribe on whose
tribal land the remains were found, followed by the Indian tribe that
has the closest cultural affiliation with the remains.105 NAGPRA de-
fines "Indian tribe" to include only groups, including Alaska Native
villages, that have been federally recognized.106 Finally, if the re-
mains' cultural affiliation cannot be determined and the remains were
discovered on federal land that is part of a tribe's aboriginal land, then
ownership is in that tribe, unless it can be shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that another tribe has a stronger cultural relationship
with the remains and as a result is entitled to priority. 10 7 The statute
makes it clear that tribal views on whether or not to accept return of a
covered item are to control by acknowledging that a tribal government
could expressly relinquish ownership of human remains and other cul-
tural items.10 8
In applying the first priority, where ownership is given to the de-
ceased Native American's lineal descendants, the NAGPRA regula-
tions define "lineal descendant" as "an individual tracing his or her
ancestry directly and without interruption by means of the traditional
and "ownership" (as well as the related term "title") to refer to other cultural
items. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002(e) ("control over any Native American human re-
mains, or title to or control over any funerary object, or sacred object"). This ap-
proach is in accord with the common law principle that human remains are not
subject to full scale ownership, but rather the next of kin of the deceased has a
"'quasi-property' interest" in the remains, which gives the "next of kin the right to
determine the treatment and disposition of the remains." Tsosie, supra note 81,
at 634 (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Welch, 82 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1936);
Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 880 (Pa. 1904)). For ease of reference, the term
.ownership" alone is used in the following discussion.
104. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(1).
105. Id. § 3002(a)(2)(A)-(B). "Indian tribe" is defined as "any tribe, band, nation, or
other organized group or community of Indians... which is recognized as eligible
for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians
because of their status as Indians." Id. § 3001(7). These provisions also refer to
Native Hawaiian organizations and recognize them as being entitled to the same
priorities as tribes under section 3002. See id. § 3002(a)(2).
106. Id. § 3001(7) (any tribe "recognized as eligible for the special programs and ser-
vices provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as
Indians").
107. Id. § 3002(a)(2)(C). The aboriginal land priority refers to "Federal land that is
recognized by a final judgment of the Indian Claims Commission or the United
States Court of Claims as the aboriginal land of some Indian tribe." Id.
108. See id. § 3002(e) ("Nothing in this section shall prevent the governing body of an
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization from expressly relinquishing con-
trol over any Native American human remains, or title to or control over any
funerary object, or sacred object."). Similarly, ownership by a tribe on the basis of
the cultural affiliation or aboriginal land priorities is dependent upon a tribe hav-
ing stated a claim for the item at issue, after receiving notice. See id.
§ 3002(a)(2)(B)-(C).
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kinship system of the appropriate Indian tribe.., or by the common
law system of descendance to a known Native American individual
whose remains . . . are being claimed."10 9 The "earlier person" whose
remains are at issue must "be identified as an individual whose de-
scendants can be traced.1 1o The present day claimant's lineal de-
scent "must be established by a preponderance of the evidence."1 1 ' In
the case of the Kennewick remains, the DOI determined that "given
the very ancient date" of the remains there were no present day lineal
descendants, without elaborating. 112 Thus, even though the regula-
tions dealing with this priority allow for traditional kinship systems to
be utilized in establishing descendancy, this seeming openness to Na-
tive American understandings of kinship, which might include a more
inclusive understanding of descendancy, did not affect the disposition
of the Kennewick remains. The tribal claimants' attorneys-perhaps
daunted by the requirement that ancestry be traced "directly and
without interruption"-apparently focused on the cultural affiliation
and aboriginal lands priorities as the basis for the tribes' legal claim,
while also referring to the Ancient One as the tribes' ancestor.
The second ownership priority belongs to the tribe on whose tribal
land the remains were discovered. NAGPRA defines "tribal land" to
include land within reservation boundaries. 113 In other words, it does
not encompass all aboriginal land of a tribe, but rather its current res-
ervation land, which may overlap with its aboriginal land or be lo-
cated elsewhere. Because the Kennewick remains were not found on
land that fits within this definition, but rather on federal land,114 no
tribe was entitled to claim the remains on the basis of this second
priority.115
NAGPRA's third priority is granted to the tribe with the "closest
cultural affiliation" with the remains. NAGPRA defines cultural affil-
109. 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(b)(1) (2004).
110. Id. § 10.14(b).
111. Id. § 10.14(f).
112. DOI Final Determination, supra note 100. A non-tribal claimant of Polynesian
ancestry, Joseph Siofele, did make such a claim but his motion to intervene in the
case was dismissed. See Siofele v. United States, 87 Fed. Appx. 654 (9th Cir.
2003); see also generally Notice of Motion and Motion of Joseph P. Siofele, AKA
Paramount Chieftain Faumuina, to Intervene as Plaintiff as a Matter of Right,
Siofele v. United States, 87 Fed. Appx. 654 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 96-1481-JE), at
http://www.saa.org(Repatriation/siofelemotion.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). An
ancestry-based claim was also filed but later abandoned by a group called the
Asatru Folk Assembly, which stated that it represented Asatru, "one of the major
indigenous, pre-Christian, European religions." Bonnichsen v. United States,
217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122 n.10 (D. Or. 2002).
113. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(15).
114. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 614, 618 n.2 (D. Or. 1997).
115. See DOI Final Determination, supra note 100, at 3 ("[A] claim brought for the
custody of the Kennewick human remains based upon its excavation or removal
from tribal lands ... cannot be validated.").
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iation as "a relationship of shared group identity which can be reason-
ably traced historically between a present day Indian tribe.., and an
identifiable earlier group."116 The statutory language does not re-
quire that the contemporary tribe and the earlier group be identical in
all respects; presumably there must be some degree of cultural simi-
larity. By referring to the "closest cultural affiliation," the statute in-
dicates that Congress contemplated that there might be more than
one present day tribe sharing some degree of group identity with the
earlier group, and concluded that priority should be given to which-
ever tribe had the closest cultural affiliation. Although the section es-
tablishing ownership priorities for newly discovered remains and
other items does not discuss the process of determining cultural affili-
ation, the NAGPRA provision dealing with repatriation of items from
existing collections, section 3005, indicates that a cultural affiliation
determination is to be "based upon geographical, kinship, biological,
archaeological, anthropological, linguistic, folkloric, oral traditional,
historical, or other relevant information or expert opinion."117 The
statute does not present these sources of information in a hierarchical
fashion as it did with the ownership and control priorities, which sug-
gests that Congress saw them as having equal relevance and signifi-
cance. The standard to be used in the cultural affiliation
determination is a preponderance of the evidence,118 and therefore
"scientific certainty"-a concept that does not seem to fit with social
science fields like anthropology and archaeology anyway-is not re-
quired. 119 A cultural affiliation finding is to be "based upon an overall
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances and evidence pertaining
to the connection between the claimant and the material being
116. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(2) (emphasis added).
117. Id. § 3005(a)(4). This provision deals specifically with the process by which a
tribe can seek repatriation of human remains in the possession of a federal
agency or museum where the "cultural affiliation" has not been established in a
NAGPRA-required inventory or where the remains have not been included in an
inventory. See id. The implementing regulations outline in greater detail the
requirements for establishing a cultural affiliation between a present day tribe
and an earlier group to which the individual whose remains were found belonged:
(1) "Existence of an identifiable present-day Indian tribe"; (2) "Evidence of the
existence of an identifiable earlier group," which may be supported by evidence of
the earlier group's "identity and cultural characteristics," "distinct patterns of
material culture manufacture and distribution methods," and "existence ... as a
biologically distinct population"; and (3) "Evidence of the existence of a shared
group identity that can be reasonably traced between the present-day Indian
tribe ... and the earlier group," which evidence establishes "that a present-day
Indian tribe ... has been identified from prehistoric or historic times to the pre-
sent as descending from the earlier group." 43 C.F.R. § 10.14(c) (2004).
118. See 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4); see also 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(e) ("Cultural affiliation is
established when the preponderance of the evidence ... reasonably leads to such
a conclusion.").
119. See 43 C.F.R. § 10.14(f).
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claimed and should not be precluded solely because of some gaps in
the record."'120 Again, scientific certainty is not required, and the deci-
sion maker is expected to evaluate the various kinds of available evi-
dence and reach a reasonable conclusion, based on a preponderance of
the evidence standard of proof.12 1
In the case of the Ancient One, the Confederated Tribes of the Col-
ville Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Res-
ervation, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian
Nation, the Nez Perce Tribe, and the Wanapum Band submitted a
joint claim for the remains. 122 As discussed below, 123 the DOI ulti-
mately concluded that these claimants had a valid claim to the re-
mains on the basis of the cultural affiliation priority.124
Finally, the fourth priority is based on aboriginal occupancy of the
federal land on which the remains were discovered. The priority is
tied to actions by the Indian Claims Commission or the Court of
Claims that recognize certain areas as aboriginal lands of particular
tribes.125 In the case of the Kennewick remains, an Indian Claims
Commission opinion and findings of fact had concluded that several
tribes (including the Nez Perce Tribe and tribes from the Umatilla
Reservation) had occupied the area where the remains were discov-
ered, 12 6 although the district court ultimately decided to discount this
finding for procedural reasons. 127
The drafters of NAGPRA contemplated that there could be some
Native American remains that were not claimed under the section
3002 ownership priorities, such as remains for which a cultural affilia-
120. Id. § 10.14(d).
121. See id. § 10.14(f).
122. See DOI Final Determination, supra note 100, at 2-3 (listing the tribal joint
claimants). The Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation include descend-
ants of twelve aboriginal tribes, "commonly known by English and French names
... the Colville, the Nespelem, the San Poil, the Lake, the Palus, the Wenatchi
(Wenatchee), the Chelan, the.Entiat, the Methow, the southern Okanogan, the
Moses Columbia and the Nez Perce of Chief Joseph's Band." See Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Facts & Information, at http://www.colville
tribes.com/facts.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). The Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Reservation include the Cayuse, the Umatilla, and the Walla Walla
Tribes. See Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, at http:/!
www.umatilla.nsn.us (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). The Nez Perce ("pierced nose" in
French), properly known as the Nimiipuu, were called the Chopunnish by Lewis
and Clark. This name may be derived from "tsoopnit," the Sahaptian word for
piercing, although it is not clear whether the Nimiipuu's ancestors did in fact
pierce their noses. See Mark Spence, Soyaapo and the Remaking of Lewis and
Clark, 105 OR. HIST. Q., Fall 2004, at 482.
123. See infra subsection III.C.2.
124. See DOI Final Determination, supra note 100, at 5.
125. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(c) (2000).
126. See DOI Final Determination, supra note 100, at 5.
127. See infra note 342.
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tion had not been established to the satisfaction of the officials who
were applying the priority provisions. NAGPRA provided that these
apparently culturally unaffiliated remains, or otherwise unclaimed re-
mains, are to be disposed of in accordance with regulations to be
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior in consultation with the
Review Committee established by NAGPRA (on which Native Ameri-
can representation is required), along with tribes, museum represent-
atives, and the scientific community.128 The Secretary has yet to
promulgate these regulations,129 although the NAGPRA Review Com-
mittee has issued recommendations about them. 130
In summary, NAGPRA establishes four ownership priorities for
human remains-lineal descendants, the tribe on whose land the re-
mains were found, the tribe with the closest cultural affiliation, and
the tribe on whose aboriginal land the remains were found (unless an-
other tribe establishes a stronger cultural relationship). In addition,
NAGPRA establishes the leading role of the Secretary of the Interior
and the NAGPRA Review Committee in setting the guidelines for the
disposition of unclaimed remains and other items that are protected
by NAGPRA.
3. Post-NAGPRA Discoveries and Repatriation of Pre-NAGPRA
Collections
NAGPRA also specifies what action is to be taken in connection
with the application of the ownership priorities in two scenarios-in-
tentional excavation and inadvertent discovery on federal or tribal
lands. Intentional removal or excavation for "purposes of discovery,
study, or removal" is permitted only if four criteria are met: (1) an
ARPA permit that is consistent with NAGPRA has been obtained; (2)
the appropriate tribe has been consulted or has given consent (in the
case of activity on tribal lands); (3) it is agreed that the ownership of
the remains will be determined in keeping with section 3002; and (4)
128. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002(b). The NAGPRA Review Committee, composed of seven
members appointed by the Secretary from lists of nominees submitted by Native
American groups and museum and scientific organizations, was established by
the statute to monitor, and make recommendations with respect to, the imple-
mentation of the statute. See id. § 3006. Three members are appointed from
among nominations "submitted by Indian tribes, Native Hawaiian organizations,
and traditional Native American religious leaders with at least 2 of such persons
being traditional Indian religious leaders;" three are appointed from nominations
by "national museum organizations and scientific organizations;" and the final
member is appointed from a list developed by and consented to by the other six
members. Id. § 3006(b)(1).
129. See 43 C.F.R. § 10.7 (2004) ("Disposition of unclaimed human remains, funerary
objects, sacred objects, or objects of cultural patrimony.").
130. Notice of Draft Principles of Agreement Regarding the Disposition of Culturally
Unidentifiable Remains-Extended Date for Comment, 64 Fed. Reg. 41,135 (July
23, 1999).
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proof of the required consultation or consent is shown.131 If an inad-
vertent discovery on federal or tribal lands occurs, the person making
the discovery must give written notice to the relevant agency head
(and to the appropriate tribe if the discovery occurs on tribal land),
cease activity in the area, and make a "reasonable effort" to protect
the discovered items.13 2 This provision is designed to ensure that Na-
tive Americans are informed of discoveries and are given an opportu-
nity to intervene in development activity on either federal or tribal
land when necessary to protect cultural items and to determine the
proper disposition of the discovered items,133 while also placing a bur-
den on the discoverer of the items to protect them prior to involvement
by the appropriate tribe.
There is a significant difference with respect to scientific study be-
tween the section 3002 provisions for newly discovered items and the
provisions governing cultural items that were already in the hands of
federal agencies and museums when the statute was enacted. Under
sections 3003 and 3004 of NAGPRA, federal agencies and federally
funded state and local government agencies were required to compile
inventories of any Native American cultural items in their possession,
indicating geographical and cultural affiliation, where possible, of
human remains. 134 Tribes found to be culturally affiliated with
human remains in a collection were to be notified within six months of
inventory completion.135 Where human remains' cultural affiliation
131. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c). The statute refers to section 470cc of Title 16, which is
the ARPA permit provision. See 16 U.S.C. § 470cc (2000). The Act, which estab-
lishes a permitting system for excavations of archaeological resources on federal
lands and Indian lands and deems resources excavated from federal lands to be
government property, is flawed by its presumption of federal ownership and its
treatment of human remains and important cultural objects as scientific re-
sources. See Sherry Hutt, Native American Cultural Property Law: Human
Rights Legislation, 34 ARiz. Arr'y, Jan. 1998, at 18, 21. For an overview of the
Act and an analysis of the evolving case law under the statute, see Roberto
Iraola, The Archaeological Resources Protection Act-Twenty Five Years Later, 42
DUQ. L. REV. 221 (2004).
132. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(d)(1). After the making of the required written notification and
upon certification by the appropriate recipient that the notification has been re-
ceived, the activity may be resumed thirty days after the certification. Id.
133. See S. REP. No. 101-473, at 9 (1990).
134. 25 U.S.C. § 3003(a). The inventories and identifications were to be completed
within five years after November 16, 1990, and were to be "completed in consulta-
tion with tribal government and Native Hawaiian organization officials and
traditional religious leaders." Id. § 3003(b). Each agency was also to prepare a
summary, including cultural affiliation "where readily ascertainable," of the
other cultural items in its holdings. Id. § 3004(a). The inventories were to be
completed within three years of November 16, 1990 and were to be "followed by
consultation with tribal government and Native Hawaiian organization officials
and traditional religious leaders." Id. § 3004(b).
135. Id. § 3003(d). Section 3004, addressing other kinds of cultural items, did not
have a comparable notification provision, but tribes and Native Hawaiian organi-
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were established by an inventory, they were to be returned "expedi-
tiously," upon the request of "a known lineal descendant" or the ap-
propriate tribe or organization. 136 However, a limitation was placed
on the timing of the repatriation. An agency or museum could tempo-
rarily refuse to repatriate requested items if they were "indispensable
for completion of a specific scientific study, the outcome of which
would be of major benefit to the United States."13 7 This kind of ac-
commodation for scientists was not, however, included in the provi-
sions dealing with remains and other items discovered after the
statute took effect. Rather, the focus is on Native American owner-
ship, and determining which individual or tribe has the strongest
claim to the item in question.
Finally, NAGPRA indicated Congress's strong support for the re-
turn of Native American cultural items to Native American groups
and individuals by including a savings provision that focused on the
repatriation authority of federal agencies and museums. 138 In addi-
zations were entitled, upon request, to have access to information about the items
in a collection "for the limited purposes of determining the geographic origin, cul-
tural affiliation, and basic facts surrounding acquisition and accession" of the
items. Id. § 3004(b)(2).
136. Id. § 3005(a)(1). If there were multiple requests for an item and the relevant
agency or museum could not "clearly determine which requesting party is the
most appropriate claimant," then the agency or museum could retain the item
until the competing parties reached agreement on the disposition of the item, or
the dispute was otherwise resolved under the provisions of NAGPRA or by a
court. Id. § 3005(e).
137. Id. § 3005(b). Items retained under this provision were to be returned no later
than ninety days after the completion of the study, but there was no limitation on
the duration of the study. Id. Cultural items other than human remains and
associated funerary objects whose cultural affiliation was determined pursuant
to the summary process established by section 3004 were also to be returned
upon the request of the appropriate tribe or organization, but their return was
also subject to the provision allowing indefinite retention for a specific scientific
study. Id. § 3005(a)(2), (b). In addition, these items were also made subject to a
provision that required a claimant to make a showing that the current possessor
did not have the right of possession as to the claimed item, and allowed the rele-
vant agency or museum to decline to return an item by proving that it had a
"right of possession" to it. Id. § 3005(a)(2), (c). "Right of possession" is defined as
"possession obtained with the voluntary consent of an individual or group that
had authority of alienation." Id. § 3001(13). Further delay in carrying out the
repatriation process for items being inventoried was also made possible by a pro-
vision allowing the Secretary to extend the inventory completion deadline for a
museum that had made a good faith effort to complete the inventory and identifi-
cation process but had been "unable" to do so on time. Id. § 3003(c). The provi-
sions relating to new discoveries do not have any similar built-in delay provisions
for the convenience of non-Native American possessors of cultural items.
138. Section 3009 provides that "[niothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit
the authority of any Federal agency or museum to return or repatriate Native
American cultural items to Indian tribes, Native Hawaiian organizations, or indi-
viduals." Id. § 3009(1)(A). Federal agency and museum flexibility was also bol-
stered by a provision stating that NAGPRA should not be construed to limit their
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tion, the concern for the protection of Native American rights that in-
spired the enactment of NAGPRA was further demonstrated by a
section providing that nothing in NAGPRA should be construed to
limit any procedural or substantive right held by individuals, tribes,
or Native Hawaiian organizations. 139
C. The Discovery of the Ancient One and the DOI's
NAGPRA Decision
The Ancient One's remains were found by chance, by spectators of
a hydroplane race, in an area under the management of the Army
Corps of Engineers in Washington State's Lake Wallula, which is a
part of the Columbia River that has pooled behind a dam. The re-
mains, which proved to be largely complete, were found scattered in
the river, close to the river terrace that contains Kennewick, Washing-
ton's Columbia Park.140 The remains were removed pursuant to a
permit issued to archaeologist James Chatters under ARPA, without
notification to the tribal claimants.141 Examination of the remains
suggested that they had some physical characteristics that differed
from both modern Native Americans and European settlers and that
there was a stone projectile point, apparently of a type that was in use
in the area long before European settlement, embedded in a pelvic
bone.14 2 Initial radiocarbon dating, based on testing of a portion of a
metacarpal bone, suggested that the remains were between 8,340 and
authority to "enter into any other agreement with the consent of the culturally
affiliated tribe or organization as to the disposition of, or control over, items cov-
ered by" NAGPRA. Id. § 3009(1)(B).
139. Id. § 3009(1), (2).
140. See Francis P. McManamon, The Initial Scientific Examination, Description, and
Analysis of the Kennewick Man Human Remains 2, at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/
kennewick/mcmanamon.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). Apparently boating traf-
fic and water level variations caused by the dam resulted in the collapse of the
terrace margin in which the remains were resting into the river edge, and water
action then scattered the remains over a wide area about 10 feet from the shore.
See id. The remains were thus recovered in a disturbed state and context, al-
though they proved to be about ninety percent intact. See Bonnichsen v. United
States, 367 F.3d 864, 869 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004). According to a newspaper account,
two individuals who made the discovery were in the area to see the "Budweiser
Columbia Cup Unlimited Hydroplane Races," and initially hid the skull in some
weeds, out of fear that drawing attention to what they believed to be the remains
of a crime victim would result in an immediate investigation that would hinder
their ability to view the races. See Danyelle Robinson, Ancient Remains Relative
to Many, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 20-Jan. 27, 1997, at Al.
141. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 869 n.6; see also James C. Chatters, The Recovery and
Analysis of an Early Holocene Human Skeleton from Kennewick, Washington, 65
Am. ANTIQUITY 291 (2000). The issuance of the permit to Dr. Chatters was itself
questionable. See Tsosie, supra note 81, at 606.
142. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 869.
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9,200 years old.143 When the local tribes that ultimately took part in
the Bonnichsen litigation learned of the discovery of the Ancient One's
remains, they sought custody of the remains for reburial, a request
that was at odds with the demand of a number of anthropologists for
access to the remains for personal study purposes.1 4 4 After the Corps
agreed with the claimant tribes that NAGPRA required the Corps to
turn the remains over to the tribes, and was not convinced by the
plaintiffs that they were entitled to the opportunity to study the re-
mains, the plaintiffs filed suit.145 The magistrate judge hearing the
case vacated the Corps's decision, but denied the plaintiffs' motion to
study the remains, and remanded the case for further proceedings.14 6
The Corps and the DOI entered into an agreement under which the
DOI was given the responsibility of determining whether the remains
were Native American and, if so, what NAGPRA required with respect
to their disposition.147 The DOI thus assumed the leading role in the
determination of the status of the remains and their proper disposi-
tion under NAGPRA.
1. The DOI's Native American Determination
In January 2000, Francis McManamon, Chief Archaeologist for the
National Park Service and Chief Consulting Archaeologist for the
DOI, announced the determination that the Kennewick remains were
considered "Native American" under NAGPRA. The determination
was based on a nondestructive analysis of the remains, which sug-
gested an ancient, pre-Columbian date, and radiocarbon dating of
samples extracted from the remains.148 Dr. McManamon explained
that "information derived using the methods and techniques of arche-
ology, geomorphology, physical anthropology, sedimentology, and
other scientific disciplines support this determination."14 9
143. See id.
144. See id. at 870.
145. See id. In discussing the Corps's decision, the district engineer for the Corps's
Walla Walla district expressed understanding of the urgent need to re-bury the
Ancient One's remains, noting that if a soldier were killed while serving abroad,
he "would want his body on a plane the next day to bring him home for burial."
Valerie Henderson, Five Tribes Seek Remains of'The Ancient One,' INDIAN COUN-
TRY TODAY, Nov. 25-Dec. 2, 1996, at B1 (quoting Lt. Col. Donald Curtis, Jr.).
146. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 871; see also Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F.
Supp. 628 (D. Or. 1997).
147. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 871.
148. See Memorandum from Francis P. McManamon, Departmental Consulting Ar-
chaeologist, to Assistant Secretary, Fish and Wildlife Service (Jan. 11, 2000), at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/cl4memo.htm [hereinafter Carbon 14
Memorandum] (determination that the Kennewick Man human skeletal remains
are "Native American" for the purposes of NAGPRA).
149. See id. at 2.
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Although the Bonnichsen plaintiffs have claimed that the Ancient
One's remains are needed for scientific study and that the tribal
claimants are preventing such study, the fact of the matter is that the
remains have already been subjected to extensive scientific study,
some of which even involved physical destruction of portions of the
remains. Moreover, most of the tests and analyses that were per-
formed were recommended by the plaintiffs, and were, in many in-
stances, performed by individuals whom the plaintiffs recommended.
The conclusions from this study, which are described below, were in-
cluded in descriptive and analytic reports, totaling several hundred
pages, that were submitted by a team of physical anthropologists, ar-
chaeologists, curators, and conservators. These reports have been
made available to the public at the National Park Service website. A
brief overview of the work done by these experts is necessary in order
to fully appreciate both the diligence with which the DOI approached
its responsibility for determining whether the Kennewick remains
were Native American and the extensiveness of the expert study and
analysis of the Kennewick remains that had already taken place by
the time the district court and court of appeals heard the plaintiffs'
claim that scientific study of the remains had been prevented by the
tribes' claims and the DOI's decisions.
The initial, nondestructive examination by experts at the invita-
tion of the DOI consisted of examinations of the remains themselves,
of the sediments adhering to them, and of the lithic, or stone, artifact
that was found embedded in one of the pelvic bones.15o The osteologi-
cal assessment of the remains included physically examining and
measuring them in detail and then comparing their measurements
and characteristics to databases containing information on recent, his-
toric, and ancient Native American skeletal characteristics.151 The
skull was reconstructed from fragmented facial bones and was mea-
sured and photographed, and then a three-dimensional computerized
150. See McManamon, supra note 140, at 5. This examination was conducted by Dr.
Joseph F. Powell of the University of New Mexico and Dr. Jerome C. Rose of the
University of Arkansas. See id. at 1 (stating the academic affiliations of Drs.
Powell and Rose), 3 (stating that Drs. Powell and Rose conducted the
examination).
151. Drs. Powell and Rose conducted a physical examination of the remains and re-
viewed the inventory that had been taken of them; measured the bones and teeth
and compared the measurements to existing databases of recent, historic, and
ancient Native American skeletal characteristics; and observed and recorded
other, non-metric dental and skeletal characteristics of the remains and com-
pared them to existing data on the characteristics, such as evidence of inflamma-
tion or trauma, toxins, dental wear and caries, and other indicators of the health
and way of life of an individual, of ancient Native American skeletal populations.
See id. at 5.
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model was created. 152 The examination indicated that the remains
belonged to a single, male individual, about 5' 9" tall,15 3 who died at
about forty-five to fifty years of age. 15 4 He was well-muscled and reg-
ularly used his arms in rigorous physical activity,155 and appeared to
have not suffered any disability from several injuries that he had ex-
perienced.156 The skeleton's virtual completeness and excellent condi-
tion suggested that it had been deliberately buried in a grave while
the body was intact, rather than having decomposed on the surface. 157
Drs. Joseph F. Powell and Jerome C. Rose, who examined the re-
mains, sought to determine whether they belonged to a "Native Amer-
ican," which they took to refer to "a modern or recent human
population indigenous to the Americas,"' 5 8 by first using multivariate
analyses to generate probabilities of the remains' membership in cer-
tain groups 15 9 and then subjectively comparing the remains' charac-
teristics to patterns of discrete morphological variation among current
forensic samples in the United States.16o Most of the available skele-
tal reference samples were recent in origin, and they included only a
small number of Palaeoindian and Archaic period skeletal series to
152. See Joseph F. Powell & Jerome C. Rose, Report on the Osteological Assessment of
the "Kennewick Man" Skeleton 1, at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/pow-
ellrose.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
153. See id. at 9.
154. See id. at 4.
155. See id. at 5-6, 15.
156. See id. at 5-7, 15. He had suffered several injuries, including bone fractures and
a wound from the projectile point that remained embedded in his pelvis, many
years before his death, but they had all healed well. The projectile point would
have entered from the rear and considerable force would have been needed for it
to penetrate the bone as deeply as it had gone, but it was impossible to tell
whether this was the result of an accident or some kind of conflict. See id. at 7,
15.
157. See id. at 8, 15. The completeness of the remains (due to the lack of loss of small
bones that can be carried off by scavengers if left exposed), the lack of carnivore
damage, and the evidence of rodent gnawing were typical of the pattern seen in
intentional burials, both prehistoric and modern. See id. The body's apparently
deliberate burial was consistent with the vast majority of human remains of the
early Holocene period that have been found in the Americas. See id. at 9.
158. Id. at 9.
159. See id. This was done to explore the remains' "biological affinity." Id.
160. See id. They developed two sets of hypotheses related to whether or not the Ken-
newick remains belonged to an individual drawn from a population of recent or of
Archaic Native Americans. The first set of hypotheses were the following: "Ken-
newick represents an individual drawn from a population of recent (late Holo-
cene) Native Americans.... Kennewick does not represent an individual drawn
from a population of recent Native Americans." Id. The second set of hypotheses
were the following: "Kennewick represents an individual drawn from a popula-
tion of Archaic (middle Holocene) Native Americans .... Kennewick does not re-
present an individual drawn from a population of Archaic Native Americans." Id.
at 10.
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which the Kennewick remains could be compared. 16 1 Drs. Powell and
Rose noted that if the Kennewick remains were those of a member of a
founding population whose descendants had evolved in the Americas
over the past 9,000 years, later American populations might well be
dissimilar to the Kennewick remains.162 In other words, they ac-
knowledged that the Ancient One could be the biological ancestor of
recent Native Americans despite morphological dissimilarities.
The analysis indicated that, like other early skeletons found in the
Americas, the Kennewick remains had a number of morphological fea-
tures that are not present in recent human populations, including Na-
tive American populations. The craniometric analyses indicated that
the Kennewick remains had a low probability of membership in any of
the available recent craniometric reference samples, which Drs. Pow-
ell and Rose noted was unsurprising given the approximately 8,000
year gap between the remains and the reference samples that were
used.16 3 They concluded that the Kennewick remains were not drawn
from a population of recent Native Americans, 164 and also were
"clearly not" those of a Caucasoid, meaning a member of the popula-
tions of modern day Europe, the Near East, and India.165 On the
other hand, there was evidence that the Kennewick cranial remains
were similar to Archaic populations from the eastern woodlands and
161. See id. at 10. They believed, though, that the comparisons could still provide
useful information on morphological similarity and dissimilarity between groups
in the Americas between 9,000 and 5,000 B.P. See id. "B.P." indicates the num-
ber of years before the present, with the year A.D. 1950 being "the present," ac-
cording to radiocarbon dating convention. See ADovAsio & PAGE, supra note 21,
at 113. Dates are given as +/- B.P., meaning a certain date plus or minus a
smaller number of years. See id.
162. See Powell & Rose, supra note 152, at 10. These dissimilarities could have re-
sulted from "the cumulative effects of genetic drift, mutation, and natural selec-
tion." Id.
163. See id. at 15. The most similar samples were those from the south Pacific, from
Polynesia, and from the Ainu people of Japan, a finding which was consistent
with patterns observed in some other studies of early human crania found in the
Americas. See id. The analyses involved comparison of the remains to the mod-
em reference samples in terms of dozens of craniometric dimensions. See id. at
10. Drs. Powell and Rose used fifty-two variables for the first analysis, and lower
numbers of variables for other analyses. See id. at 10-13.
164. See id. at 15. This conclusion was based on the available craniometric data and
an analysis of cranial and dental discrete traits. Id. at 15-16. They could not,
however, draw this conclusion from their analysis of anthroposcopic traits and
odontometric data. See id. at 16; see also id. (describing the odontometric, cranial
and dental discrete trait, and anthroposcopic, analyses).
165. See id. at 16. In nineteenth century anthropological literature, the Ainu of Japan
were described as Caucasoids, but Drs. Powell and Rose agreed with the more
recent approach of viewing the Ainu as having derived from peoples who had
their closest biological affinity with south Asians rather than with western Eura-
sians. See id.
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the northern Great Basin regions.' 6 6 In short, the Powell and Rose
analysis indicated that the Kennewick remains were not very similar
to any modern human populations included in the limited available
reference samples, which included only nineteen North and South
American populations from among a total of 183 populations used for
craniometric comparison, 16 7 but were similar to some Archaic Native
American populations. In other words, the available data suggested
that the remains were more similar to other ancient remains than to
modern ones, hardly a surprising conclusion,16s given the great
change that facial features within a population can undergo over sev-
eral millennia.169
The nondestructive analysis of the Kennewick remains also in-
cluded examination of the sediments adhering to them as a means of
possibly linking the remains to dated soil layers in the river terrace in
which, it was believed, the remains had been buried. 170 The skeletal
sediments were found to be similar to a portion of the soil profile that
was dated to between 7,000 and 9,000 years ago, 17 1 leading to an esti-
mate that the remains dated to between 6700-9000 years B.P. (before
the present).17 2 Thus the sedimentary analysis, like the osteological
assessment, indicated that the Ancient One lived, died, and was bur-
ied in the distant past, long before the European settlement of the
Americas.
Finally, an analysis of the object embedded in one of the Ancient
One's pelvic bones 173 indicated that it resembled a Cascade Point, a
166. See id.
167. Id. at 11. This limited representation of Native American populations made it
difficult for them to fully assess the possible biological affinity between the An-
cient One and recent Native Americans using their methodology.
168. Drs. Powell and Rose stated that only a sequence of remains, dated to various
points over the past 9,000 years, could provide direct evidence of biological con-
tinuity between the Kennewick remains and modem tribes. See id. at 16.
169. See ADovAsio & PAGE, supra note 21, at 245.
170. See McManamon, supra note 140, at 5. Dr. Gary Huckleberry of Washington
State University and Dr. Julie K. Stein of the University of Washington per-
formed this examination. See Gary Huckleberry & Julie Stein, Analysis of the
Sediments Associated with Human Remains Found at Columbia Park, Ken-
newick, WA 1 (Oct. 1999), at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/huck-stein.
htm; see also McManamon, supra note 140, at 1 (listing the academic affiliations
of Drs. Huckleberry and Stein).
171. See McManamon, supra note 140, at 6.
172. See Huckleberry & Stein, supra note 170, at 16.
173. Dr. John L. Fagan, the president of Archaeological Investigations, Inc. of Port-
land, Oregon, performed this analysis. See John L. Fagan, Analysis of Lithic
Artifact Embedded in the Columbia Park Remains (Oct. 1999), at http:l/
www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/fagan.htm; see also McManamon, supra note 140,
at 1 (listing the business affiliation of Dr. Fagan). Because the object was still
embedded in the remains, Dr. Fagan had to use CT scans to document and ana-
lyze it. See id. at 5; see also Fagan, supra, at 2 (describing the use of CT scans in
the analysis). It appeared to have been made from basalt and shaped by percus-
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type of stone projectile point that was in common use in the Pacific
Northwest prior to 7,000 years ago.1 7 4 The point appeared to be the
tip or armament of a spear, which could be used for thrusting or
throwing, or of a dart, which would have been propelled by an
atlatal.175 This finding gave an idea of the kind of technology that
was available to the Ancient One and his community and clearly sug-
gested a pre-Columbian date for the remains.176
In summary, the nondestructive analysis of the Kennewick re-
mains-analysis of the remains themselves, sediment adhering to
them, and the stone point embedded in them-indicated that they
dated from a time that far preceded European settlement in the Amer-
icas. The analysis also indicated that the Ancient One had lived an
active, physically demanding life, and was buried (presumably by
members of his community) when he died, and gave an idea of at least
one kind of technology that was in use in his community. This work
established the kind of detailed scientific documentation of the re-
mains that both ARPA and NAGPRA required.1 7 7 Limitations in
their respective fields' techniques and methodologies, and in their ap-
plication, however, forced each group of investigators to conclude that
their own results, standing alone, were insufficient to serve as the ba-
sis for a determination by the DOI that the Kennewick remains were
Native American. 178 This uncertainty led to a decision to extract bone
samples from the remains for the purposes of radiocarbon testing.
This testing was done despite the opposition of the tribal claimants,
who objected to the partial destruction of the remains that resulted
from sample extraction.179
The radiocarbon dates obtained for the skeletal material samples
ranged from close to 6000 years B.P.1s0 to over 8400 B.P.,181 dates
sion flaking. It was at least 5.6 cm. long and about 2 cm. wide at its wider end.
See id. at 2.
174. See Fagan, supra note 173, at 3.
175. See id.
176. See McManamon, supra note 140, at 7. Because Cascade points were used and
reused after the time period during which they were most common, the conclu-
sion that the artifact might be a Cascade point did not ensure that it came to be
embedded in the pelvis of the Kennewick remains as many as 7,000 years ago.
See id.
177. See id. at 1 (citing Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) of 1979 § 4, 16
U.S.C. § 470cc (2000); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(NAGPRA) of 1990 § 3(c)(1), 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c)(1) (2000)).
178. See id.; see also id. at 7.
179. In September 1999, despite tribal objections, two bone samples were extracted,
subdivided, and submitted to three different laboratories for dating. See id. at 1.
180. The NSF-Arizona AMS Facility at the University of Arizona dated a sample from
the left tibial crest to 5750 +/-100 B.P. See Carbon 14 Memorandum, supra note
148, at 3. The UC-Riverside Laboratory also dated a sample from the left tibial
crest, which it dated to 6940 +/-30 B.P. See id. It was believed that the more
recent dates for the tibial samples indicated that newer carbon was pronounced
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which were consistent with the early dates suggested by the
nondestructive analysis. In addition, two of the laboratories provided
an additional detail about the Ancient One's way of life by noting that
their analysis indicated that the Ancient One, much like the tribes of
the area centuries into the future, had a marine diet.18 2 On the basis
of the examination and analysis of the remains, soil, and lithic point,
bolstered by the radiocarbon dating, the DOI determined that the
Kennewick remains were "Native American,"183 and that NAGPRA
therefore governed their disposition.184
2. The Cultural Affiliation Analysis
In order to determine the proper disposition of the Ancient One's
remains under NAGPRA, the DOI gathered and evaluated a wide
range of information, consulted (as NAGPRA requires) with repre-
sentatives of the claimant tribes,185 read reports submitted by the tri-
bal claimants, and evaluated the data and observations submitted by
experts enlisted by the DOI.186 These experts performed almost all of
the studies that the plaintiffs had recommended. 187
in the left tibia, which had made the sample seem of more recent origin than it
really was. See id. For a description of radiocarbon dating and more recently
developed dating techniques, see ADovAsio & PAGE, supra note 21, at 112-17.
181. The right first metatarsal, the source of the material that was assigned this C14
date by two laboratories, is one of the load-bearing bones of the foot. One of the
two laboratories reported a date of 8410 +/- 40 B.P. See Carbon 14 Memorandum,
supra note 148, at 2. The other laboratory reported a date of 8130 +/-40 B.P. See
id. There was some concern that the skeleton, or parts of it, might have been
contaminated at some point in the past by exogenous, or intrusive, carbon which
could have distorted the carbon dates for the samples. See id. at 3. If this had
occurred, however, the effect would have been to make the dates for the samples
more recent than their true dates, and this may explain the more recent date,
which was obtained for the tibial crest samples. See id. In certain circumstances,
bone can be contaminated by older carbon, but this kind of contamination was
unlikely to have occurred in the Kennewick case because of the characteristics of
the area in which the remains had been located. See id.
182. See Letter from Darden Hood to Francis P. McManamon, Departmental Consult-
ing Archaeologist, 2 (Oct. 17, 1999), at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/
hoodl.htm (Attachment 1 to Carbon 14 Memorandum); Letter from R.E. Taylor,
Radiocarbon Laboratory, University of California, Riverside, to Francis P.
McManamon 1 (Dec. 20, 1999), at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewicktaylor.
htm (Attachment 3 to Carbon 14 Memorandum).
183. See Carbon 14 Memorandum, supra note 148, at 4.
184. See id. at 1.
185. See Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, to Louis Caldera, Secre-
tary of the Army 2 (Sept. 21, 2000), at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/babb
_letter.htm [hereinafter Disposition Determination Letter].
186. See id.
187. See Comparison Between Studies Initiated by the Department of the Interior on
the Kennewick Human Remains and Those Requested and Recommended by
Plaintiffs (Bonnichsen et al. v. United States) (Sept. 21, 2000), at http://www.cr.
nps.gov/aad/kennewick/encl-2.htm (Enclosure 2 to Disposition Determination
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In analyzing the possibility of a claim being validated on the basis
of NAGPRA's cultural affiliation priority,'8 8 the DOI reviewed "geo-
graphical, kinship, biological, archeological, anthropological, linguis-
tic, folklore, oral tradition, historical, and other relevant information
and expert opinion evidence," deeming all of the lines of evidence
equally important and according all of them equivalent weight.189
This equal weighting approach comported with the text of the statute,
which does not assign priorities to the kinds of evidence that are to be
considered.19 0 Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt noted, in his letter
notifying the Department of the Army of the DOI's determination as
to the proper disposition of the remains, that when implementing
NAGPRA, the DOI is to make the determination that, based on the
evidence, would best carry out NAGPRA's purpose.191
Because the tribal claimants were pursuing a claim jointly, the
DOI had to determine preliminarily whether cultural affiliation with a
single tribe was required by NAGPRA, or whether affiliation could be
determined for a group of tribes claiming jointly. In creating a prefer-
ence in NAGPRA for the tribe with the "closest cultural affiliation,"
Congress recognized that more than one tribe could be culturally affil-
iated with human remains.192 The DOI concluded that NAGPRA did
permit a finding of cultural affiliation with multiple tribes that sub-
mitted a joint claim,193 and that the fact that one of the claimant
tribes (in this case, the Wanapum Band) was not federally recognized
did not foreclose a joint claim disposition where the other claimants
were federally recognized.'94 In addition to being consistent with
what the text of NAGPRA suggested about this issue, this conclusion
made sense in light of the respect for tribal views that NAGPRA re-
flects. In short, if a group of recognized tribes is willing to welcome a
Letter). The plaintiffs recommended seventeen kinds of studies. As of the time of
the disposition letter, the results of the DNA analysis were pending. The kinds of
requested studies that were not conducted were the following: antibody studies;
section analysis-dental; bone histology; and phytolith recovery (due to a lack of
calculus on the teeth). In addition, further study of the discovery site had been
recommended by the plaintiffs and DOI experts.
188. The DOI concluded that a claim could not be validated based either on lineal
descent or on excavation or removal from tribal lands, the first two ownership
priorities under NAGPRA. See Disposition Determination Letter, supra note 185,
at 2-3. Secretary Babbitt explained in his letter that "[gliven the very ancient
date for the Kennewick Man remains . . . we found that no present day lineal
descendants... exist." Id. at 2. Also, the tribal lands priority was not relevant
because the remains were found on federal lands, rather than on a reservation or
other tribal lands. Id. at 3.
189. Id. at 3.
190. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
191. See Disposition Determination Letter, supra note 185, at 3.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 3 n.1.
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non-recognized tribe as a joint claimant, deference to this decision
seems appropriate. Moreover, the Kennewick joint claim in particular
seems appropriate because of the traditional joint use of the area by
the tribal claimants and because of the vagaries of the federal tribal
acknowledgment process, which would have presented a formidable
obstacle to the recognition of the Wanapum Band if the tribe had de-
cided to seek it.
In order to analyze the cultural affiliation issue, the DOI assem-
bled a panel of experts and asked each to explore, within the context of
his field, how an earlier group with which the Kennewick remains
were associated could be identified and to consider the possible cul-
tural affiliation of the remains and the group they represented with
the present-day tribes, as of the time of the visit of Lewis and Clark to
the area. 19 5 The Corps of Discovery's sojourn with the Nez Perce and
other tribes thus played an unanticipated role as a time marker in the
cultural affiliation analysis. Four reports-focusing on archaeological
data, historical and ethnographic information, linguistic information,
and bio-archaeological information-resulted from this process. Read-
ing the summaries of the reports included below gives a sense of the
challenge that faced the courts in reviewing the documentation that
prompted the DOI's decision-documentation of a kind with which
federal judges are unlikely to have any familiarity. Indeed, review of
the reports and of the rest of the record in the case, which totaled over
20,000 pages, proved to be such a daunting task that the district court
felt compelled to provide an explanation to the parties of the resulting
"unusual delay" that occurred before the case was decided.196 Moreo-
ver, this review reveals the difficulties faced by the experts who pre-
pared the reports, and the consequent limitations of their conclusions,
and of the inherent limitations and doubts of the experts' fields them-
selves. In short, the reports suggest that the concept of "scientific cer-
195. See Francis P. McManamon et al., Background and Scope for the Cultural Affilia-
tion Reports 1-2 (Sept. 2000), at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/cultaff in-
tro.htm. They were asked to identify evidence both of continuity and
discontinuity between tribes that inhabited the area in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, when the Lewis and Clark expedition visited the area, and the ancient
group, represented by the remains, which probably resided in that area 9,500
years ago, as well as to describe gaps in the record due to insufficient informa-
tion. Id. at 2. Because the historical record showed that since at least 1805, the
ancestors of the interested present-day tribes had resided in the area, it was not
necessary to examine and set out in detail the links between these tribes and the
groups, bands, and tribes reported to be there at the beginning of the nineteenth
century. Thus the studies focused on the period between 9,500 years ago and the
early nineteenth century, when written historically documented accounts of the
area began. See id.
196. See Letter from John Jelderks, United States Magistrate Judge, to counsel, Bon-
nichsen v. United States (June 18, 2002), at http://www.friendsofpast.orgkenne
wick-man/courtlopinions/letter-counsel.html.
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tainty," which the plaintiffs would prefer to have applied to the
cultural affiliation determination, simply has no place in the field of
archaeology and other branches of anthropology.
a. Archaeological Data Report
The preparation of the archaeological data report, which focused
on determining what social and economic interpretations, based on
material culture, site components, and regional settlement patterns
revealed by archaeological data, could be made, was hampered by em-
pirical gaps in the archaeological record itself that made it difficult to
establish either cultural continuities or discontinuities. 19 7 Only a
small sample of radiocarbon dates, broken up by as yet unexplained
gaps, exists for the period to which the Kennewick remains were
dated, a period during which local population levels were apparently
very low.1 98 The available evidence suggested that a number of fea-
tures of the period's material culture did not appear to carry forward
into later periods, but this was probably due to cultural change rather
than to cultural replacement, as the archaeological record contained
no evidence of a migration into the area. 199 Also, several important
aspects of the topography of the area-features that must have cer-
tain unavoidable effects on the formation of the way of life of the peo-
ple of an area-had not changed since the Ancient One's day, and the
economies of the area had continued to be hunter-gatherer economies
over the previous 9,500 years.20 0
197. See McManamon et al., supra note 195, at 2. The report was prepared by Dr.
Kenneth Ames of Portland State University. See Kenneth M. Ames, Review of
the Archaeological Data: Conclusions 1 (Sept. 2000), at http://www.cr.nps.gov/
aad/kennewick/ames7.htm [hereinafter Archaeological Data: Conclusions]
(describing the difficulty of establishing continuities). The term "cultural conti-
nuities" refers to continuous transmission of cultural traits from one generation
to another, while "cultural discontinuities" means that one cultural system
ceased to be transmitted and was replaced by another. Kenneth M. Ames, Re-
view of the Archaeological Data: Issues and Problems 2-3 (Sept. 2000), at http:l
www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/ames3.htm [hereinafter Archaeological Data: Is-
sues] (defining continuities and discontinuities).
198. See Archaeological Data: Conclusions, supra note 197, at 1. Gaps in the record
might be due to the small size of the sample or be due to some other factor. See
id.
199. See id. at 1-2 (continuities and discontinuities); see also id. at 2 (lack of evidence
of migration). At the same time, there were some continuities in tools, but these
did not necessarily indicate cultural continuity, because they may be simply anal-
ogous similarities. In other words, if two groups of people used similar tools, the
similarity may not be due to the fact that they shared a common cultural ances-
try, but rather to the fact that these two groups just happened to develop the
same kind. See Archaeological Data: Issues, supra note 197, at 2-3 (discussing
the difference between historical, or homologous, and functional, or analogous,
causes of similarities).
200. See Archaeological Data: Issues, supra note 197, at 4.
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Preparation of the report was also hampered by the haste with
which it had to be prepared, because of district court deadlines. 2O1
Some of the existing data and reports simply could not be located and
examined in time.20 2
An additional problem was created by the nature of the archaeo-
logical work that had been done on the Columbia Plateau, which was
piecemeal and had not produced the kind of data that would have been
useful. 20 3 Moreover, differences of opinion among archaeologists who
had worked on the region-differences which the report's author
deemed normal in a profession that requires a "positive skepticism
about the knowledge claims of one's peers and one's self'-as to appro-
priate theoretical standpoints, basic assumptions, and cultural chro-
nologies, and even as to the best way to understand the concepts of
continuity and discontinuity, further complicated the task.204 As a re-
sult of these obstacles, the author of the report was unable, on the
basis of the evidence then available to him, either to link the Ken-
newick remains to peoples in the area circa 1800 A.D., or to disprove
the existence of such a link. He emphasized that his conclusions did
not mean that there was not cultural continuity between the early
nineteenth century people of the area and earlier groups, but simply
that the gaps in the record precluded establishing either continuities
or discontinuities. 205
201. Dr. Ames noted at the outset of his report that the DOI's scope of work for his
investigation had acknowledged the time constraints imposed upon his study of
the archaeological data and noted that much of the necessary evidence might be
in materials with limited circulation or even be unpublished. See Kenneth M.
Ames, Review of the Archaeological Data 2 (Sept. 2000), at http://www.cr.nps.gov/
aad/kennewick/ames.htm [hereinafter Archaeological Data: Introduction]. The
relevant materials were difficult to obtain, because much of the archaeological
literature on the Columbia Plateau was unpublished, was published only in lim-
ited distribution reports, or was available only "in venues which are obscure, or
difficult even to find out about." See Kenneth M. Ames, Review of the Archaeo-
logical Data: The Southern (Columbia) Plateau: Background 2 (Sept. 2000), at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/ames2.htm [hereinafter Archaeological
Data: Columbia Plateau].
202. See Archaeological Data: Columbia Plateau, supra note 201, at 2.
203. See id. at 3.
204. See id.; Archaeological Data: Issues, supra note 197, at 11. Given the fact that
the area has a known archaeological record extending over approximately 13,500
calendar years, there are plenty of opportunities for professional disagreement.
See Archaeological Data: Columbia Plateau, supra note 201, at 3.
205. See Archaeological Data: Conclusions, supra note 197, at 2. He explained that
additional fieldwork and a more extensive review of the published literature and
of museum collections than time constraints allowed him might have uncovered
additional evidence. Id.
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b. Traditional Historical and Ethnographic Information
Report
The historical and ethnographic report examined the extent to
which the ethnographic record on the region might be related to the
region's earlier peoples.206 The author examined both published and
archival materials, 20 7 and also reviewed oral traditions in order to
create a historical context for the period prior to 1805 (when written
records first existed). This approach reflects the current theoretical
understanding of ethnohistorians that oral traditions are not inferior
to written records and that histories recorded in oral traditions are not
any less valid than histories recorded in writing.208
Researchers consider the cultures of the southern Plateau region,
at the confluence of the Columbia and Snake Rivers, to be "a set of
interconnected and culturally similar groups,"20 9 that, prior to Euro-
pean contact, developed a rich body of oral traditions. 2 10 These tradi-
tions, which are more than merely stories, legends, or fables,211 have
functioned as histories for the indigenous peoples of the region, and
link the people's existence to the beginning of the appearance of
human beings in the area and relate their continued existence on the
Plateau to that distant past.21 2 Unlike the traditions of most indige-
nous peoples of North America, these traditions contain no origin
myths that explain the placement of the Plateau peoples by creation
or by migration to the region.2 13 The way of life described in this
206. See McManamon et al., supra note 195, at 2. Dr. Daniel Boxberger of Western
Washington University prepared this report. Id.
207. He reviewed published ethnographic materials, archaeological reports, published
versions of oral traditions, and local histories, as well as archival materials, cov-
ering such matters as traditional histories of the region; kinship; artifact types;
dwellings; residence, community, and settlement patterns; economic and subsis-
tence patterns; and trade and social networks. See Daniel L. Boxberger, Review
of Traditional Historical and Ethnographic Information 1-2 (Sept. 2000), at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/boxberger.htm.
208. See id. at 2. A different type of analytical approach may, however, be used for
them. See id. For another description of an analytical framework that can be
used to examine oral traditions, see generally Roger C. Echo-Hawk, Ancient His-
tory in the New World: Integrating Oral Traditions and the Archaeological Record
in Deep Time, 65 AM. ANTIQUITY 267 (2000).
209. See Boxberger, supra note 207, at 4.
210. See id. at 6.
211. See id. at 16.
212. See id. at 6.
213. See id. "Instead, the Plateau became populated by people who were already
there." Id. The tribes' history tells that Coyote traveled up the Columbia River
and its tributaries and transformed the landscape to create a place for people. He
interacted with the myth people, who were identified as animals but acted like
humans, and whose "way of life set the pattern for the people whom Coyote
caused to be scattered across the Plateau by slaying the Monster and distributing
its parts which became the people." Id.; see also id. at 17-18 (discussing the ab-
sence of a creation event and the Coyote and the Monster narrative).
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traditional history is similar to that described in written ethnographic
accounts of the region, and thus serves as supplementary historical
documentation for the written sources. 21 4
As the report explained, this history makes clear the ancient and
enduring ties between the modern day peoples in the area and the
land itself, and links the origin of the people to the area's geological
features. 21 5 The knowledge of ancient events exhibited in some of the
narratives indicates a striking time depth.216 One narrative, for ex-
ample, refers to a time when the Columbia River flowed through the
Grand Coulee rather than in its present channel, thus linking the
story to an event that occurred over 10,000 years ago, when, geologists
believe, the Columbia did flow through the Grand Coulee.217
Ethnographic research indicates that the peoples of the area deter-
mined kinship through both the male and female lines and developed
extensive kinship ties. Extended families grouped together to form
small villages, usually located along rivers, in which the families lived
in longhouses.218 Semi-subterranean pithouses-circular structures
which were apparently the main prehistoric dwellings-located next
to the longhouses were used for storage and other purposes, 21 9 and
thus linked the past to the present in the daily lives of their users.
Because of extensive intermarriage, villages would often include re-
sidents from a number of different tribes.220
A network of relations among the region's people, extending be-
yond the villages, was formed for co-utilization of resources and ac-
cess, through a mechanism of intermarriage, mutual co-utilization of
resources, and intergroup cooperation. 22 1 Intergroup activities, such
as fishing for salmon, plant gathering, and trading, were carried on at
many sites throughout the region,222 and there was "considerable evi-
dence" that these intergroup activity patterns had existed for 10,000
years. 2 23
214. See id. at 6.
215. See id. at 18 (describing how the peoples of the area are believed to have their
origin in the body of the Monster, the heart of which remains in stone form in
Idaho's Kamiah Valley). The history includes narratives that refer to specific lo-
cal geological features. See id. at 20-23 (giving examples of narratives that refer
to specific geological features).
216. See id. at 23.
217. See id. at 20. Another narrative suggests the geologic period during which gla-
ciers, the retreat of which caused massive flooding, created large lakes. Id.
218. See id. at 7, 9. During the food-gathering season, people would move to gathering
locations and reside in tipis. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 9.
221. Id. at 7.
222. Id.; see also id. at 10 (describing subsistence and trading patterns).
223. Id. at 10.
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The report also briefly surveyed the three main periods of the pre-
history of the region and identified a number of continuities between
prehistoric and historic times. 22 4 Evidence from the period 11,500
B.P. to 5000-4400 B.C. indicated the existence of a mixed economy,
based on consumption of animals, plants, and fish (which the Ancient
One seems to have regularly consumed),2 25 that was similar to the
economy of historic times. 226 Striking similarities between this early
period and the historic period existed with respect to subsistence ac-
tivities, technology, dwellings, and trade. 2 2 7
By the time Lewis and Clark visited the area, items such as brass,
copper, and coins had reached the region via intertribal trade routes
and via Plateau peoples' direct access outside the region. 228 The
greatest impacts from non-native contact came from European dis-
eases 229 and from the introduction of the horse, but these phenomena
facilitated and accelerated the activities that already characterized
the region rather than fundamentally changing them.230 The begin-
ning of non-native influence triggered a process of change and adapta-
tion, as it had in the prehistoric period, 23 1 but the region's distinctly
Plateau cultural tradition survived. 232
The report concluded that the area where the Kennewick remains
were found was part of the traditional use area of the claimant tribes,
who are the "heirs of succession" to the area.2 33 The protohistoric, his-
toric, and ethnographic evidence suggested a cultural continuity in the
region extending into the prehistoric period; the cultural change that
did occur was transitional and evolutionary, rather than indicating a
cultural transformation that could have occurred from in-migration 23 4
(a kind of event for which the archaeological report had also found no
evidence).23 5 The native history of the region placed the tribes in the
224. Id. at 10-11.
225. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (noting that the Ancient One seems to
have had a marine diet).
226. See Boxberger, supra note 207, at 11.
227. See id. ('Projectile points, net weights, milling stones, tipi-like dwellings, and
evidence of trade from the sea coast as long ago as 9000 B.C. impress one as
strikingly similar to the cultural traditions described in the ethnographic
database.").
228. See id. at 12.
229. See id. Some scholars believe that the Plateau region was struck by a hemi-
spheric-wide smallpox pandemic that they believe emanated from the 1519 Car-
ibbean smallpox epidemic, and then was not struck again until the historically
recorded epidemics of the late 1700s. See id. Others believe that no epidemic
affected the region until after Europeans first reached the coast in 1774. See id.
230. See id. at 13. Horses were acquired by at least 1730 A.D. See id. at 12.
231. See id. at 13.
232. See id. at 12.
233. See id. at 24.
234. See id.
235. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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region from the beginning of time and related to events of the distant
past, which are "highly suggestive of long-term establishment of the
present-day tribes."23 6 In short, the evidence suggested very long-
term cultural connections between the tribal claimants and the peo-
ples, like the Ancient One's group, who had formerly inhabited the
region in which the remains were found.
c. Linguistic Information Report
The linguistic information report focused on the use of historic lin-
guistic methods to try to determine the linguistic affiliation of the
group to which the Ancient One belonged. Widely accepted historical
linguistic methods make it "theoretically possible to establish 'cultural
affiliation' across the 9,000 years" separating contemporary Native
American groups from the earlier group to which the Ancient One be-
longed. 23 7 Because language is a part of culture, as well as the chief
means for transmitting it, if the linguistic evidence suggests continu-
ities in the "cultural core"-"'[t]he constellation of features which are
most closely related to subsistence activities and economic arrange-
ments' "-then this indicates cultural affiliation between the claimant
tribes and the Ancient One's group. 23 8
The linguistic evidence suggested that the language that linguists
believe to be ancestral to Nez Perce and Sahaptin (languages in use at
the time of first Euro-American contact), called proto-Sahaptian, was
most likely spoken near the Ancient One's burial site at least 2,000
years ago, and that proto-Sahaptian (or its immediate predecessor)
was spoken throughout the Plateau region about 4,000 years ago.2 39
Proto-Penutian, the ancestral language of the Penutian phylum of lan-
guages, to which proto-Sahaptian belonged, might, in turn, "have been
spoken 8,000 or more years ago," making it "more than likely" that the
Ancient One spoke a proto-Penutian dialect. 2 40 The continuity of oc-
236. Boxberger, supra note 207, at 25.
237. See Eugene S. Hunn, Review of Linguistic Information 8, at http://www.cr.nps.
gov/aad/kennewick/hunn.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). The term "group" is
used to mean a local residential group or a group sharing the same language. See
id. at 4 (explaining how "group" is defined). This report was prepared by Dr.
Eugene Hunn of the University of Washington.
238. Id. at 1 (quoting JULIAN STEWARD, THEORY OF CULTURAL CHANGE 37 (1955)); see
also id. at 8 ("[I]f a contemporary group can be shown 1) to be linguistically affili-
ated with an earlier group and 2) to occupy the ancestral habitat of that earlier
group by similar technical means, these factors would support an inference of
shared group identity between the earlier group and the modem group.").
239. See id. at 2; see also id. at 12 (discussing the close kinship of Sahaptin and Nez
Perce, which are likely to have diverged not more than 2,000 years ago).
240. Id. at 3. The Penutian language phylum is estimated to be older than
Indo-European, which is thought to be about 7,000 years old. See id. The prefix
"proto" refers to a proto-language, defined as "a hypothetical language which
through time has diversified to form the known contemporary descendant lan-
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cupation in the area by descendant speakers would then suggest that
it is most likely that the Ancient One is culturally affiliated more
closely with historic Sahaptin-speaking people in the region than with
any other Native American group. 24 1
An analysis of the cultural correlates of language made it seem
even more likely that the Ancient One was part of a culture that was
fundamentally like that practiced in historic times by the peoples of
the Southern Plateau.2 42 Throughout the millennia stretching back to
the Ancient One's time, the region's peoples had sustained themselves
by harvesting a group of resources that included salmon, shellfish, a
variety of roots and berries, and game.2 43 The Sahaptin vocabulary
shows close links between language and specific features of the local
environment, 24 4 the key features of which have changed little during
the last 12,000 years, 245 and the ethnobiological vocabulary of con-
temporary Sahaptin does not suggest that the Sahaptin-speaking peo-
ples ever resided in a location other than their historic homeland.246
Finally, the report examined the legend of Laliik, a summit that is
a dominant feature of the central Columbian basin and which has no
name in English.247 In Sahaptin, Laliik means "standing above the
water," a name that refers to a great ancient flood that surrounded the
summit and that may in fact refer to the great floods, called the Bretz
floods, that occurred in the area between 13,000 and 18,000 years
ago. 248 If this is indeed the case, then the legend links the area's con-
temporary Sahaptin-speaking residents to a group that witnessed the
Bretz floods, and indicates that the Sahaptin language includes a "cul-
tural memory" of events that occurred long before even the Ancient
One lived. 24 9 The Laliik legend thus offers an additional potential lin-
guages of a linguistic family, stock, or phylum." Id. at 8; see also id. at 14 (stating
that there is "a strong possibility that [the Ancient One] spoke a Proto-Penutian
language"). Dr. Hunn stated that it was also possible that Ancient One's group
"spoke a language which was not Penutian-a language now extinct or ancestral
to languages spoken outside the present region-and that the Penutian-speaking
predecessors of the historic occupants of this region ... either displaced this ear-
lier group or arrived after that group had moved elsewhere or had died out," but
there was no evidence to support this alternative. Id.
241. See id. at 3.
242. See id. at 14.
243. See id.
244. See id.; see also id. at 6-8 (examining the animal terms, plant terms, and place
names in the contemporary Sahaptin vocabulary as evidence that Sahaptin
speakers were intimately familiar with the environmental features of the region,
the key environmental features of which have changed little in the last 12,000
years).
245. See id. at 6.
246. See id. at 17.
247. See id. at 15.
248. See id. at 15.
249. See id. at 16-17.
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guistic link between the contemporary residents of the region and its
ancient inhabitants.
d. Bio-Archaeological Information Report
The bio-archaeological information report focused on mortuary pat-
terns and bio-archaeological studies of the Pacific Northwest.250 The
report's author compiled a chronological outline of key archaeological
sites that include burials and osteological data, 251 followed by reviews
of the literature on mortuary patterns,2 5 2 of biological anthropology
studies, 25 3 and of osteological studies. 25 4 The report also described
researchers' ongoing bioarchaeological work, focused on DNA analy-
sis 2 5 5 and on developing more extensive osteological studies, 25 6 which
are relevant for analyzing the biological and cultural affiliation of
early human remains.25 7 The report did not, however, draw any con-
clusions about the Ancient One's cultural affiliation, but instead was
limited to describing the existing literature while also indicating what
current research might ultimately prove helpful.
In summary, the archaeological data report was unable to reach a
conclusion as to either cultural continuities or discontinuities between
the Ancient One's group and area Native American groups because of
gaps in the archaeological record itself, fundamental disagreements
among archaeologists who worked in the area, and time restrictions
that necessitated ignoring some of the existing data. There was, how-
ever, no evidence of migration into the area as a source of discontinu-
ity, and key aspects of the topography and the region's economies had
remained in place between the Ancient One's time and the Lewis and
Clark visit. The evidence revealed by the historical and ethnographic
report suggested very long-term connections between the traditional
culture of the tribal claimants and the people who had inhabited the
area in the past. Finally, the linguistic report's evidence also sug-
gested cultural continuities between the area's indigenous peoples in
historic times and the ancient inhabitants of the area.
250. See Steven Hackenberger, Cultural Affiliation Study of the Kennewick Human
Remains: Review of Bio-Archaeological Information 1, at http://www.cr.nps.gov/
aad/kennewick/hackenberger.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). This report was
prepared by Dr. Steven Hackenberger of Central Washington University. He and
his associates sought to identify continuities, discontinuities, and gaps in the
data in these areas for the period from 9500 B.P. to the early nineteenth century.
See id.
251. See id. at 4.
252. See id. at 9-11.
253. See id. at 11-15.
254. See id. at 15-20.
255. See id. at 20.
256. See id. at 21-23.
257. See id. at 22.
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3. The DOI's Cultural Affiliation Conclusion
After considering the purpose of NAGPRA, NAGPRA's emphasis
on returning Native American remains to tribes, and the guidance
provided by the NAGPRA regulations, the DOI concluded that the evi-
dence established a reasonable link between the Kennewick remains
and the tribal claimants. 258 As summarized in a detailed report, 259
the DOI relied upon the geographic and oral tradition evidence, but
took a very cautious approach to some other evidence and treated it as
being too limited to allow the drawing of conclusions as to the cultural
affiliation between the group to which the Ancient One belonged and
the tribal claimants. 260 Working backwards in time, the DOI found
that cultural and historical evidence firmly established the link be-
tween the claimant tribes and the Plateau cultural pattern that ex-
isted in the region 2,000-3,000 years ago, 26 1 but additional evidence
was then needed to bridge the gap extending back to the period be-
tween 8,500 and 9,500 years ago, when the Ancient One and his group
lived there.26 2 The oral tradition evidence suggested a continuity be-
tween the Ancient One's group and the claimant tribes.26 3 Although
some cultural discontinuities were suggested by some of the evidence,
such as differences in population size, the perceived discontinuities
were due, at least in part, to the current lack of more complete evi-
dence about the period 8,500-9,500 years ago. 2 6 4 Secretary of the In-
terior Babbitt stressed that "none of the cultural discontinuities
suggested by the evidence are inconsistent with a cultural group con-
258. See Disposition Determination Letter, supra note 185, at 4; see also id. at 5 (stat-
ing the DOI's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence of cultural continuity
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Ancient One's group was
culturally affiliated with the claimant tribes).
259. The report accompanied the letter that conveyed the DOI's determination. See
Enclosure 3, in Disposition Determination Letter, supra note 185.
260. See Disposition Determination Letter, supra note 185, at 4. The evidence of burial
patterns, linguistic evidence, and morphological data were deemed too limited.
See id. The evidence of burial patterns for the period from 8,500 to 9,500 years
ago was very limited, and significant time gaps existed for other periods. See id.
The linguistic analysis also was unable, the DOI believed, to provide reliable evi-
dence for the Ancient One's period. See id. Finally, the morphological data was
inconclusive. While there were some differences in morphological characteristics
between members of the claimant tribes and the Ancient One, it was unclear
whether these differences indicated a cultural discontinuity between the two
groups or just indicated that the Ancient One's group subsequently intermixed
with other groups in the region, leaving descendants with different morphological
characteristics. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. For example, the claimant tribes possess similar traditional histories as to the
region's landscape and these histories make no reference to a migration in or out
of the region. See id.
264. See id. at 5.
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tinuously existing in the region, interacting with other groups migrat-
ing through the area and adapting to changing climatic conditions."26 5
In short, the DOI took a cautious approach to the evidence in the ex-
perts' reports, but still found enough evidence in the reports to be able
to conclude that the NAGPRA threshold for establishing cultural affil-
iation had been met. In addition, as Secretary Babbitt explained, be-
cause NAGPRA is Indian legislation, as indicated by the text of the
statute and its legislative history, the DOI was required to construe
any ambiguities in the statutory language liberally in favor of tribal
interests. 2 66
The DOI further determined that disposition to the tribal claim-
ants on the basis of aboriginal occupation was also appropriate. 26 7
The area was the subject of several Indian Claims Commission cases,
brought by the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation, in
which the Commission had determined that several tribes, including
the Umatilla tribes (the Umatilla, Walla Walla, and Cayuse), the Nez
Perce, and the Wayampam Band had used and occupied the area as
joint aboriginal land.268
Because the DOI concluded that the proper disposition of the An-
cient One's remains was to the tribal claimants on the basis of cultural
affiliation and aboriginal occupation, any study of the remains by the
public, without the permission of the tribes as the legal custodians of
the remains, was precluded by NAGPRA.269 Interior Secretary Bab-
bitt communicated the DOI's determination to the Department of the
Army on September 21, 2000.270
265. Id.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 5. The reasoning supporting the DOI determination was included in an
attachment to the letter. See Enclosure 4, in Disposition Determination Letter,
supra note 185.
268. See Disposition Determination Letter, supra note 185, at 5. The cases had re-
sulted in a compromise settlement so the aboriginal territory had not needed to
be fully delineated. See Enclosure 4, supra note 267, at 1. Although the statute's
aboriginal land provision referred to a "final judgment" of the ICC, the Secretary
thought that disposition under this provision should not be precluded "when the
ICC final judgment embodied a voluntary settlement agreement that did not spe-
cifically delineate aboriginal territory, yet where findings of fact were previously
published by the ICC that recognized the land in question as being subject to use
by several tribes." Id. at 3. This flexible approach was appropriate because
NAGPRA is Indian legislation and therefore the ambiguity canon of construction
applies. See id. at 2. In 1964, the ICC determined that the area in which the
Kennewick remains were later found was within an area that had not been exclu-
sively used by a single tribe, but that at the time an 1855 treaty was ratified (in
1859), the discovery area was within the Walla Walla Tribe's original title area.
See Enclosure 4, Attachment A, at 4, in Disposition Determination Letter, supra
note 185.
269. See Enclosure 4, Attachment A, supra note 268, at 6.
270. See Disposition Determination Letter, supra note 185, at 1.
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IV. THEY BLINDED ME WITH SCIENCE: BONNICHSEN v.
UNITED STATES
[Like any other group of priests and politicians ... scientists lie and fudge
about their conclusions as much as the most distrusted professions in our soci-
ety-lawyers and car dealers.2 7
1
A. The Empire Strikes Back: Imperial Anthropology Lays
Claim to the Ancient One
From the standpoint of the plaintiffs, the Kennewick dispute was
frustratingly familiar. Like their ancestors of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, the tribes were laying claim to human remains
and thus trying to interfere with the attempts of anthropologists to get
access to resources that they claimed for themselves and their profes-
sion. Once again, they were standing in the way of "progress," as they
had in past centuries by objecting to graverobbing by those who
sought to "prove" Indian inferiority and ripeness for extinction in the
new world of a superior civilization.272 In addition, the tribes' laying
claim to the Ancient One as an ancestor, without scientific evidence of
biological ties to him, demonstrated their stubborn adherence to the
far-reaching kinship ties and to the religiously influenced understand-
ing of history and time that the nineteenth century founders of an-
thropology had labeled primitive, and that government officials had
long tried to suppress through the assimilation process. That the
tribes had survived, and that their understanding of kinship, history,
and time survived as well, testified to the miscalculations of both the
anthropologists and the bureaucrats.
Moreover, from the plaintiff anthropologists' perspective, the
stakes were now even higher than they had been before. Other sets of
human remains were already being "lost to science" from existing col-
lections as a result of NAGPRA. Also, human remains, especially vir-
tually complete sets of remains, that have been radiocarbon dated to
be as old as the Ancient One's remains are in particularly short sup-
ply, because so few have been discovered and claimed as archaeologi-
cal resources. 2 73 Interest in the Kennewick remains was even further
271. VINE DELORIA JR., RED EARTH, WHITE LIES 41 (1995). The first phrase in the title
of Part IV was suggested by Thomas Dolby's song "She Blinded Me With Science."
See Thomas Dolby, Unofficial Fan Site, at http://www.tmdrfan.com/tmdr/lyrics/
tgaow/she blinded me withscience.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
272. See generally supra Part II.
273. The remains known to anthropologists and archaeologists as "Spirit Cave Man"
and "Buhl Woman" are other examples of remains believed to be of similar antiq-
uity. The Buhl Woman remains, which were discovered in 1989 and radiocarbon
dated to be over 10,000 years old, were reburied on the Fort Hall Indian Reserva-
tion, after the Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Council was notified of the find in accor-
dance with Idaho's Graves Protection Act. See Karen Bossick, Bones Found in
Magic Valley in 1989 Were Those of a Girl Who Lived at Least 11,600 Years Ago,
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heightened by the fact that they came to light during a period in which
fierce battles were being fought within the plaintiffs' profession over
competing theories as to the original peopling of the Americas. 27 4 Ca-
IDAHO STATESMAN, Aug. 12, 2003, at 3, available at 2003 WL 60747875;
Samantha Silva, A Famous Skeleton Returns to the Earth, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
vol. 25, no. 4 (Mar. 8, 1993), available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/
hcn.URLRemapper/1993 /mar08/dir/lead.html. The skeleton was analyzed by an
Arkansas Archaeological Survey team, in consultation with the Sho-
shone-Bannock Tribes, before its 1991 reburial, and was determined to have cra-
nial morphology that was similar to that of both American Indian and East Asian
populations. Andrew L. Slayman, News Briefs: Buhl Woman, ARCHAEOLOGY, vol.
51, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 1998), available at http://www.archaeology.org/9811/news
briefs/buhl.html. See also infra note 302 (noting differences of opinion among
investigators with respect to analysis of the remains). "Spirit Cave Man" was
excavated from Spirit Cave, Nevada and was found by the NAGPRA Review
Committee to have a relationship of shared group identity with the Fallon Pai-
ute-Shoshone Tribe, and was therefore required to be repatriated to the tribe.
See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Review Committee
Findings and Recommendations Regarding Human Remains and Associated
Funerary Objects from Spirit Cave in Nevada, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,463 (April 10,
2002). The remains were dated to be over 9,400 years old. Diedtra Henderson,
New Branch of the Human Family Tree? Kennewick Man, Other Skeletons May
Represent a New Human Branch, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, at A10, available
at 1997 WLNR 1445033.
274. For a thorough overview of current developments and competing theories on the
peopling of the Americas from the viewpoint of anthropologists and archaeolo-
gists, see THE FIRST AMERICANS: THE PLEISTOCENE COLONIZATION OF THE NEW
WORLD (Nina G. Jablonski ed. 2002). In 1999, plaintiff Robson Bonnichsen's
Center for the Study of the First Americans hosted a conference, called "Clovis
and Beyond," for the purpose of discussing research on the settlement of the
Americas. The conference was attended by over 1400 people, an indication of the
extent of interest in this issue. See Don Allan Hall and George Wisner, Clovis
and Beyond Draws Over 1,400, MAMMOTH TRUMPET, Jan. 2000, at 1, available at
http://www.centerfirstamericans.com/mt.html?a=2. For an additional view of
competing theories on the peopling of the Americas, which gives a sense of the
acrimonious nature of the debate, see David G. Anderson & J. Christopher Gil-
lam, Paleoindian Colonization of the Americas: Implications from an Examina-
tion of Physiography, Demography, and Artifact Distribution, 65 AvI. ANTIQUITY
43 (2000) (discussing possible movement corridors used by initial settlers in the
colonization of the Americas and exploring the implications of these routes, when
coupled with demographic and archaeological evidence, for the spread and diver-
sification of the initial settlers); John H. Moore & Michael E. Moseley, How Many
Frogs Does it Take to Leap Around the Americas? Comments on Anderson and
Gillam, 66 Am. ANTIQUITY 526 (2001) (discussing the allegedly dubious nature of
some of Anderson and Gillam's assumptions); David G. Anderson & J. Christo-
pher Gillam, Paleoindian Interaction and Mating Networks: Reply to Moore and
Moseley, 66 AM. ANTIQUITY 530 (2001) (responding to Moore and Moseley's crit-
icsms). For yet another view, focused on human craniofacial data, see C. Loring
Brace et al., Old World Sources of the First New World Human Inhabitants: A
Comparative Craniofacial View, 98 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 10,017 (2001) (dis-
cussing the evidence from craniofacial data supporting the hypothesis that a first
population of settlers, with both European and Asian roots, entered the Western
Hemisphere between 15,000 and 12,000 years ago, and that a second population,
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reers can be built-or not-on the basis of access to the remains and
sites that are believed to date back to earliest American human
habitation. For those nearing the end of their careers, access to dis-
coveries like that of the Kennewick remains represents an opportunity
to "go out with a bang." Indeed, one of the arguments made in the
Bonnichsen case was that several of the plaintiffs were advanced in
years, so haste was needed so that they could have access to the re-
mains before they retired or died. Even if all, or the vast majority, of
the tests and analyses that the plaintiffs sought to perform on the re-
mains had already been carried out, in many cases by experts sug-
gested by the plaintiffs themselves, this was not considered an
adequate substitute for being able to satisfy their own scientific curi-
osity by touching and examining, and perhaps even partially destroy-
ing for the purposes of further testing, the bones personally.
From the claimant tribes' perspective as well, this encounter had
an all too familiar ring. Once again, they found themselves fighting
for what they believed to be their own against the demands of outsid-
ers claiming greater entitlement. In the early nineteenth century, in
Johnson v. M'Intosh,275 Indian tribes' "backwardness"-their alleged
failure to farm and enclose the land and to thus make it their own in
the landscape-altering way that Euro-Americans considered legally
significant-had been used to justify their loss of land to the scions of
a "more advanced" civilization. This attitude was bolstered by the ex-
pectation that Indians would obligingly "recede into the forest," as the
Supreme Court put it in Johnson, because they were believed to be
unable to live in the vicinity of manufacturers and agriculturists, and
thus would free up land for settlement.2 76 The less benign version of
this expectation was the "dying race" hypothesis of nineteenth century
anthropologists,277 which envisioned the tribes as doomed to extinc-
tion, rather than as simply being doomed to being pushed farther west
as settlers' seemingly ever-increasing greed for land advanced the
line of settlement. The anthropologists' demands were focused not on
the tribes' real property-although having tribes removed from their
with Asian roots, entered the Western Hemisphere between 5,000 and 2,000
years ago).
275. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
276. Id. at 590-91 ("[A]s the white population advanced, that of the Indians necessa-
rily receded; the country in the immediate neighborhood of agriculturists became
unfit for them; the game fled into thicker and more unbroken forests, and the
Indians followed. The soil, to which the crown originally claimed title, being no
longer occupied by its ancient inhabitants, was parcelled out .... ). This view was
based on an erroneous understanding of Native American agricultural practices
and lifestyles in general. See generally Allison M. Dussias, Squaw Drudges,
Farm Wives, and the Dann Sisters' Last Stand: American Indian Women's Resis-
tance to Domestication and the Denial of Their Property Rights, 77 N.C. L. REV.
637, 648-53, 656-70 (1999) (discussing tribal agricultural practices).
277. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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land had certainly been convenient-but rather on their personal
property-funerary objects, sacred objects, and other items, as well as
on the very bones of their deceased family members. NAGPRA
seemed to have largely put an end to graverobbing, at least on tribal
and federal lands, but in the case of the Kennewick remains the tribes
found themselves fighting the same battle all over again. Once more,
they were faced with anthropologists' claims of entitlement. Once
more, their understandings of kinship, ancestry and history were
treated as uncivilized and unscientific, and therefore not entitled to
respect from the dominant society and its judicial system. For the
tribes, as for the anthropologists, the stakes were high; what was
claimed was not land or goods, but rather the body of a man whom
they understood to be their kinsman.
1. The Plaintiffs' Claim-Science Battling Religion
A sense of outrage at Indian tribes trying to stand, once again, in
the way of anthropologists' access to a human body that interested
them was not alone sufficient for the plaintiffs to proceed with a legal
claim. The plaintiffs had to cast in legal terms their demands for ac-
cess and claims of entitlement to human remains that could not, in
any sense, be said to belong to them personally.
The plaintiffs presented themselves to the courts as "renowned
scientists" whose ability to carry on their profession had been ad-
versely affected by the defendants' decisions.2 78 Presumably money
was at stake, as well-funding, the life blood of research (along with
eager graduate students), could be expected to flow to those with ac-
278. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 3, Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp.
2d 1116 (D. Or. 2002) (No. 96-1481-JE), available at http://www.friendsofpast.
org/kennewick-mancourt/communications/amended-complaint.html [hereinafter
Amended Complaint]. Plaintiff Robson Bonnichsen was the Director of the
Center for the Study of the First Americans, which was housed at Oregon State
University when the litigation began. The other plaintiffs were as follows: C.
Loring Brace, Curator of Biological Anthropology at the University of Michigan
Museum of Anthropology; anthropology professors George W. Gill, C. Vance
Haynes, Jr., Richard L. Jantz, and D. Gentry Steele; Douglas W. Owsley, division
head for physical anthropology at the National Museum of Natural History at the
Smithsonian Institution; and Dennis J. Stanford, Director of the Paleo Indian
Program at the Smithsonian Institution. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367
F.3d 864, 868 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). The website of the Anthropology Department
at Texas A & M University, where the Center for the Study of the First Ameri-
cans is now located, describes anthropology and its sub-fields as follows: "Anthro-
pology is the study of humankind over the entire world and throughout time.
Anthropologists study existing cultures and human behavior (cultural anthropol-
ogy), traditions (folklore), prehistoric cultures and lifeways (archaeology), the bio-
logical makeup and evolution of humans (physical anthropology), and the origin
and nature of language (linguistics)." TAMU, Department of Anthropology, at
http://anthropology.tamu.edu (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
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cess to such an important discovery as the Kennewick remains. 27 9
The plaintiffs claimed, on behalf of scholars and students in general, a
"right" to study the remains, and argued that their First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech and to access to information and their
Fifth Amendment right to due process had been violated by the de-
fendants' interpretation of NAGPRA.280 The plaintiffs were thus
claiming rights, as private citizens, to have access to property found
in a federally managed area that belonged to the U.S. Government
(unless it belonged to tribal claimants under NAGPRA). A similar
claim relating to access to government property, though brought by
Native Americans, was rejected by the Supreme Court in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,28 1 in which the
Court considered three tribes' argument that their free exercise rights
were threatened by government plans to build a logging road through
sacred areas in a national forest. In Lyng, after admitting that the
proposed action would virtually destroy the plaintiffs' ability to prac-
tice their religion, the Court recast their constitutional claim into
property law terminology, and then bristled at the thought of the
plaintiffs trying to dictate to the government what it could do with its
own property. 28 2 The federal courts in the Bonnichsen case, however,
approached the anthropologists' rights of access claim with quite a dif-
ferent attitude and gave them a much more sympathetic reception.2 83
The Bonnichsen plaintiffs purported to make their claims not only
on behalf of themselves, as individuals with careers at stake, but also
on behalf of the American nation (although only their own access was
279. Anthropologists' and archaeologists' personal and professional interests are
threatened whenever reburial of human remains in which they are interested is
proposed. See Larry J. Zimmerman, Anthropology and Responses to the Reburial
Issue, in INDIANS AND ANTHROPOLOGISTS: VINE DELORIA JR., AND THE CRITIQUE OF
ANTHROPOLOGY 92, 101 (Thomas Biolsi & Larry Zimmerman eds., 1997) ("As the
reburial controversy 'heated up,' many physical anthropologists simply reacted to
Indian demands in an understandably defensive way. After all, many had in-
vested years of their lives in the study of human skeletal remains. With some
justification, they felt that an important database was being threatened and, per-
haps, their livelihood as well."). It stands to reason that for a plaintiff like Rob-
son Bonnichsen, who, until his death in December 2004, was the Director of the
Center for the Study of the First Americans, which he moved from Oregon State
University to Texas A & M University in July 2002, funding needs must be of
particular concern, in light of the need to fund the Center's many programs. See
generally Center for the Study of the First Americans, at http://csfa.tamu.edu
(last visited Aug. 5, 2005). Bonnichsen is playing a role in Center funding even
after his death, as the Center has set up a memorial fund to receive donations in
his memory. See Center for the Study of the First Americans, Dr. Robson Bon-
nichsen, at http://www.centerfirstamericans.com/memorial-fund.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 5, 2005).
280. Amended Complaint, supra note 278, at 10-11.
281. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
282. Id. at 453.
283. See infra section IV.B.
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of immediate concern to them). They claimed that the remains of the
Ancient One constituted a "national treasure," which, if "properly
studied" (in other words, studied by the plaintiffs themselves) could
"provide information important to an understanding of the peopling of
the Americas and human evolution in general."28 4 Study of the re-
mains would be of "major benefit" to the nation, and could, apparently
singlehandedly, lead to a better understanding of the earliest human
populations of what the plaintiffs eurocentrically referred to as the
"New World."285 The plaintiffs claimed that building such a "better
understanding" was an issue of "great importance" to all people of the
Americas, including Native Americans. 286 This claim ignored the per-
spective of the tribal claimants, who were confident that they already
knew everything significant that could be known about the history of
their people in the region, and who did not feel a need for the kind of
understanding that might arise from the plaintiffs' method of study-
ing the remains. As Professor Tsosie has explained, this kind of "com-
mon heritage" claim made by the plaintiffs, which is aimed at securing
coveted objects for scientific study, amounts to nothing more than an
imperialistic appeal for everyone to "accept the supreme value of sci-
entific knowledge over all other cultural, political and social val-
ues."2 8 7 In addition, the claim echoed the attitude toward Native
American rights and resources that for so long had characterized judi-
cial decision-making and government policy-making-the rights are
expendable, and their resources can be taken away by non-Native
Americans, when the "national interest" so demands. The claim also
brings to mind past allegations that Native American demands and
ancient claims were standing in the way of progress, and that their
obstructionism had to come to an end, for their own good as well as the
good of the nation.
The claim that the remains of the Ancient One are tied to all Amer-
icans represents an about-face from the attitudes of nineteenth cen-
tury anthropologists. In the past, the claimed difference between
Native Americans and (white) Americans was what mattered-Native
Americans were the doomed, backward "other," and as people who
would ultimately leave no survivors, their property and ultimately
their very bodies were up for grabs. Anthropologists distanced them-
selves from the humanity of Native Americans and thus became com-
fortable with robbing their graves or enjoying the spoils of others'
graverobbing. Now, however, the better legal strategy for the plain-
tiffs was to claim a kind of national kinship with the Ancient One, in
keeping with which his remains could be presented as belonging to all
284. Amended Complaint, supra note 278, at 5.
285. Id. at 6-7.
286. Id.
287. Tsosie, supra note 81, at 632.
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Americans, while the particular ties between the Ancient One and
contemporary Native Americans were denied. This strategy also had
assimilationist overtones. By claiming him as one of their own, the
plaintiffs were implicitly seeking to erase the distinctiveness of the
Ancient One and his community, and of his descendants, as compared
to contemporary Euro-Americans.28 8
The plaintiffs also argued that if they were not afforded the access
to the Ancient One's remains that they demanded, then this would
"preclude his descendants, if any such descendants exist today, of
knowledge about their ancestry."28 9 Again, this ignores the perspec-
tive of the tribal claimants; they already claimed the Ancient One as
his descendants and already knew all that they needed to know about
him. Respect for their ancestor required that he be returned to the
rest from which he had been disturbed, rather than being subjected to
further objectification and destruction. The plaintiffs, however, ap-
parently understood the term "descendants" to refer to direct biologi-
cal descendants of the Ancient One, and would not acknowledge the
claimant tribes' status as descendants of the Ancient One, in the ab-
sence of scientifically based evidence of direct genetic ties.
The plaintiffs presented themselves as the defenders of "science"
against religion, and thus sought to obscure the real conflict-between
human rights and anthropologists' demands-that NAGPRA was de-
signed to address. In other words, they claimed, as scientists, to be
engaged in "a unified enterprise defined by a set of shared attributes
that uniquely determine what it is for [their] discipline to be scientific,
that set real science apart from other (lesser) epistemic enterprises,
and that trump any non-scientific interests or knowledge claims that
might challenge the epistemic authority of science."2 90 Much like
288. Professor Ragsdale has observed that:
Science has long been a battleground for those with other vested inter-
ests. Behind the first breeze of a scientific conclusion of basic similarity
between native culture and mainstream America might come the re-
newed storms of assimilation and termination. The tribes, once de-
scribed by Felix Cohen as miners' canaries in the shifting gases of
American politics, are bracing for the onslaught.
John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Tinkering with the Past, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11, 2002, at A20;
see also generally John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Some Philosophical, Political and Legal
Implications of American Archeological and Anthropological Theory, 70 UJMKC L.
REV. 1 (2001).
289. Amended Complaint, supra note 278, at 7.
290. Alison Wylie, Questions of Evidence, Legitimacy, and the (Dis)unity of Science, 65
AM. ANTIQUITY, 227, 229 (2000) (defining science as seen by science advocates
who insist that such a thing as "science" exists). Critics, on the other hand, have
raised "skeptical questions about expansive claims of authority made on behalf of
science" and have challenged
"the presumption that the sciences are uniquely non-parochial in scope
and warrant, that they share a body of investigative practices capable of
establishing knowledge that decisively transcends the contexts of its pro-
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their professional forbears, they believed that they were being stymied
by Indians' religiously influenced sensibilities about their dead. They
accused the defendants of harboring a "desire to suppress legitimate
scientific inquiry" and of depriving them of access to, and information
about, the remains "for reasons based on religious beliefs and doc-
trines,"29 1 which was alleged to violate the Establishment Clause.292
In light of the government's past policies of systematically sup-
pressing Native American religions and of unabashedly financing mis-
sionary activities aimed at "Christianizing" tribes, and the Supreme
Court's rejection of Native American religious freedom claims in the
Lyng and Smith cases,29 3 the idea that the government was deliber-
ately extending a constitutionally impermissible preference to a Na-
tive American religion and thus "establishing" it as something akin to
a national religion may well have had a ring of irony to it from the
perspective of the tribal claimants. The plaintiffs in effect sought to
discount the tribes' claim as being based on their religious faith, and
to subordinate it to the anthropologists' claim, which was based in-
stead on their own faith in their "science." Moreover, if science is the
antithesis of religion, and the anthropologists were asking the courts
and government officials to privilege science over religion, it could be
observed that they, too, were, in effect, seeking what might be viewed
as an Establishment Clause violation-government preference for,
and endorsement of, non-religion over religion.29 4
duction. . . . In reaction, the defenders of science reaffirm the divide
between science and nonscience, and insist on the unique integrity and
authority of science as a corporate whole. "
Id. at 228. Alison Wylie has observed that the antagonistic exchanges over NAG-
PRA are linked to "the fear of what archaeologists stand to lose if scientific ideals
are undermined in any way." Id.
291. Amended Complaint, supra note 278, at 9-10.
292. Id. at 10-11, 13. The plaintiffs did not pursue this claim in their final district
court appearance so it was not addressed by the Ninth Circuit.
293. See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-
Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Ex-
ercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 776-805 (1997) (discussing the history of gov-
ernment policy toward Native American religions); id. at 818-19 (discussing
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); id. at
828-31 (discussing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988)).
294. Some Supreme Court Justices have interpreted the Establishment Clause as re-
quiring neutrality between religion and non-religion, and therefore the govern-
ment cannot favor either. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 644 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It might also be ar-
gued that the plaintiffs' faith in science is itself a kind of religion and that favor-
ing this "faith" would violate the Establishment Clause. See FRNK S. RAVITCH,
LAw AND RELIGION, A READER: CASES, CONCEPrs, AND THEORY 524 (2004) (noting
that a belief in science and proof by the scientific method might qualify as "relig-
ion" under the approach to defining religion that has been developed by the Su-
preme Court).
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It should also be noted that the plaintiffs' demands, put forth in
the name of science under attack from religion, obscured the fact that
despite the objections of the tribal claimants, the remains had already
been subjected to extensive scientific examination, most of it corre-
sponding to the kind of analysis that the plaintiffs had claimed was
required. The plaintiffs' claim could not be that scientific examination
had not taken place because of the tribal claimants' religious scruples,
as this would have been blatantly false. Their only objections could be
that not all of the analyses that qualified experts had already per-
formed had been carried out exactly as the plaintiffs would have done
them, and that the analyses had not been done by the plaintiffs them-
selves. In short, it cannot be denied that "science" had already had
access to the remains, and had even managed to deliberately destroy
part of them for its own purposes, regardless of objections that might
be attributed to "religion."
Finally, the plaintiffs' argument that their claims, as anthropolo-
gists, were being brought on behalf of science reflects an incomplete
characterization of their profession and field of study. While practi-
tioners in the fields of anthropology (particularly physical, or biologi-
cal, anthropology) and its sub-discipline archaeology have become
more scientifically oriented in recent years,29 5 the fact remains that
they are still typically categorized as social (or "soft") sciences, in con-
trast with the "hard" sciences, such as chemistry and physics. In
plaintiff Robson Bonnichsen's home institution, Texas A & M Univer-
sity, for example, anthropology and archaeology are housed in the Col-
lege of Liberal Arts with such fields as political science, English, and
history, while the sciences are housed in the College of Science.296 In
the hard sciences, unlike the soft sciences, researchers can develop a
hypothesis, frame an experiment to test the hypothesis, and prove or
disprove the hypothesis; another researcher can perform the same ex-
295. See, e.g., ADovAsio & PAGE, supra note 21, at 148 (discussing the "New Archaeol-
ogy" and its focus on developing a more scientific approach); see also Wylie, supra
note 290, at 228 (referring to the New Archaeology's "scientizing ambitions").
296. See College of Liberal Arts at Texas A & M University, at http://clla.tamu.edu/
REALP.pl?term=degrees (last visited Aug. 5, 2005); College of Science at Texas
A & M University, at http://www.science.tamu.edu (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
Christopher Chippindale, of the Cambridge University Museum of Archaeology &
Anthropology, has observed that "[i]n a structured ordering of sciences, classical
mechanics-dealing with predictable and limited physical systems-comes at one
end, while archaeology is at the other." Christopher Chippindale, Capta and
Data: On the True Nature of Archaeological Information, 65 AM. ANTIQUITY 605,
606 (2000). He has also noted that in archaeology the data-"those statements
we are given that encapsulate the real-world problem at issue"-"are not inde-
pendent of the conclusions, for different viewpoints and interests direct what
kind of conclusion (if any) is pursued and guide the researcher toward those
kinds of data pertinent not just to the problem at issue, but toward the preferred
view that is taken of it." Id. at 605.
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periment under the same conditions and should obtain the same re-
sult. 29 7 As archaeologist J.M. Adovasio has written, there are still
doubts as to "whether the field of archaeology can ever be pursued as a
science,"298 as opposed to being a field in which at least some practi-
tioners "develop a theory and then set out to find the data to support
it"299 or have theories inspired by "dreams" and then "persuade them-
selves that the evidence is supportive."30 0 Moreover, even the sub-
field of physical anthropology, with its use of precise measurements
and statistical analyses, is not as objective and "scientific" as it may at
first appear. Anthropologists have themselves noted, for example,
that some of the variables that are considered in craniometric analy-
ses "tend to exhibit a high degree of intra- and inter-observer er-
ror,"301 and even if anthropologists agree upon the specific
measurements of particular remains, they may still disagree about
the precise methods, protocols, and reference samples that should be
used to analyze them, and on what conclusions can be drawn from
them.30 2 The plaintiffs ignored these realities. Instead, by presenting
their field of study as science, which must be privileged over religion
and any other "nonscientific" interests or foundations for knowledge,
the plaintiffs claimed a status for anthropology that is itself debatable,
and that is belied by the categorization of anthropology and archaeol-
ogy by academic institutions, in the hope that their misrepresentation
would convince the courts of the legitimacy of their claim.
2. The Tribal Claim-We Are Still Here
The defense by the U.S. Government of the DOI's NAGPRA deter-
mination was based on the requirements of NAGPRA and its related
regulations, and on the appropriateness of the way in which govern-
ment officials acted in carrying out their statutory responsibilities.
The tribal claimants also rested their claim on the proper interpreta-
tion and carrying out of NAGPRA's provisions by the DOI. In addi-
tion, they also claimed the remains of the Ancient One on grounds
that reflected their own perspective on such fundamental matters as
the nature of kinship and community, the sources of historical knowl-
edge, and the nature of time itself, as the discussion below reveals.
297. See ADOVASIO & PAGE, supra note 21, at 111; see also id. at 182 (discussing the
concept of replicability in the hard sciences and its absence in archaeology).
298. Id. at xvi.
299. Id. at 200.
300. Id.; see also Tsosie, supra note 81, at 618-19 (discussing whether archaeology can
be regarded as a science).
301. Powell & Rose, supra note 152, at 13.
302. Compare Thomas J. Green et al., The Buhl Burial: A Paleoindian Woman from
Southern Idaho, 63 AM. ANTIQUITY 437-56 (1998), with Walter A. Neves & Max
Blum, The Buhl Burial: A Comment on Green et al., 65 AM. ANTIQUrY 191-93
(2000).
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First of all, the tribal claim to the remains reflected a belief that
the physical remains of all human beings, regardless of race, are de-
serving of respectful treatment. For buried remains that have been
disinterred, this would include reburial, so that the remains could be
returned to the state of rest from which they had been disturbed. As
tribal leader Armand Minthorn explained, "Our elders have taught us
that once a body goes into the ground, it is meant to stay there until
the end of time," so if the Ancient One's remains were returned to the
claimant tribes, they would "re-bury him and put him back to rest."3 03
The tribal claimants' concern for the fate of disinterred human re-
mains is not limited to Indian remains. The tribes believe that they
have "an inherent responsibility to care for those who are no longer
with us ... [and] to protect all human burials, regardless of race. We
are taught to treat them all with the same respect."30 4
Respect for human burials is not a sentiment that is at odds with
the sensibilities of most Americans. Presumably even the plaintiffs
would agree that at least the remains of all recently deceased individ-
uals, even Native Americans, should be treated with dignity, and
should not presumptively be available as the objects of scientific in-
quiry. Legal entitlement to this kind of respectful treatment was, of
course, a long time in coming for the indigenous inhabitants of the
Americas, and remains incomplete. Regarded in the past by many
Euro-Americans either as less than fully human or as existing at a
lower level of human development and civilization, Native Americans
were not afforded equal treatment under the law during life or after
death. Indeed, this attitude was not completely laid to rest with the
end of the nineteenth century, as the need for a statute like NAGPRA
made clear. Despite anthropologists' fears over NAGPRA's effects on
the availability of the resources that they see as indispensable to their
careers, NAGPRA has not brought a complete halt to the robbing of
Native American graves within the United States or ensured the re-
turn of all Native American remains to Native American individuals
or tribes. As Armand Minthorn has noted, Native American remains
continue to be held by museums and other institutions, "waiting for
the day when they can return to the earth, and waiting for the day
that scientists and others pay them the respect they are due."30 5
Native American remains continue to be held by private collectors
as well. In 1997, in the very state in which the remains of the Ancient
303. Armand Minthorn, Human Remains Should be Reburied (Sept. 1996), available
at http://www.umatilla.nsn.us/kmanl.html. The focus in this discussion is on the
attitudes of the claimant tribes toward human remains and toward the remains
of the Ancient One in particular. For discussion of how tribes differ in terms of
their attitudes toward death, the deceased, and repatriation, as well as some
commonalities, see Tsosie, supra note 81, at 633, 635-40.
304. Minthorn, supra note 303, at 2.
305. Id.
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One were found, the remains of at least ten Native Americans were
found dumped in the Snoqualmie River, as if the bones, and the once
living people whom they represented, were simply garbage to be dis-
posed of when the person who had collected them deemed it expedient
to do S0. 3 0 6 A morbid and disrespectful fascination with Native Amer-
ican remains seemingly penetrates American society at many levels.
The Skull and Bones Society, an organization unofficially tied to Yale
University whose members include both President George W. Bush
and Senator John F. Kerry, is believed by some to hold the skull of the
Apache leader Geronimo, which was reportedly obtained through
graverobbing by President Bush's grandfather. 30 7 This allegation has
persisted long enough and received sufficient attention to prompt a
NAGPRA Review Committee member to request an investigation. 3O8
It is illuminating and sobering to realize that even Americans with
high political status-and high political hopes-feel no need to re-
spond to these allegations. Perhaps they believe that for most Ameri-
can voters, who may have seen the remains and grave goods of
indigenous peoples in museums, the kind of treatment that Native
American remains receive is unimportant.
The basis for the difference of opinion between the plaintiffs and
the tribal claimants as to the kind of treatment to which the Ancient
One's remains are entitled warrants careful analysis, given that re-
spectful treatment of the dead is a commonly shared American value.
One explanation for their differing views might be that the plaintiffs
had something to gain, in terms of potential career advancement and
maybe even research support, from not having the remains reburied,
and their beliefs as to what treatment was appropriate were based on
this calculation. Armand Minthorn has described the anthropologists
who want to study the Ancient One's remains as believing "that he
306. Scott Sunde, Clues Found in Mystery of Bones; A Collection May have Been
Dumped in River, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 23, 1997, at B1, available
at 1997 WLNR 1899732. The bones were believed to be about two hundred years
old; radiocarbon dating and DNA analysis were not done, at the request of the
tribe on whose historical lands they were found, because such analysis would
have necessitated breaking or grinding portions of the bones. See id. The bones
were believed to have been part of a collection because some of them had been
treated with shellac or varnish, some were found in a burlap sack, and the ab-
sence of algae growing on the bones indicated that they had been in the river for
only a short time. See id.
307. Sherry Hutt, If Geronimo Was Jewish: Equal Protection and the Cultural Prop-
erty Rights of Native Americans, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527, 538 n.75, 560 n.211
(2004). Some believe that Prescott Bush, along with five other army captains,
partially exhumed Geronimo's remains in 1918 from their resting place in the
Apache cemetery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Id. at 538 n.75.
308. Kim Martineau, The Skull, and Skull and Bones: Tale of Yale Society and Gero-
nimo Won't Die, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 16, 2004, available at http://www.ct
now.com/news/local/hc-skullbones08l6.artaugl6,1,564845,print.story?coll=.
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should be further desecrated for the sake of science, and for their own
personal gain."3 0 9
Setting this possible self-interested motivation aside, though, the
plaintiffs' views as to what treatment is appropriate for the Ken-
newick remains-namely, their conviction that the remains should be
subjected to further study by themselves, and possibly to additional
testing-related destruction-suggest a sense of separation from the
human being whose remains are at issue. For at least some of the
plaintiffs' anthropological forebears, the sense of separation that al-
lowed them to treat Native American remains as objects for anthropo-
logical inquiry seemingly stemmed from racial prejudice.
Anthropologist Ales Hrdlicka, for example, dug up freshly buried
corpses at the Larsen Bay native community, despite the anguish that
he knew this caused to the deceased individuals' surviving family
members, whom he treated with utter contempt.3 10 It is difficult to
imagine that he would have thought it appropriate to treat the re-
mains of recently deceased white Americans in the same way, even if
the law had so allowed. The perceived racial divide thus may have
allowed him to see himself as separate from the remains he collected,
and enabled him to be comfortable with treating them as he did.
Although the persistence of Native American graverobbing and
bone collecting indicates that some Americans continue to tolerate
treatment for Native American remains that presumably they would
not countenance for other human remains, there has been no express
indication that the plaintiffs share the blatantly racist sentiments of
Ales Hrdlicka. Nonetheless, they also are comfortable with handling,
and with partially destroying, the disinterred human remains at the
center of the dispute in the Bonnichsen litigation. Their comments
suggest that it is the temporal divide, rather than a racial divide, that
they see as existing between themselves and the Ancient One that en-
ables them to treat his bones as objects for study rather than as a
disinterred human corpse. For the plaintiffs, the fact that the Ancient
One died so long ago provides them with a basis to distance them-
selves from him as a fellow human being, and to think of him instead
as merely an object of scientific curiosity. In their eyes, because the
Ancient One lived in the distant past, he "belongs" to no one as kin,
but rather to everyone as a fascinating object from the past.
To the tribal claimants, however, a temporal distance between the
present day and the Ancient One's time has not lessened their sense of
bearing a responsibility to treat his remains with the same respect
and dignity with which the bodies of more recently deceased individu-
als are treated. Although the tribal claimants have not publicly ex-
309. Minthorn, supra note 303, at 1.
310. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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pressed any explicit views about the significance of the temporal
divide between themselves and the Ancient One, their refusal to make
the temporal divide-a divide that anthropologists tell them is vast-
determinative of their obligations is consistent with the traditional
sense of time commonly attributed to the indigenous peoples of the
United States. The traditional indigenous world view conceives of
time not in the linear and "progress"-oriented way of Western thought,
in which time is clearly divided into past, present, and future, but in a
cyclical and reciprocal manner.3 1 1 This cyclical understanding of time
is reflected in what is transmitted through oral tradition:
Events or processes transmitted through oral traditions tend not to be re-
counted in terms of time past or time future in the linear sense. Indeed most
Native American languages do not have past and future tenses; they reflect
rather a perennial reality of the now. The rich mythic accounts of creation, for
example, do not tell of chronological time past, but of processes that are eter-
nally happening. The same processes are recurring now and are to recur in
other future cycles.
3 1 2
Although the recounting of tribal history may begin with phrases such
as "in the long ago," this phrase "does not refer to a historical period of
a linear time past, but usually refers to a qualitative condition of ear-
lier existence which, through the telling of the myth, may be mysteri-
ously reintegrated and realized in the immediacy of the timeless
now."3 13 This perspective understands "all worlds-natural and su-
pernatural, ancestral and contemporary-and their inhabitants as si-
multaneous, coequal, and balanced."3 14 By the same token,
individuals who lived in the past may not be seen as "dead and gone"
in the way that Euro-American anthropologists perceive them;
rather, they may be seen as spiritually, even if not physically, alive.
Commenting on the remains of the woman known to anthropologists
as "Buhl Woman" and radiocarbon dated to over 10,000 years old,
which were re-buried on the Fort Hall Reservation, Sho-
311. See JOSEPH EPES BRowN, THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 4,
49-50, 118-20 (1982).
312. Id. at 49-50; see also id. at 84-85 ("The recitation of a myth defining creation, for
example, is not experienced in terms of an event of linear time past, but rather of
a happening of eternal reality, true and real now and forever, a time on the 'knife
edge between the past and the future.'"), 86 ("[C]reation ... occurs not just once
out of nothingness in linear time past, but is an event ever occurring and recur-
ring in cyclical fashion, just as the observable cycle of days or seasons speak of
death and rebirth. . . . [This understanding of creation] shifts the orientation
away from creation understood as a single event of time past, to the reality of
those immediately experienced processes of creation ever happening and observa-
ble through all the multiple forms and forces of creation.").
313. Id. at 98.
314. Rennard Strickland, Implementing the National Policy of Understanding, Pre-
serving, and Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian Peoples and Native Hawaiians:
Human Rights, Sacred Objects, and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 175,
182 (1992).
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shone-Bannock anthropologist Diana Yupe stated that she is "'the
Mother of us all .... To us, she is our ancestor, and hers is not just a
decomposed body; she is alive."'315
Within the context of a world view that has been influenced by
such an understanding of time and the past, the period during which
the Ancient One lived does not seem as distant and utterly divorced
from the present as it does to anthropologists. As Walter Echo-Hawk
has put it, "We don't accept any artificial cutoff date set by scientists
to separate us from our ancestors .... What Europeans want to do
with their dead is their business .... We have different values."316
This perspective can foster a sense of responsibility to those living at
different times, all of whom can be seen as equal parts of an organic,
continuing community, extending from the seemingly distant past
into the present, and beyond into the future. The Western linear
sense of time and process, by contrast, assumes that what came ear-
lier is inferior to what came more recently-"the more and the new are
mysteriously and automatically identified with the better."317 It was
under the influence of this understanding of time and "progress" that
past anthropologists and others viewed Native Americans as ranking
low on a hierarchy of civilization and as "innately inferior in their hu-
manity and lifeways to people of modern civilization." 3 18 And this
perspective allows today's anthropologists to see the remains of the
Ancient One as objects from a distant, primitive past, which have lost
their status as human. They therefore treat these remains as not be-
ing entitled to the deferential treatment owed to the remains of re-
cently deceased human beings.
The view of the past shared by archaeologists and physical anthro-
pologists like the plaintiffs also leads them to objectify human re-
mains like those of the Ancient One. Their view can be characterized
as a "technical rationality that reduces the past and all else it exam-
ines to a simple 'dead' exteriority open to all manner of investigation
and manipulation."319 When the plaintiffs treat the past as "gone, ex-
tinct, or lost with reburial, [they] send a strong message to Indians
that Indians themselves are extinct." For Indians, acceptance of this
view of the past "would actually destroy the present .... If the past is
315. Virginia Morell, An Anthropological Culture Shift, SCIENCE, v. 264, n. 5155, at 20
(Apr. 1, 1994) (quoting Diana K. Yupe); see also Tsosie, supra note 81, at 636-38
(discussing Native Americans' views on the connections between themselves and
their ancestors and their sense of ancestral remains and sites as being "alive").
For another account of a long-awaited return of an ancestor to rest, see Kevin P.
Peniska, Chief Long Wolf Returns Home After a Century, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY,
Oct. 6-Oct. 13, 1997, at Al.
316. Morell, supra note 315 (quoting Walter R. Echo-Hawk).
317. BROWN, supra note 311, at 117; see also id. at 50.
318. Id. at 118.
319. Zimmerman, supra note 279, at 102.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the present, excavated human remains are not devoid of personality
and must be respected as a living person should be."320 By using any
other approach, anthropologists "are actually showing disrespect to
the person that is the remains and to contemporary Indians."3 2 ' The
plaintiffs' objectification of human remains and dismissal of the past
as being dead and gone thus puts them seriously at odds with the tri-
bal perspective.
It is also clear that the tribal claimants' sense of responsibility to
the Ancient One stems not just from a sense that the passage of time
has not robbed him of his right, as a human being, to be treated as
more than a mere object for study. In addition, the tribes feel an obli-
gation to try to see that his remains are treated with dignity because
of their recognition of him as an ancestor. Their general respect for
his remains as human remains is accompanied by a more particular-
ized respect for the remains as their ancestor's remains. From the tri-
bal claimants' perspective, the Ancient One is an individual who was
undoubtedly part of a community that lived on their lands thousands
of years ago, long before the arrival of Euro-American settlers. As
Armand Minthorn explained, his tribe "has ties to this individual be-
cause he was uncovered in our traditional homeland - a homeland
where we still retain fishing, hunting, gathering, and other rights
under our 1855 Treaty with the US Government."32 2 The archaeologi-
cal evidence that the Ancient One lived over 9,000 years ago does not
lessen their sense of connectedness to him as an ancestor, but rather
strengthens it. The claimant tribes' people have been part of this
land, as they know from their oral histories, "since the beginning of
time," and so the discovery of very ancient human bones in their tradi-
tional homeland is wholly compatible with their beliefs. 323
The tribes' claim to the Ancient One also indicates their under-
standing of kinship and community ties. They do not consider genetic
or other biologically based evidence necessary to prove the Ancient
One's kinship with them. This reflects a more inclusive sense of kin-
ship than that of the plaintiffs, for whom the lack of any scientifically
proven biological link between the remains and contemporary tribal
members is determinative. NAGPRA's provisions enshrine at least
partial respect for the tribal perspective on kinship. The ownership
provisions give first priority to "lineal descendants"-a term that is
undefined in the statute but which suggests the kind of direct link
between the individual whose remains are at issue and living individ-
uals that would satisfy mainstream genealogists. Failing the exis-
tence of such descendants, however, NAGPRA looks more broadly for
320. Id. at 103.
321. Id.
322. Minthorn, supra note 303, at 1.
323. Id. at 2.
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relationships with the deceased individual and, in effect, assigns
tribes the status of next of kin.3 24 Among these more broadly recog-
nized relations, the top priority is given to the tribe on whose tribal
land the remains were found, followed by the tribe with the closest
cultural affiliation with the remains, and then the tribe on whose ab-
original land the remains were found.325 Cultural affiliation is based
on shared group identity (i.e., a culturally based connection) between
a present day tribe and an earlier group,3 26 rather than on evidence of
genetic connections between the older group and the contemporary
tribe.
The plaintiffs' understanding of biological connections as the basis
for significant human relationships is reminiscent of nineteenth cen-
tury government policymakers' hostile attitude toward Native Ameri-
cans' more inclusive understanding of kinship and community. One
aspect of the assimilation program implemented by federal Indian pol-
icy makers was the restructuring of the Native American family. The
elaborate kinship networks and extended family structures of the
tribes targeted for assimilation, and the communal family life that ac-
companied them, were to be replaced by nuclear families, each to be
headed by a property-owning man who was to be responsible for the
support of his wife and minor children.32 7 Any sense of responsibility
and allegiance to other members of the community, such as fellow clan
members, was to be obliterated in favor of a focus on the nuclear fam-
ily, its members joined together by what the government deemed to be
close biological ties. As U.S. Board of Indian Commissioners member
Merrill E. Gates put it in 1885, "The family is God's unit of society....
There is no civilization deserving of the name where the family is not
the unit of civil government."3 28 "The family has always been ... the
best school for the development of character."3 2 9 A sense of relation-
ship with the tribal community was to be "outgrown," because it un-
dermines the "manful effort which political economy teaches us
proceeds from the desire for wealth .... [T]he tribal system paralyzes
at once the desire for property and the family life that ennobles that
desire." 33 0 Native American notions of relationship and belonging
also accommodated a more extensive and more flexible sense of inter-
324. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2) (2000).
325. Id. § 3002(a)(2).
326. Id. § 3001(2).
327. See Linda J. Lacey, The White Man's Law and the American Indian Family in the
Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327, 331, 342 (1986).
328. Merrill E. Gates, Land and Law as Agents in Educating Indians, Seventeenth
Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners (1885), in AMERICANIZING
THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE "FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN" 1880-1900, at
45, 50 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1973).
329. Id. at 55.
330. Id. at 51.
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generational ties, with extended family members playing important
roles in child-rearing and adoption being more widely accepted than in
Euro-American society.
Despite the best efforts of nineteenth century assimilation propo-
nents, in contemporary tribal communities, extended family ties, and
foster care and adoptive relationships, continue to flourish. This con-
ception of significant kinship connections not being limited to those
sharing what outsiders would consider close biological ties, taken to-
gether with a traditional understanding of time as not creating a great
temporal divide between the present and the distant past, is consis-
tent with the tribal claims of affiliation with the Ancient One. In
short, for the tribal claimants, the Ancient One is one of their rela-
tions, and his apparent age and lack of a proven genetic link to them
are immaterial. As far as any possible differences in appearance be-
tween themselves and the Ancient One are concerned, they, too, are of
no consequence to the tribal claimants, in marked contrast to the
great significance that the plaintiffs attach to physical appearance.
Any such differences are unsurprising to the tribes, Armand Minthorn
has explained, because they believe that humans and other animals
change over time, in response to their environment, and tribal elders
have said "that Indian people did not always look the way we look
today."3 3 1 Indeed, even other anthropologists have indicated that ap-
parent physical differences between the Ancient One and contempo-
rary Native Americans are unsurprising given the passage of time,3 3 2
and that the differences do not disprove the claim that the Ancient
One was a Native American.
In summary, from the tribal claimants' perspective, kinship is not
just based on close biological connections. Ties with, and responsibili-
ties to, members of the community are not limited to members of the
nuclear family and other "blood relatives" alive today. To the plain-
tiffs, on the other hand, family ties seemingly do not exist (with the
exception, presumably, of marriage) in the absence of a biologically
based relationship, and community and kinship ties with and respon-
sibilities to past generations are seen as greatly circumscribed.
Although tribal leaders, like Armand Minthorn, have spoken in
terms of their religious and cultural beliefs, it is important to note
that the tribes do not, as Donald Sampson, former Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Umatillas, has pointed out, wholly reject sci-
ence. Rather, they argue for a more thoughtful, sensitive, and bal-
anced approach than they believe the plaintiffs have exhibited.
Sampson explained: "[W]e have anthropologists and other scientists
on staff, and we use science every day to help in protecting our people
331. Minthorn, supra note 303, at 2.
332. See, e.g., ADovAsio & PAGE, supra note 21, at 245.
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and the land. However, we do reject the notion that science is the
answer to everything and therefore it should take precedence over the
religious rights and beliefs of American citizens."33 3 Tribal leaders
and others have questioned the way in which the scientists have led
the public to believe that considerable data could be generated simply
by studying one skeleton, and have published, in popular publications
such as The New Yorker magazine, descriptions of the Ancient One
and his lifeways that were depicted as scientific knowledge when they
were based on what can only be accurately referred to as specula-
tion. 33 4 In the same vein, archaeologist J.M. Adovasio has explained
that it is "unwise" to make too much of a single set of remains from the
early period to which the Kennewick remains were dated, given that
"[n]ot only are there great diversity and complexity in the human
anatomy-the differences often shading imperceptibly from one type
to another-but there are also individuals who simply don't fit the
type even though they are members of it."335 Also, Adovasio has criti-
cized some archaeologists for going "off the mark with their exuberant
Europeanoid claims" 33 6 and has described the reconstructed head of
the Ancient One that appeared in national magazines, and led to a
lingering preconception that he was European, as an illusion.337 The
head, which was reconstructed using a method that is itself subject to
considerable doubt,3 38 looked Caucasian only from the angle in the
heavily publicized photograph and looked altogether different if seen
head on,3 3 9 leading Adovasio to conclude that magazine editors had
selected this unique view "[slo that uncounted numbers of Americans
could persist in the absurd belief that it was a white guy, not an In-
dian, who got to the Americas first."340 The plaintiffs have not indi-
cated any concern for clearing up the misconceptions that their own
activities and those of their professional colleagues have fostered, and
333. Don Sampson, (Former) Tribal Chair Questions Scientists' Motives and Credibil-
ity, Nov. 21, 1997, available at http://www.umatilla.nsn.us/kman2.html. For an-
other example of the kind of fruitful relationship that can develop between a tribe
and archaeologists, see John R. Welch, Working Together-White Mountain
Apache Heritage Program Operations and Challenges, Part H, 16 Soc. AM. AR-
CHAEOLOGY BULL., Jan. 1998, at 8.
334. Sampson, supra note 333, at 2. The New Yorker article claimed that scientists
knew a great deal about the Ancient One's diet, physical appearance, group, lifes-
tyle, shelter, and clothing. Id. at 1.
335. ADovAsio & PAGE, supra note 21, at 254.
336. Id. at 253.
337. See id. at 243.
338. A statistical method that adds clay in certain thicknesses to the model of a skull,
which police forensics experts use to reconstruct the general appearance of an
individual's face from his or her skull, was used to construct the head. See id. at
244. This provided, at best, "a plausible but generalized statistical projection of a
face no one alive had ever seen." Id.
339. See id. at 243-44.
340. Id. at 245.
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seem unwilling to indicate any respect for the tribal claimants'
perspective.
B. The Court of Appeals Opinion in Bonnichsen v. United
States
From the tribes' and U.S. Government's perspective, there was
simply no legal basis for the plaintiffs to seek judicial interference
with the DOI's decision as to what NAGPRA required with respect to
the Kennewick remains. At the district court level, however, the gov-
ernment and the tribal claimants were unable to persuade the magis-
trate judge hearing the case, Magistrate Judge Jelderks, with their
arguments against the plaintiffs' standing and other arguments for
dismissal of the case and summary judgment against the plaintiffs.3 41
Instead, Magistrate Judge Jelderks ultimately sided with the plain-
tiffs and, in a 2002 opinion, set aside the DOI's disposition decision,
enjoined transfer of the Ancient One's remains to the tribal claimants,
341. The district court's involvement with the case was extensive and generated mul-
tiple published opinions. In the first opinion, issued on February 19, 1997, deal-
ing with the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim, Magistrate Judge
Jelderks denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case on the grounds of ripe-
ness or failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but granted the motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs' section 1983 claim because no action under color of state
law had been taken. Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 614, 620, 625 (D.
Or. 1997). He granted the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' section 1981 claim to
the extent that it alleged that NAGPRA violated section 1981 or alleged conduct
that could be addressed pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act or 25
U.S.C. section 3013. See id. at 626. The judge denied the motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' claim that NAGPRA was unconstitutional but expressed no opinion on
the merits of the claim, which he thought would be better addressed in later pro-
ceedings. See id. at 626. Finally, the judge denied the motion to dismiss the
claim on the grounds that NAGPRA had been violated, rejecting the arguments
that there was no private right of action under NAGPRA and that sovereign im-
munity barred the claim. See id. at 627. In a second opinion, dated June 27,
1997, the judge denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, determin-
ing that the plaintiffs had standing, that the case was not moot, that the Corps's
decision-making procedure had been flawed, that a First Amendment claim
might exist, and that the plaintiffs' equal protection argument was unclear. Bon-
nichsen v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 628, 637, 641, 645, 648, 649 (D. Or. 1997).
The judge vacated the decision on the disposition of the remains and remanded
the case to the Corps for further consideration, accompanied by a lengthy list of
issues that the Corps was to consider on remand. See id. at 645, 651-54. For a
thoughtful article on the litigation at this stage, see generally Tsosie, supra note
81. Following the remand of the case, the Corps and the DOI entered into an
agreement that the DOI would make the Native American and disposition deter-
minations. Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1126 (D. Or.
2002). The parties agreed that the magistrate judge's decision would not be re-
viewed by the district court. (The magistrate judge's opinions will be referred to
as the district court's opinion, in keeping with the practice of the Ninth Circuit in
its opinion in the case.) See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 871 n.9
(9th Cir. 2004).
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and required that the plaintiffs be allowed to study the remains, in
spite of his acknowledgment of the overlap between the plaintiffs' pro-
posed studies and those that had already been performed.3 42
The tribal claimants had originally participated in the Bonnichsen
litigation solely as amici curiae; they were not defendants in the case
and it had appeared to them that the federal defendants had ade-
quately represented their interests.343 Following Judge Jelderks'
2002 decision, however, the tribal claimants344 sought to intervene in
the case for purposes of appeal to the Ninth Circuit. They were con-
cerned about the federal defendants' slowness in seeking an appeal to
defend the DOI's interpretation of the term "Native American" and
the DOI's cultural affiliation determination, and believed that the fed-
eral defendants no longer adequately represented the tribal claimants'
interest in obtaining possession of the remains and upholding the
DOI's interpretation of NAGPRA.345 Judge Jelderks granted their
342. Bonnichsen, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1119, 1167. Magistrate Judge Jelderks held that
the DOI did not have sufficient evidence to conclude that the Ancient One's re-
mains were "Native American" within the meaning of NAGPRA or to establish
cultural affiliation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1139, 1156. He
rejected the DOI's conclusion that the "aboriginal lands" ownership priority pro-
vided an additional legitimate basis for a disposition decision. Id. at 1161. He
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the DOI's consideration of oral traditions,
which were intertwined with religious beliefs, violated the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 1152. He declined to address the plaintiffs' claim that the refusal to allow
them to study the remains and the discovery site violated their First Amendment
rights, on the grounds that courts avoid considering constitutional questions un-
less it is necessary to do so. Id. at 1161-62.
343. Joint Tribal Claimants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Intervention for
Purposes of Appeal, Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Or.
2002) (No. 96-1481-JE), available at http://www.friendsofpast.org/kennewick-
man/court/communications/tribes020926.html, at 2 [hereinafter Tribal Memoran-
dum to Intervene].
344. The motion to intervene was filed by the Nez Perce Tribe, the Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Col-
ville Reservation, and the Yakama Nation. See id. at 7-8. Thus the Wanapum
Band, a non-federally recognized tribe that was not eligible to file its own claim
under NAGPRA, did not participate. Magistrate Judge Jelderks held that the
DOI had erred in treating the tribal coalition, of which the Wanapum Band had
been a member, as a proper claimant under NAGPRA. Bonnichsen, 217 F. Supp.
2d at 1143. The Ninth Circuit did not review the holdings on cultural affiliation,
the status of the coalition as a claimant, or the aboriginal occupation priority.
See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 872 n.11.
345. Tribal Memorandum to Intervene, supra note 343, at 2, 6. The memorandum
explained the reasons for their concern as follows:
The federal defendants have allowed the deadline for seeking to amend
the judgment to pass without requesting relief. Nor is it clear that the
federal defendants will file and actively pursue an appeal of the district
court decision. Even if they do, it is uncertain whether the federal de-
fendants are capable and willing to raise the same issues on appeal as
the Joint Tribal Claimants. Considering the numerous legal issues at
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motion, 34 6 over the objection of the plaintiffs, 347 and the tribal claim-
ants filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit.348 The tribal claimants' con-
cerns about the federal defendants' commitment to defending the
DOI's determinations proved well founded, as the federal defendants
did not file a notice of appeal until the day before the appeal dead-
line.349 Moreover, the government decided to defend only the DOI's
Native American determination, and not the cultural affiliation deter-
mination or aboriginal lands conclusion, on appeal.350 The govern-
ment decided to change its stance on the tribal claimants' entitlement
to the remains to the position that the remains should be treated as
remains without a qualified claimant, and that such treatment would
stake in this action, the interests of the Applicants and the federal de-
fendants are no longer congruous.
Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
346. Civil Minutes: Record of Proceedings before Judge John Jelderks: Telephone Sta-
tus Conference held 10/21/02 (noting that Magistrate Judge Jelderks had
granted the joint tribal claimants' motion), available at http://www.friendsofpast.
org/kennewick-man/court/opinions/jelderks-appeal.html. The federal defendants
did not oppose the tribal claimants' request. Id.
347. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Request to Intervene, Bonnichsen v.
United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Or. 2002) (No. 96-1481-JE), available at
httpJ/www.friendsofpast.org/kennewick-man/court/communications/plaintiffs-02
1007.html.
348. Joint Tribal Claimants' Notice of Appeal, Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F.
Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Or. 2002) (No. 96-1481-JE), available at http://www.friendsof
past.org/kennewick-man/court/communications/tribes02lO24.html.
349. The federal defendants filed a notice of appeal on October 28, 2002. Opening
Brief for the Federal Appellants, Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th
Cir. 2004) (No. 96-1481-JE), at 2 [hereinafter Federal Appellants' Opening Brief]
(noting that the appeal was filed on Oct. 28, 2002), available at http:/www.
friendsofpast.org/pdf/appellants-brief-030314.pdf. The deadline was October 29,
2002. Civil Minutes: Record of Proceedings before Judge John Jelderks: Tele-
phone Status Conference held 10/21/02 (noting that the government had to de-
cide by October 29, 2002 whether it would appeal), available at http://www.
friendsofpast.org/kennewick-man/courtlopinions/jelderks-appeal.html.
350. The federal defendants sought appellate review only on two issues: whether the
DOI's determination that the Ancient One is Native American within the mean-
ing of NAGPRA was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to
law" and whether Magistrate Judge Jelderks erroneously interpreted the term
"Native American" as requiring a demonstrated cultural relationship between
the remains in question and a presently existing tribe. Federal Appellants'
Opening Brief, supra note 349, at 3. The government's opening brief explained
that the federal defendants were not appealing the part of the district court order
that set aside the DOI determination that the tribal claimants were entitled to
custody of the remains under NAGPRA. Id. at 52. The government's position
was that if the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court holding on the "Native
American" issue and upheld the DOI's determination that the Ancient One was
Native American, then the matter should be remanded to the DOI so that the
remains could be disposed of as unclaimed remains. Id. at 52-53.
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not necessarily preclude scientific study.35 1 Thus, the federal govern-
ment left the tribal claimants to go it alone in their appeal of the dis-
trict court's rejection of the DOI's cultural affiliation determination.
In their appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the tribal
defendants renewed the standing argument before the three-judge
panel hearing the appeal, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to challenge the DOI's decisions because, among other reasons, they
were not seeking to invoke interests within the "zone of interests" pro-
tected by NAGPRA.352 NAGPRA was, after all, enacted as human
rights legislation aimed at protecting the interests of tribes and their
members against repetition of the centuries of past misconduct by the
professional forbears of the plaintiffs. The court of appeals, however,
interpreted the wording of the NAGPRA enforcement provision 353 as
amounting to a congressional negation of the zone of interests test 3 54
and held that the federal courts' jurisdiction was therefore not limited
to cases brought by tribes or Native Americans. 3 55 Moreover, the
court minimized the protective nature of NAGPRA and distorted its
focus by stating that the statute "was not intended merely to benefit
American Indians, but rather to strike a balance between the needs of
scientists, educators, and historians on the one hand, and American
Indians on the other."35 6 This passage downplayed the legitimacy of
Native American claims under NAGPRA by implicitly characterizing
Native Americans as the recipients of gratuitous statutory benefits,
which must be balanced against the demands of scientists and others
who seek access for study-demands that the court elevated in impor-
tance by characterizing them as "needs." By rejecting the tribes' argu-
ment that the court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case,3 57 the
court in essence agreed to hear a case brought by the very kind of
people against whom NAGPRA was designed to provide tribes with
protection.3 58
351. Reply Brief for the Federal Appellants, Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d
864 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 96-1481-JE), at 3, available at http://www.friendsofpast.
org/pdf/doi-reply-july2003.pdf.
352. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 871-74 (9th Cir. 2004).
353. See 25 U.S.C. § 3013 (2000) ("The United States district courts shall have juris-
diction over any action brought by any person alleging a violation of this
chapter.").
354. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 873.
355. Id. at 874.
356. Id. at 874 n.14 (emphasis added).
357. Id. at 874.
358. The court of appeals also decided that the plaintiffs had satisfied the redressable
injury prong of the constitutional standing requirements because if there were a
decision favorable to the plaintiffs on the NAGPRA issue, it was likely that the
plaintiffs' injury-the loss of the opportunity to study the remains-would be re-
dressed. Id. at 873.
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The appeals court's willingness to hear the plaintiffs' claim despite
the goals of NAGPRA was unsurprising, given the perspective that the
court brought to the case-a perspective that echoes centuries of
Euro-American attitudes and government policy toward the indige-
nous peoples of the Americas-as revealed by the first paragraph of
the court's opinion. A critical examination of the precise language of
the opinion reveals much about the underlying attitudes and sympa-
thies that shaped the court's decision and that guaranteed an uphill
battle for the tribal claimants. The court's approach and ultimate de-
cision also underscore the threat to NAGPRA that is posed by courts'
acceptance of warped interpretations of the statute and criticisms of
DOI decision making that are brought to the court by anthropologists,
eager to regain some of the ground that they believed they had lost to
the tribes under NAGPRA.
1. Setting the Stage
The court set the stage for its decision with a revealing opening
paragraph:
This is a case about the ancient human remains of a man who hunted and
lived, or at least journeyed, in the Columbia Plateau an estimated 8340 to
9200 years ago, a time predating all recorded history from any place in the
world, a time before the oldest cities of our world had been founded, a time so
ancient that the pristine and untouched land and the primitive cultures that
may have lived on it are not deeply understood by even the most well-in-
formed men and women of our age.
3 5 9
The court's language suggested that it equated recorded history with
written history. This approach ignored the fact that for the tribes of
the area, the recorded history of the region-the history that has been
preserved in a form that has survived transmission from generation to
generation-dates back to the very creation of the area, and thus en-
compasses the period of the Ancient One's life. For the tribes, history
preserved by oral transmission is recorded history, and is no less legit-
imate than history as recorded in written form. Contemporary
ethnohistorians have also recognized that the documentary record on
which they rely in their work should include oral tradition, along with
folklore, place names, enduring customs, and other forms of
evidence. 36 0
359. Id. at 868.
360. See James Axtell, Ethnohistory: An Historian's Viewpoint, in THE EUROPEAN AND
THE INDIAN: ESSAYS IN THE ETHNOHISTORY OF COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA 3, 8
(1981). Ethnohistory is "the use of historical and ethnological methods and
materials to gain knowledge of the nature and causes of change in a culture de-
fined by ethnological concepts and categories." Id. at 5. A briefer definition of
ethnohistory is "the use of historical data to conduct anthropological research."
Daniel L. Boxberger, Introduction, in NATIVE NORTH AMERICANS: AN ETHNOHIS-
TORICAL APPROACH vii, ix (Daniel L. Boxberger ed., 1990); see also supra note 208
and accompanying text.
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Next, the court's opening paragraph juxtaposed cities, recognized
by Western thought as the embodiment of civilization and human pro-
gress, with the "pristine and untouched land," which was inhabited by
"primitive cultures." This dichotomy brings to mind past government
policies aimed at "civilizing" the "primitive" Indian tribes,36 1 as well
as the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. M'Intosh36 2, in which
the tribes' allegedly unsettled and violent lifestyle, in contrast to the
Euro-American agriculturists around them, was presented as a justi-
fication for depriving them of full title to their land. The juxtaposition
of cities with undeveloped land inhabited by primitive cultures also
suggests anthropology's long-held, traditional view of Native Ameri-
cans as primitive peoples who ranked low in the hierarchy of civiliza-
tion, and were doomed to extinction. 36 3
Finally, by claiming that the land and people of the Ancient One's
time are not well understood by even the "well-informed," the passage
implicitly discounted the claimant tribes' understanding of their peo-
ple's chronologically distant past. It seems that to the court, only
properly credentialed archaeologists and anthropologists could be con-
sidered to possess the kind of knowledge that would render them well-
informed.
2. What's in a Name?
Having set the stage for the analysis with this revealing opening
paragraph, the court proceeded to describe the Ancient One as "one of
the most important American anthropological and archaeological dis-
coveries of the late twentieth century."36 4 The court separated the
Ancient One from the rest of humanity by objectifying him as a "dis-
covery," rather than treating him as a human being whose remains
had been disturbed from their resting place. The court thus started
with the premise, shared by the plaintiffs, that the Kennewick re-
mains are not to be regarded as deserving of the respectful treatment
that U.S. law usually affords to the physical remains of deceased
human beings. Moreover, the court claimed the Ancient One as being
"American"-while it later went on to refuse to recognize him as "Na-
tive American'-and indicated that the meaning of the discovery to
social scientists was what was significant. Again, for the tribes, the
discovery had a different significance; it meant that the final resting
place of a human being had been disturbed, and that respect for
human dignity demanded that the victim of this disinterment be re-
turned to his previous state of repose.
361. See supra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
362. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-92 (1823).
363. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
364. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 868.
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Next, the court elected to use the plaintiffs', rather than the tribes',
name for the focus of the litigation, "Kennewick Man"-a name that
was originally given by anthropologist James Chatters365 and was
popularized by members of the press as some of them were publishing
stories that erroneously identified the Kennewick remains as being
Caucasian, a mistake that some newspaper accounts indeed continue
to make. The court identified "Kennewick Man" as the "popular" and
"common" name for the skeleton-in other words, the name that is
commonly and popularly used by those whose perspective matters,
namely non-Native Americans-while grudgingly admitting that
"some American Indians" know the find as the "Ancient One."3 66
Again allying itself with the viewpoint of the plaintiffs, the court privi-
leged the name assigned by the anthropologists, and by the main-
stream media and its audience, over the name that reflected the
tribes' understanding of the nature of the remains. Supplanting Na-
tive American names by imposing "American" replacements had been
a longstanding component of the federal government's assimilation
policy, and thus the court was following in the footsteps of past gov-
ernment policy makers when it exercised the power of naming in this
manner.367
In addition, the court opted to use the term "American Indian"
rather than "Native American" throughout the opinion. The court
stated that this preference was adopted because the definition of the
term "Native American," as used in NAGPRA, was a disputed is-
sue, 3 6 8 but most of the contexts in which the term was used in the
opinion did not relate to the contested issue of whether or not the dis-
puted remains were "Native American" under NAGPRA. Conse-
quently, the court's general reluctance to use the term suggests, once
again, the court's inherent sympathy for the viewpoints expressed by
the plaintiffs.
Finally, the court gave its characterization of the two perspectives
present in the litigation. From the perspective of the plaintiff anthro-
pologists, the court explained, "[Tihis skeleton is an irreplaceable
365. See Flood, supra note 80, at 40.
366. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 868-69.
367. See, e.g., DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS
AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875-1928 at 108-12 (1995) (discussing
the imposition of new first names and surnames on Native American boarding
school students as part of the effort to extinguish students' cultural identity); see
also Flood, supra note 80, at 40-41 & n.8 (describing the power to name some-
thing or someone as a "significant power" and noting that the tribal claimants
refer to the remains as Oytpamanatityt, which has been translated into English
as "the Ancient One"). The remains have also been referred to as Xwesaat, a
name that means "old man" in Ichiskin, one of the Yakama languages, according
to Rory Flintknife, a Yakama Indian Nation attorney. See Robinson, supra note
140, at Al.
368. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 869 n.3.
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source of information about early New World populations that war-
rants careful scientific inquiry to advance knowledge of distant
times."3 69 This statement embraced the perspective of European ex-
plorers and settlers by using the term "New World." From the tribes'
perspective, there was, and is, nothing "new" about the North Ameri-
can continent, on which they understand their ancestors to have lived
since creation. Moreover, from the tribes' perspective, additional
"knowledge of distant times" is unnecessary, as the tribes' rich unwrit-
ten history already tells them all about the past that there is to know.
Further scientific inquiry is simply not warranted. As described by
the court, the tribes' perspective is that the skeleton "is that of an an-
cestor who, according to the tribes' religious and social traditions,
should be buried immediately without further testing."37 0 This
description refers to the burying of the remains, while the re-burying
of the remains, which had been disturbed from their resting place,
would be the more accurate way to describe the tribes' goal. Also, the
court suggested that the tribes' preference for reburial was peculiar to
them by stating that it was based on the "tribes' religious and social
traditions," rather than on a basic respect for human dignity that is
shared by many, both Native American and non-Native American
alike. NAGPRA itself represents an endorsement of this perspective,
as it was enacted as basic civil and human rights legislation aimed at
guaranteeing to Indian tribes the same dignified treatment for their
dead that had long been the norm for non-Indian decedents. In short,
the tribes and their perspective were presented as being "on the
fringe," while the plaintiffs were presented as dedicated, knowledge-
seeking scientists-"experts in their respective fields"371-who were
endeavoring to further understand a time that was inadequately un-
derstood by those whose claims of knowledge the court respected.
3. Redefining "Native American"
After addressing, and rejecting, the argument that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to pursue their claim,372 the court proceeded to dis-
cuss whether the remains constitute "Native American" remains and
thus are subject to NAGPRA. According to NAGPRA, remains are
"Native American" if they are "of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or
culture that is indigenous to the United States."373 The court focused
on the word "is" and concluded that the use of this word indicated that
NAGPRA requires that the human remains in question "bear some
relationship to a presently existing tribe, people, or culture" in order to
369. Id. at 869.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 869 n.1.
372. See supra notes 352-58 and accompanying text.
373. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9) (2000).
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be subject to NAGPRA.374 This view is at odds with the text of NAG-
PRA, which does not require remains to be related to a contemporary
tribe in order to be considered Native American, but rather considers
such a link to be relevant to the cultural affiliation determination. As
a result, the term "present day" appears in NAGPRA's cultural affilia-
tion definition rather than in the Native American definition. In addi-
tion, the phrase "bear some relationship" suggests a low threshold for
finding the existence of a relationship, but later in the opinion the
court indicated that there must be a finding that the remains have a
"significant relationship to a presently existing 'tribe, people, or cul-
ture"' in order for them to be considered Native American. 3 75 The
court did not explain what it meant by "significant." The court thus
grafted a present, significant relationship requirement onto the statu-
tory definition. The court's "Native American" interpretation is note-
worthy for how it ignored the usual dichotomy between non-Native
Americans, meaning descendants of settlers who came from Europe
and other areas outside of the modern day United States after the Eu-
ropean "discovery" of the North American continent, and Native
Americans, meaning descendants of pre-contact inhabitants of the
land of the United States. The court in effect invented a third cate-
gory: individuals who are descendants of pre-contact inhabitants of
the United States but whom the court will not consider "Native Ameri-
can" because the court is not convinced that they have a significant
enough relationship (whatever "significant" may mean in this context)
with a current tribe. The remains of these individuals were not pro-
tected by NAGPRA, which meant to the court that they were "up for
grabs" by descendants of post-contact settlers. The court appeared to
be claiming for the judiciary the ultimate power to determine whether
or not the relationship was sufficiently significant. A determination
by the tribes that such a relationship existed certainly seemed to be
irrelevant, or at least not determinative. Furthermore, as anthropolo-
gist Robert L. Kelly has pointed out in criticizing the court's redrafting
of NAGPRA's Native American definition, if Congress had intended to
require that remains be culturally affiliated with a tribe in order to be
classified as Native American, then under NAGPRA there would be no
"culturally unaffiliated" remains-a category of protected remains to
which the statute explicitly refers. 37 6
374. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 875.
375. Id. at 878.
376. Robert F. Kelly, Kennewick Man is Native American, 5 SAA ARCHAEOLOGICAL
REC. 33, 34 (Nov. 2004). Professor Kelly further noted that as NAGPRA's inven-
tory requirements have been put into operation, only about 25% of approximately
117,000 inventoried remains have been found to be culturally affiliated to tribes.
Id. at 34. For further criticism of the court's reasoning as to the Native American
definition, see id. at 34-35.
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The court claimed that its narrowing of NAGPRA's coverage was
consistent with what it identified as NAGPRA's first goal: respecting
"the burial traditions of modern-day American Indians by sparing
them the indignity and resentment that would be aroused by the de-
spoiling of their ancestors' graves and the study or display of their
ancestors' remains."377 As the court explained, this goal would not be
served "by requiring the transfer to modern American Indians of
human remains that bear no relationship to them."3 78 The court ig-
nored the point that there may be a difference of opinion, even among
anthropologists, as to whether or not there is a relationship between
particular remains in dispute and contemporary Native Americans.
Clearly such a dispute existed in this very case. The tribal claimants
believed that there was a relationship between the Ancient One,
whom they considered an ancestor, and themselves, and NAGPRA
was intended to take into account Native Americans' views on this
kind of issue. The DOI had reached the same conclusion on the ques-
tion of the Ancient One's Native American status, as had the SAA.379
The DOI further concluded that the tribes' cultural affiliation with the
Ancient One had been established in accordance with NAGPRA. The
key question was whose views on whether or not such a relationship
exists are to be respected. The court concluded that only its views, as
shaped by those of the plaintiffs, mattered. According to this ap-
proach, human remains cannot be considered Native American under
NAGPRA unless the reviewing court is satisfied that a "significant"
relationship (again, a term that the Bonnichsen court does not define)
exists between the remains and contemporary tribes.
The court identified protecting the dignity of human bodies after
death, by ensuring respectful treatment of Native American graves, as
the second main goal of NAGPRA.380 The court said that this goal
was served by requiring the return to Native Americans of human re-
mains that bear some "significant relationship" to them.38l Once
again, the problem with the court's analysis was that it failed to ac-
knowledge that contemporary Native Americans, on the one hand,
and judges and many other members of the dominant society, on the
other hand, may have different views as to who "counts" as an ances-
tor and therefore whether a significant relationship exists. In order
for NAGPRA to provide Native Americans with adequate protection
with respect to deceased individuals with whom they claim kinship,
just as protection has long been provided for the remains of those who
are regarded as relatives by members of the dominant society, contem-
377. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 876.
378. Id. (emphasis added).
379. See infra notes 409-18 and accompanying text.
380. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 876.
381. Id. at 877.
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porary Native American perspectives on kinship and ancestry must be
given more respect than the court appeared willing to give them.
Moreover, the court's unwillingness to recognize the tribal perspec-
tive on kinship represented continuing acceptance of the assimilation-
ist attitudes of nineteenth century policy makers toward Native
American conceptions of family and kinship,382 which were rejected as
over-inclusive and uncivilized in compared with those of the dominant
society. The analysis also brings to mind the contemporary federal
tribal acknowledgment process, in which petitions for acknowledg-
ment have been found to lack the kind of information, including exten-
sive genealogical data, that federal officials considered essential for
establishing "true" ancestral and kinship connections. 38 3
The court rejected the argument, made by the government, that
limiting the term "Native American" to cover remains that the court
believed have a significant relationship with present day Native
Americans collapsed NAGPRA's first inquiry (whether remains are
Native American) into NAGPRA's second inquiry (which Native
Americans or tribe are affiliated with the remains). The court stated
that the first inquiry requires only a "general finding" that the re-
mains have a "significant relationship" with a contemporary "tribe,
people, or culture."384 The court did not explain what it meant by a
"general finding" in this context, but it is difficult to envision how a
finding of a "significant" relationship could be made without focusing
on the strength of the link between the remains and a contemporary
Native American or Native Americans, which is the issue on which the
second NAGPRA inquiry is focused. In rejecting the DOI's argument
on this point, the court refused to afford the Secretary the usual Chev-
ron-based deference to the Secretary's determination of the meaning
of the term "Native American." The court claimed that NAGPRA
unambiguously required that remains bear a relationship to a pres-
ently existing tribe, people, or culture, and therefore, the Secretary's
interpretation was not entitled to deference.38 5 The court also used its
characterization of the definition as unambiguous as an excuse for not
applying the Indian law canon of construction under which doubtful
expressions in statutes are to be construed in tribes' favor.386
The court admitted that "NAGPRA does not specify precisely what
kind of a relationship or precisely how strong a relationship ancient
human remains must bear to modern Indian groups to qualify as Na-
382. See supra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
383. See, e.g., Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,388 (June 21, 2004).
384. The Secretary of the Interior had made this argument in criticism of the district
court's decision. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 877.
385. See id. at 877-78.
386. See id. at 877 n.18.
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tive American."38 7 These omissions are unsurprising, however, given
that the requirement of a "significant relationship" with contemporary
Native Americans is simply not part of the text of the statutory defini-
tion, but rather was just grafted onto the definition by the court. The
court did not acknowledge this fact, but rather claimed that the legis-
lative history "provides some guidance on what type of relationship
may suffice" 38 8 and quoted two passages from the House Report on
NAGPRA that referred to Native American demands about the return
of their ancestors. The court stated that "[h]uman remains that are
8340 to 9200 years old and that bear only incidental genetic resem-
blance to modern-day American Indians... cannot be said to be...
'ancestors' within Congress's meaning."38 9 It is unclear, however, ex-
actly what conclusions can be drawn about the meaning that Congress
attached to the term "ancestors" when the statements quoted by the
court described Indians' concerns. The court continued: "Congress
enacted NAGPRA to give American Indians control over the remains
of their genetic and cultural forbearers, not over the remains of people
bearing no special and significant genetic or cultural relationship to
some presently existing indigenous tribe, people, or culture."390 Once
again, the court made a statement that failed to acknowledge that the
people whose rights and cultural understandings were intended to be
protected by NAGPRA might have a different sense of who their for-
bears are than the court, and that, under NAGPRA, their sense of kin-
ship is deemed deserving of respect. Moreover, it is difficult to see
how Congress could have focused on the "genetic forbearers" of con-
temporary Native Americans in the same way that the court appeared
to believe was appropriate, given that the DNA techniques for assess-
ing ancestry that are available today, even with their continuing limi-
tations, were not available when NAGPRA was enacted. 39 1
Finally, it is worth noting that at the time that museums began to
experience the full effects of NAGPRA, anthropologists were report-
387. Id. at 879.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Private DNA testing companies are part of a growing industry focused on genetic
assessment of Native American ancestry. For a discussion of the use of DNA
based ancestry testing for Native Americans and the uses and limitations of the
kinds of tests currently available, see Ripan S. Malhi & Jason A. Eshleman, The
Uses and Limitations of DNA Based Ancestry Tests for Native Americans, availa-
ble at http://tracegenetics.con/nativeamericandna.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005);
see also Jason A. Eshleman et al., Mitochondrial DNA Studies of Native Ameri-
cans: Conceptions and Misconceptions of the Population Prehistory of the Ameri-
cas, in 12 EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY 7 (2003); Peter N. Jones, American
Indian Demographic History and Cultural Affiliation: A Discussion of Certain
Limitations on the Use of mtDNA and Y Chromosome Testing, available at http:ll
www.bauuinstitute.com/Articles/JonesmtDNA.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
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edly "upset that the law provides Native Americans with very broad
ancestral claims-even on items that scientists say predate the ori-
gins of the tribes themselves," 3 92 and that it could be used as a basis
for claiming prehistoric remains on the basis of tribal tradition.3 93 In
other words, at least some anthropologists expected early on that
NAGPRA would extend to and protect tribal claims to items that an-
thropologists would not consider to be tied to the claimant tribe. Any
shock professed at NAGPRA's application to the Ancient One's re-
mains needs to be considered with this past understanding in mind.
4. Rejecting Disinterested Experts' Opinions
Having grafted onto the statutory definition of "Native American"
the requirement of a "significant relationship" between a set of human
remains and a contemporary tribe, the court proceeded to review the
determination of the Secretary of the Interior that the remains of the
Ancient One were Native American. The court concluded that the ad-
ministrative record did not contain substantial evidence that the re-
mains were Native American (as the court interpreted the term) and
that no reasonable person could conclude that the remains were Na-
tive American.3 94 In effect, the court dismissed as irrational not only
the views of the claimant tribes, but also those of the DOI and the
SAA, which had agreed with the DOI's Native American
determination. 39 5
The court did not find in the record evidence of a connection by a
genetic or cultural relationship that was "special or significant"
(again, these were terms that were left undefined) between the re-
mains and a current tribe-the kind of connection that the court said
was required to establish that the remains were Native American.
The court found that there was "no cognizable link" between the re-
mains and contemporary tribes of the Columbia Plateau, citing the
differences between the cranial measurements and facial features of
the reconstructed skull and those of contemporary Native Americans.
The court stated that the Ancient One's cranial measurements and
features "most closely resemble those of Polynesians and southern
Asians," and that they "differ significantly from those of any modern
Indian group living in North America."3 96 The court did not add that
the experts' report on the craniometric analyses had in fact concluded
that the remains could be excluded from all recent human groups, 3 9 7
which indicated that differences between the Ancient One's morphol-
392. Morell, supra note 315, at 20.
393. See id.
394. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 880 & n.20.
395. See infra notes 409-18 and accompanying text.
396. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 880.
397. See Powell & Rose, supra note 152, at 20.
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ogy and contemporary Native Americans' morphology were not neces-
sarily attributable to a lack of a biological connection between the
Ancient One and the tribal claimants, but may have been due to
changes that took place in the population over the course of several
millennia.398 Moreover, the report had found morphological similari-
ties to other ancient populations of the Americas, namely North Amer-
ican Archaic populations from the northern Great Basin region, as
well as those from the eastern woodlands. 3 99 The Ancient One's mor-
phology thus had not been found to be as different from all past North
American populations as the court's selective citing of the report's
findings indicated. The court focused on what it and the plaintiffs,
rather than the tribes, considered to be a sufficient relationship be-
tween the remains and contemporary tribes, and this sense of rela-
tionship was based on genetics, as evidenced by morphology-itself a
problematic linkage. 40 0 And the court's statements as to the conclu-
sions reached by those who did the relevant analyses were incomplete
and misleading.
It is worth emphasizing that, as discussed above,40 1 the limitations
in the analyses that had been done to determine whether or not the
remains were Native American had been pointed out by those who did
them. The measurements of the reconstructed skull had been com-
pared to only a limited number of Native American skulls. The spoils
of past plundering of Native American remains did not provide as
complete a sample as would have been required to draw conclusions in
which more confidence could have been placed. Moreover, a number of
the variables that are considered in the craniometric analyses "tend to
exhibit a high degree of intra- and inter-observer error,"4 0 2 casting
into doubt the value of such analyses in general. And of course, it is
unsurprising that there are significant morphological differences be-
tween the remains and contemporary Native Americans, given the
chronological distance between the Ancient One's time and today.403
398. See, e.g., ADovAsio & PAGE, supra note 21, at 254 ("[T]he skull is exceptionally
malleable in evolutionary terms and capable of changing greatly over genera-
tions, much less thousands of years. For example, native skeletons from some
two or three millennia after Kennewick Man show resemblances to today's native
populations.").
399. See Powell & Rose, supra note 152, at 20.
400. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 376, at 35 (noting that the use of cranial variation to
determine ancestor-descendant relationships "is not settled scientifically").
401. See, e.g., supra notes 197-98, 201 and accompanying text (discussing the limita-
tions inherent in the archaeological data analysis and report).
402. See Powell & Rose, supra note 152, at 13. Because of this problem, these vari-
ables were removed for one of the analyses, which meant that fewer dimensions
could be used for the analyses. See id.
403. See id. at 12 ("If the Kennewick remains represent a member of a founding popu-
lation whose descendants evolved in situ over the past 9,000 years, North and
South American populations who appear later in time may be dissimilar to the
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It is also important to note the existence of a debate among anthro-
pologists themselves over the scientific validity of the kinds of cranial
analyses that anthropologists have performed to assess the link be-
tween ancient human remains and contemporary peoples. For exam-
ple, in a 2003 article in American Antiquity, anthropologists Alan
Swedlund and Duane Anderson discussed the problems and limita-
tions inherent in the morphometric techniques that Douglas Owsley
and Richard Jantz, both plaintiffs in the Bonnichsen litigation, have
used in assessing biological affinities between ancient cranial speci-
mens from the Americas and contemporary humans.40 4 Swedlund
and Anderson have raised concerns about the limited nature of the
sample crania to which measurements of an ancient cranium speci-
men being studied are compared;40 5 the geographic and temporal dis-
tances between the specimen and the comparison samples; 40 6 the
craniometric variability that may exist within a population based on
how different individuals' crania respond to nutritional, dietary, and
founder populations due to the cumulative effects of genetic drift, mutation, and
natural selection over time."); see also id. at 14 (noting that the craniometric
analyses suggested that "the Kennewick skeleton morphologically is unlike any
modem human population").
404. See Alan Swedlund & Duane Anderson, Gordon Creek Woman Meets Spirit Cave
Man: A Response to Comment by Owsley and Jantz, 68 AM. ANTIQurrY 161 (2003).
Swedlund and Anderson focused specifically on the use of these methods in ana-
lyzing the so-called "Gordon Creek Woman," but their critique extended to the
analysis of other paleo-Indian remains.
405. They noted the importance of being aware of"sampling errors raised by the avail-
ability of remains and by those originally involved in assembling the databases."
Id. at 162. Sample populations may suffer from the flaws of not being random
with respect to sex and age and of being selected for inclusion on the basis of the
subjective judgment of those who were selecting the samples. See id. at 163.
406. Swedlund and Anderson explained that Owsley and Jantz's technique involved
comparing a specimen to crania database samples with regard to a number of
cranial measurements; placing the specimen in some degree of probability of rela-
tionship to the comparison samples on the basis of the morphological, or physical
measurement, distance between the specimen and the comparison samples; and
then plotting this out into a multi-dimensional, spatial representation. Owsley
and Jantz assume that the specimen being studied should plot closest to the pop-
ulation samples with which it is most closely associated geographically, and if it
instead plots closest to a population found at a greater geographical distance,
then it is morphologically/genetically closer to that population sample. See id. at
163. This is problematic because "a specimen that might date approximately
8,000 years older than its closest reference sample is not only separated by geo-
graphic distance but also by considerable temporal distance . . . in which gene
flow, drift, mutation, and natural selection have had an opportunity to operate
between the specimen and the referents." Id. These same factors were men-
tioned in the report on the osteological assessment of the Ancient One. See Pow-
ell & Rose, supra note 152, at 12. Swedlund and Anderson noted that in light of
these considerations it was not surprising to them that some ancient American
cranial specimens plotted more closely to the samples from other continents. See
Swedlund & Anderson, supra note 404, at 163.
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environmental forces;407 and the specific statistical inferences that
Owsley and Jantz make as to the relatedness of ancient specimens
and more recent samples.408 In short, while the court, like the plain-
tiffs, attached considerable importance to the cranial measurements
of the Ancient One, the appropriate analysis of such measurements
and their significance for determining biological identity and affilia-
tion are a subject of debate within the field of anthropology itself. The
court was unlikely to have an awareness and understanding of this
debate, and, apparently unwittingly, just happened to choose the posi-
tion that corresponded with the views of the plaintiffs.
Finally, it is instructive to analyze the divergence between the
court's view on the "Native American" determination and the views of
the SAA, the leading professional organization of archaeologists fo-
cused on the archaeology of the Americas.409 The SAA, which has
publicly stated that it "believes strongly" that the Kennewick remains
are Native American,410 was involved in the development and draft-
ing of NAGPRA and has monitored and participated in its implemen-
tation.4 1 1 Although the SAA disagreed with the DOI's cultural
affiliation determination for the Kennewick remains, 4 12 it publicly en-
dorsed both the DOI's position on the interpretation of "Native Ameri-
can" under NAGPRA and the DOI's specific conclusion that the
Ancient One's remains are Native American, believing that the inter-
pretation is fully consistent with congressional intent and the conclu-
sion is supported by the evidence.413 The SAA explained its
agreement with the DOI on this issue in a brief submitted to Magis-
407. See Swedlund & Anderson, supra note 404, at 163. They noted that "[1lifestyle,
nutrition, and diet, and mechanical forces on the face related to diet and food
processing[,] can account for significant amounts of temporal variation in crani-
ofacial morphology. These trends help to explain why central tendencies can
shift across time and space without any genetic change or replacement occur-
ring." Id. at 164.
408. They explained that Owsley and Jantz's "method for assigning affinity is by using
the 'typicality probability' as defined" in a commonly cited article by S.R. Wilson,
but without regard to certain safeguards and caveats observed by Wilson herself.
Id. at 164. In addition, Owsley and Jantz had apparently not analyzed the refer-
ence population samples that they used to evaluate the variation among the sam-
ples themselves. A proper evaluation would determine "whether between-group
variation was sufficient for reliable prediction of group membership" and would
indicate "the possibility of misclassification for each group." Id. at 165.
409. SAA Brief, supra note 101, at 1.
410. FAQs on the Society for American Archaeology's Amicus Curiae Brief in the Ken-
newick Case, June 2001, at 3, available at http://www.saa.org/Repatriation/kenne
wickfaq.html.
411. The SAA has worked with the NAGPRA Review Committee and the DOI on
NAGPRA issues and has testified at Senate committee hearings on NAGPRA im-
plementation. See id. at 2.
412. SAA Brief, supra note 101, at 9.
413. Society for American Archaeology Position Paper, The Secretary of the Interior's
September 21, 2000 Determination of Cultural Affiliation for Kennewick Man,
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trate Judge Jelderks. The SAA viewed the DOI's Native American in-
terpretation as being consistent with the plain language of NAGPRA,
in which the "Native American" definition turns on the meaning of the
word "indigenous." Dictionary definitions demonstrate that the word
"commonly refers to the original or early inhabitants of a region, par-
ticularly as distinct from later European colonists," and the DOI's in-
terpretations of "Native American" and "indigenous" were consistent
with the standard meaning of these terms.4 14 Moreover, other alter-
native readings of the term "Native American" and the word "indige-
nous," the SAA believed, were problematic. For example, if
"indigenous" were read to "give primacy to its connotations of "first or
earliest," then if followed to an extreme, a paradox would result. It
would exclude later descendants, including present-day tribes, which
is clearly not what Congress intended. The SAA explained:
Most scholars today believe that the initial, prehistoric peopling of North
America was a long and complex process. Contemporary Native Americans
are the descendants of people who arrived in many waves from multiple
places of origin. Thus a definition of a "Native American" that would include
only the "first or earliest" peoples to inhabit the United States would be incon-
sistent with the common understanding of "Native American."4 1 5
Similarly, according to the SAA, it would not make sense to interpret
the term "Native American" to "require proof of a relationship with
present day Native peoples," as the plaintiffs had argued (and man-
aged to persuade Judge Jelderks and the Ninth Circuit panel). This
interpretation would be contrary to NAGPRA's plain language, "which
requires the remains or artifacts to have a relationship to 'a tribe, peo-
ple or culture indigenous to the United States,' not a relationship to
'present day Native peoples."' 4 16 In addition, this interpretation
would be contrary to the common-sense understanding of "Native
American" as it could exclude the many groups that are historically
Oct. 14, 2000, at 6, available at http://www.saa.org/repatriation/lobby/Kennewick
Position.html.
414. See SAA Brief, supra note 101, at 6. As the SAA noted, the DOL's determination
of the meaning of the terms "indigenous" and "Native American" turned "in part
on whether the remains or items in question are related to tribes, peoples or cul-
tures that predated the historically documented arrival of European explorers."
Id. Christopher Columbus's voyages "provide a widely known and appropriate
benchmark for the 'historically documented arrival of European explorers' that
quickly followed," even if Columbus himself never set foot in the United States.
Id. Also, using the 1492 date as a benchmark would not, as the plaintiffs had
claimed, open up the possibility of artifacts and remains that are not commonly
understood to be "Native American," such as Vikings or Japanese fishermen, be-
ing covered by NAGPRA. They would not fit the "Native American" definition
because the word "indigenous" refers to "a long-term, rather than temporary
presence," and also includes the concept of being born in the region. Id. at 7.
Thus, African, Asian, or European remains that reflect a temporary presence
would not be considered Native American. Id.
415. Id. at 8.
416. Id.
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documented and prehistorically known that would be commonly
thought of as "Native American" but which scientists do not believe,
based on evidence found to date, have any present-day descend-
ants.4 1 7 Finally, the SAA concluded that it was "eminently reasona-
ble" to conclude that the Ancient One was indigenous and therefore
Native American, because the remains were pre-Columbian, they
were found well within U.S. borders, and there was no reason to be-
lieve that he was born outside U.S. borders or was not a permanent
resident within those borders.418
The SAA made these arguments in an amicus curiae brief submit-
ted to Magistrate Judge Jelderks. When the litigation proceeded to
the court of appeals level, however, the SAA, perhaps acting out of a
now more keenly felt concern that the career interests of at least some
of its 6,600 members were at stake, submitted a brief that did not
mention the SAA's agreement with the DOI's Native American deter-
mination, but instead focused only on the SAA's disagreement with
the DOI's cultural affiliation determination.419 There is no reason to
believe, however, that, given its basic approach to the case, the Ninth
Circuit panel would have been any more receptive to or respectful of
the views of this important professional organization on the Native
American definition than Magistrate Judge Jelderks had been.
5. Denying Cultural Affiliation
The court continued its explanation of its finding on the Native
American issue with a discussion of cultural similarities between the
Ancient One and modern day tribes. In this portion of the opinion, the
court relied on statements extracted from the cultural affiliation re-
port, prepared for the second inquiry under NAGPRA, as opposed to
the findings in the report that actually had investigated whether or
not the remains were Native American. Because the DOI had consid-
ered determining the Native American status and the cultural affilia-
tion of the remains to be truly separate inquiries, as NAGPRA
indicated, the report on Native American status had not considered
cultural affiliation and was therefore not sufficient for the court's pur-
poses. The opinion summarized points made in the archaeological
data report about the difficulty of establishing either cultural continu-
ities or discontinuities between the present and the distant past, par-
ticularly before 5000 B.C. While the court emphasized the limited
evidence as to cultural similarities and continuities, the report's au-
thor had taken pains to note that the available evidence was equally
417. See id.
418. See id. at 9.
419. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Society for American Archaeology, Bonnichsen v.
United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 96-1481-JE), available at http:l!
www.saa.org/Repatriation/appealsAmicus.pdf.
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inadequate for demonstrating discontinuity. He stated, "These con-
clusions emphatically do not mean that to my mind there was not cul-
tural continuity between the peoples of the Columbia Plateau in 1800
and earlier peoples on the Plateau."4 20 In short, the court used the
evidentiary limitations as a basis for concluding that there was a lack
of similarity and continuity between the Ancient One and contempo-
rary Native Americans, rather than treating the lack of evidence of
discontinuity as an indication that continuity in fact may have ex-
isted, which is what the expert who prepared the report had indicated.
It is almost as if the court had presumed discontinuity. Moreover, the
court did not note that the report was limited to a focus on continuities
and discontinuities in the archaeological record, and did not cover his-
torical continuities and discontinuities, meaning the "presence or ab-
sence of cultural links between ancestral and descendant groups."42 1
The report was also limited by the fact that it had to be prepared hur-
riedly; additional evidence bearing on continuity might have been ob-
tained by an extensive review of other existing evidence, as well as
additional fieldwork, the report had noted.4 22
Repeated reading of the experts' reports, and of the court's descrip-
tion of its selective reliance on them, generates a strong impression of
great uncertainty surrounding the Ancient One's identity and life, and
his affiliation with contemporary tribes, in the minds of anthropolo-
gists, along with great uncertainty and disagreement within the pro-
fession as to the identity, origins, and lifestyles of ancient North
Americans. As the authors of the Osteological Assessment report, us-
ing the idiom of their profession, had noted, for example, "Much of the
interpretation of the biological affinity of Kennewick results depends
on subjective opinions and assumptions about the rate of morphologi-
cal change possible during the past 10,000 years, the underlying ge-
netics of the traits examined, and the demographic history of early
and late Holocene humans in the New World."423 The tribes, on the
other hand, express no such uncertainty. To them, the Ancient One is
unquestionably their kinsman, and they bear a responsibility to ob-
tain respectful treatment for his physical remains. Similarly, when
Lewis and Clark visited the area where the Ancient One's remains
were unearthed and discovered, the completion of their task was
threatened time and again by their ignorance. Their guide, Saca-
gawea, and the tribes whom they met along the way, by contrast, were
imbued with valuable knowledge of the land and its resources. Lewis
and Clark recognized the value of, and consciously depended on, the
knowledge of the Native Americans whom they encountered. The
420. Archaeological Data: Conclusions, supra note 197, at 2.
421. Id. at 1.
422. See id. at 2.
423. Powell & Rose, supra note 152, at 12.
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Bonnichsen court, however, treated the admitted ignorance of one
group of academics as the basis for handing the Ancient One over to
another group of academics; the tribes' knowledge of the Ancient One
and his identity seemingly had no value. This lack of respect for the
tribes' perspective is wholly at odds with Congress's reasons for the
enactment of NAGPRA, and reinforces the impression that the atti-
tudes that necessitated the enactment of NAGPRA have not been laid
to rest.
The court of appeals also cited statements by the Secretary of the
Interior about the lack of evidence of continuity with respect to settle-
ment patterns, 4 24 burial practices, 4 25 and language.42 6 As with the
archaeological evidence, gaps in knowledge based on a lack of profes-
sionally respected empirical data had created a perceived lack of con-
tinuity at various points between the Ancient One's time and the
present, and this ignorance was used to bolster the plaintiffs' claim
and to undercut the tribes' claim to the remains.
While hastening to point to suggestions of discontinuity in some of
the DOI experts' reports, the court gave short shrift to the oral history
evidence cited by the Secretary of the Interior in making the cultural
affiliation determination, which was based on the traditional histori-
cal and ethnographic information report prepared as part of the cul-
tural affiliation report. The court decided that the oral history
accounts of the area were "just not specific enough or reliable enough
or relevant enough to show a significant relationship of the Tribal
Claimants with Kennewick Man."42 7 The oral history evidence was
not adequate to show the "required significant relationship" between
the remains and the tribes, the court concluded, because "oral ac-
counts have been inevitably changed in context of transmission, be-
cause the traditions include myths that cannot be considered as if
factual histories, because the value of such accounts is limited by con-
cerns of authenticity, reliability, and accuracy, and because the record
as a whole does not show where historical fact ends and mythic tale
begins."42 8 The court's conclusion seemed to have been based in large
part on a fundamental scepticism about and rejection of all oral tradi-
tion evidence, which was contrary to Congress's intentions as ex-
424. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 881 (9th Cir. 2004). Settlement pat-
terns were addressed in Dr. Ames's archaeological study. See supra notes
196-205 and accompanying text.
425. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 881. Burial practices were addressed in Dr. Hack-
enberger's bio-archaeological study. See supra notes 250-57 and accompanying
text.
426. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 881. Language distribution and development were ad-
dressed in Dr. Hunn's linguistic study. See supra notes 237-49 and accompany-
ing text.
427. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 881.
428. Id. at 881-82.
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pressed in NAGPRA. Congress not only did not discount oral history
evidence, but even included it in a list of relevant types of evidence to
be considered without indicating that it was to be given lesser weight
than other forms of evidence. In other words, Congress did not sub-
scribe to what anthropologist Peter Whiteley has called "the Western
cult of the written word," which is characterized by "engrained-
though largely unexamined-ideas about the supposed instability and
unreliabilty of oral narratives."429 The fixation on written texts and
denial of validity to oral texts has led many archaeologists of the
Americas to reject the evidence presented by tribal oral histories, in
marked contrast to the practice of classical archaeologists.430 This at-
titude has also led them to take literally and unquestioningly Spanish
colonial and exploratory records while rejecting tribal oral texts as
historical sources. 43 1 Whiteley does not advocate unquestioned ac-
ceptance by archaeologists of all elements of oral accounts of the past,
but instead believes that they should be evaluated according to certain
standards of truth evaluation, such as multiplicity and
reproducibility.432
While the court discounted the opinion of the ethnographic expert
who had contributed his work to the preparation of the cultural affilia-
tion report, it acknowledged that "considerable help" was provided in
the court's evaluation of the oral history evidence by the "explanations
of the uses and limits on oral narratives as explained and documented
with scholarly authority" by Professors Andrei Simic and Harry Glynn
Custred, Jr.433 The amicus brief submitted by these two anthropology
professors, which the court found so helpful, suffered from the same
limited perspective as the court. Like the court, the professors found
the information drawn from the tribes' traditions to be not credible,
while expressing respect for the opinions of non-Native American an-
thropologists and literary critics. Relying on the oral narratives dis-
cussed in the ethnographic report, the professors wrote, would "ignore
all that has been learned about the nature of such stories"434-in
other words, all that these anthropologists and other individuals who
are outside the tribal communities believe about the nature of these
429. Peter M. Whiteley, Archaeology and Oral Tradition: The Scientific Importance of
Dialogue, 67 AM. ANTIQUITY 405, 407 (2002).
430. See id. at 408 (noting that it would be unthinkable for classical archaeologists to
interpret an ancient Greek or Trojan site without looking to "subsequent contem-
porary [written] textual references and other archived information about Greek
or Trojan cultural history").
431. See id. at 406, 408.
432. See id. at 411-12.
433. Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 882 n.23.
434. Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae, in Support of the Plain-
tiff-Appellees, by Dr. Andrei Simic and Dr. Harry Glynn Custred, Jr., at 3, Bon-
nichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-35996) [hereinafter
Simic-Custred Brie/].
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stories. Only such individuals are deemed capable of performing the
kind of "critical analysis" of the traditions that these anthropologists
believe is needed to determine, to their satisfaction, the "authenticity
and accuracy" of the traditions.43 5 To these anthropologists, the oral
traditions discussed in the ethnographic report are "clearly myths,"
and therefore are to be discounted and not to be treated as "factual
histories."436 They contrasted "history" with oral traditions, described
as stories. These stories, they wrote, "are always told for a purpose
which may change from time to time depending on the intent of the
story-teller,"43 7 and their "selective and interpretive aspect" cannot be
ignored. 438 They failed to acknowledge that similar statements have
been used to describe written history. The continuing existence of dis-
putes between more traditional American historians and those whom
they-and some Supreme Court Justices-criticize as "revisionist his-
torians," for example, undermines the monolithic view of "factual his-
tory" presented by these anthropologists.439
Professors Simic and Custred faulted the tribes for failing to "test
their oral tradition evidence to determine whether it is authentic,
credible and accurate."440 For the tribes, the kind of "testing" that the
professors had in mind might well have seemed pointless and unnec-
essary. The tribes might also have pointed out that written history
must also be subjected to the kind of testing that the professors de-
scribed, to assess its potential bias, purposes, selectivity, and interpre-
tation of evidence. As anthropologist Peter Whiteley has noted, for
example, "written records, such as diaries, journals, even official re-
ports, are certainly no less interpretively problematic [than oral
records], as historians currently recognize."4 4 1
While expressing great skepticism about the reliability of tribal
oral narratives, the professors presented as well-established, uncom-
plicated fact one of the several theories of human migration to the
Americas: "Since all humans originated in the Old World"-they used
the same kind of Eurocentric nomenclature that the court
adopted442-"the Tribal Claimants' ancestors must have migrated
into the region at some point in the past. For the Salishan speaking
tribes, this happened within the last four or five thousand years."443
They did not acknowledge the controversy among anthropologists of
435. See id. at 3.
436. See id. at 6.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 7.
439. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
440. Simic-Custred Brief, supra note 434, at 8.
441. Whiteley, supra note 429, at 408.
442. See supra notes 365-66 and accompanying text.
443. Simic-Custred Brief, supra note 434, at 22.
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various stripes that continues to surround the issue of the first settle-
ment of the Americas, in terms of the identity of the first settlers,
their place of origin, how they got here, whether and when they were
followed by subsequent migrations, and what conclusions can be
drawn about these continuing questions from anatomical, archaeologi-
cal, linguistic, and genetic evidence. And again, the professors' skepti-
cal attitude toward oral history was not shared by Congress as it
enacted NAGPRA.
The great confidence that the Ninth Circuit panel placed in the
brief submitted by these two professors might lead to an assumption
that they must be eminent anthropologists who had proven them-
selves well qualified to comment on the oral history and linguistic his-
tory of the tribes of the Pacific Northwest. However, this was not the
case. Professor Custred has written articles focused on Andean eth-
nography, language use in Transylvania, and South American lan-
guage boundaries,444 while Professor Simic has focused most of his
research on East European ethnic studies.445 Thus, their areas of ex-
pertise raise questions about their ability to offer an informed opinion
on oral history evidence related to the indigenous peoples of the Pla-
teau region. Nonetheless, the court accepted the "evidence" about oral
history submitted by Professors Custred and Simic and thus accepted
their implicit claim that their profession's knowledge "is not just dif-
ferent from indigenous knowledge, [but] . . . is fundamentally better"
and has the power to "define what is truth."446 In addition, it is inter-
esting to note that Professor Custred's participation in this case is just
one example of his advocacy activities in publicly prominent issues
that touch upon race. He has devoted time to such projects as promot-
ing Proposition 209, of which he was a co-author. Passed by California
voters in 1996, Proposition 209 was designed to eliminate race- and
gender-based affirmative action in public contracting, education, and
444. See Profile of Professor Custred, California Civil Rights Initiative, at http://www.
publicaffairtsweb.com/ccri/custred.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
445. Professor Simic submitted to the district court an affidavit addressing oral tradi-
tion and cultural affiliation, in which he admitted that his professional research
had focused principally on East European ethnic studies, but explained that he
believed that he was nonetheless qualified to comment on Native American folk-
lore and oral traditions because he was "familiar" with them. Affidavit of Andrei
Simic, Mar. 2000, available at http://www.friendsofpast.orgfkennewick-man/
court/affidavits/oral-tradition-5.html. Professor Simic received his Ph.D. in social
anthropology and is a professor at the University of California at Los Angeles.
See Anthropology at USC, Andre Simic, at http://www.usc.edu/dept/elab/anthl
FacultyPages/simic.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
446. See Whiteley, supra note 429, at 408. Although Whiteley was discussing archae-
ologists in particular, his comments also accurately characterize the attitude of
anthropologists like Professors Custred and Simic.
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employment.44 7 The perspective indicated by Professor Custred's
public advocacy work seems to have colored his attitude toward NAG-
PRA and tribal claims as well, as the following comments on the An-
cient One suggest:
Indian activists weren't amused [about further testing] . . , for the present
system of incentives and rewards in which they operate depends on constant
assertion of Indian victimhood and white guilt. Such assertions would not be
helped if it turned out the Indians weren't the first Americans after all; that
Europeans may have been here before them; or that Indians, like the Europe-
ans that followed, may have come to America as colonizers to find a racially
different aboriginal population, which they eventually replaced. For them it
is better that as little as possible be known about Kennewick Man, or about
any other ancient skeletal material for that matter.4 4 8
These are not the kind of sentiments expressed in the amicus brief,
leaving unanswered the question of whether an awareness of Profes-
sor Custred's general attitude toward NAGPRA and his broader con-
cerns about Native American status would have made any difference
to the Ninth Circuit panel.
The tribal claimants' ability to defend the DOI's cultural affiliation
decision making against attack by the plaintiffs and by Professors
Simic and Custred undoubtedly was hampered by the stance taken by
their United States co-defendant at this stage of the litigation. As
noted above, after defending the DOI's cultural affiliation determina-
tion at the lower court level, the government declined to do so before
the court of appeals. The tribal claimants were thus left to defend by
themselves this key determination by the Secretary of the Interior.
Defending DOI decisions in litigation is not a role that tribes and their
attorneys regularly take on, but the tribal claimants were left no
choice in the Bonnichsen litigation.
6. The Panel's Conclusion
In concluding its analysis, the court of appeals panel acknowledged
that the administrative record might permit a reasonable conclusion
that the tribes' ancestors had lived in the area "for a very long time,"
but maintained that the record did not permit a conclusion that the
Ancient One shared "special or significant genetic or cultural features
with presently existing tribes" such that his remains could be consid-
ered "Native American" within the court's revised definition of the
447. Justin Jones, Prop. 209 Co-author Glynn Custred Endorses Prop 54, at http:ll
www.freerepublic.com/focuslf-news/971051/posts (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
448. Ron Selden, Bones of Contention, MISSOULA INDEPENDENT, Mar. 22, 2001, availa-
ble at http://www.missoulanews.com/Archives/News.asp?no+1592. Concerns
about the scholarliness with which Professor Custred approached his work might
also be raised by his and his co-author's failure to even spell Magistrate Judge
Jelderks' name correctly in their brief. See Simic-Custred Brief, supra note 434
(addressed to "Judge Jeldricks").
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term.4 49 As a result, NAGPRA did not apply, and the plaintiffs could
proceed under ARPA, to carry out the same kinds of studies that had
already been done by the experts who contributed to the Native Amer-
ican determination analysis and the cultural affiliation report. 45 0
Having been abandoned by the United States at the appeals level,
and having lost the case before a Ninth Circuit panel, the tribal claim-
ants had to consider their next move. After the Ninth Circuit denied
their request for a rehearing en banc,451 they considered whether to
appeal the panel's decision to the Supreme Court. The tribes ulti-
mately decided not to seek a writ of certiorari,4 5 2 as did the U.S. Jus-
tice Department 4 5 3 (an unsurprising decision, given the government's
marked lack of enthusiasm for pursuing the appeal to the Ninth Cir-
cuit). The tribal claimants were unwilling to take the risk that the
Supreme Court would uphold the Ninth Circuit's judicial amendment
to NAGPRA's "Native American" definition and thus extend its poten-
tial impact beyond the Ninth Circuit.454
C. The Aftermath and Impact of the Bonnichsen Decision
Following the announcement of the Ninth Circuit decision, the
plaintiffs worked on preparing a study plan for the remains, as the
appeals court had instructed them to do. James Chatters, the archae-
ologist who had obtained an ARPA permit covering the remains when
they were first discovered and whose initial indication that the re-
mains were Caucasoid did much to foster the widespread public mis-
perception of their nature,4 5 5 expressed excitement at the chance to
examine them again. He stated that the Ancient One's remains would
449. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 882 (9th Cir. 2004).
450. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 882 n.24.
451. Joseph B. Frazier, Legal Options Run Low on Kennewick Man, SEA7tLE TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2004, at B4.
452. Press Statement: CTUIR Will Not Pursue Case in the US Supreme Court, July
18, 2004 (announcing the decision of the Umatillas not to seek to pursue the case
before the Supreme Court), available at http://www.umatilla.nsn.us/kman14.
html; Anna King, Kennewick Man Appeal Unlikely, TRI-CITY HERALD, July 17,
2004 (stating that officials of four tribes had decided not to appeal to the Supreme
Court), available at http://www.kennewick-man.com/kman/news/v-kprint/story/
5310042p-5247626c.html.
453. Justice Won't Appeal Kennewick Man Case, TRI-CrrY HERALD, July 22, 2004,
available at http://www.kennewick-man.com/kman/news/v-kprint/story/53287
72p-5266824c.html.
454. See King, supra note 452. Tribal attorney Rob Roy Smith also noted that appeals
to the Supreme Court are expensive and there is no guarantee that the Court will
agree to hear the case. Id. Umatilla spokeswoman Deb Crosswell also noted that
the Umatillas had considered how the current membership of the Court would
affect the chances of an appeal. Frazier, supra note 451, at B4.
455. Chatters eventually distanced himself, at least in the anthropological literature,
from the impression that he created. He claimed, "Once the skeleton's age was
known, however, I referred to the remains as 'Caucasoid-like'.... I did not state,
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be stored for further scientific study, rather than re-buried, and would
be part of a federally maintained collection, in the company of "the
rest of the national treasures where he belongs."45 6
The plaintiffs' excitement over their success in persuading the
Ninth Circuit panel to re-write NAGPRA's "Native American" defini-
tion and overturn the DOI's disposition determination has undoubt-
edly been tempered by their finding themselves faced with the federal
government's determination to conscientiously carry out the terms of
ARPA. Alan Schneider, an attorney for the plaintiffs, has accused the
government of using ARPA to hinder the plaintiffs' plan of study for
the remains, which are housed in the Burke Museum in Seattle. The
Army Corps of Engineers has explained that the plaintiffs' plan was
"subject to reasonable terms and conditions" and that the Corps was
trying to work out the details with the plaintiffs.457 The tribal claim-
ants have sought to be granted full party status by the court, along
with the government and the plaintiffs, in the process of negotiating a
study plan for the remains. In a motion to intervene filed on Septem-
ber 9, 2004, the tribal claimants relied on the American Indian Relig-
ious Freedom Act, their status as sovereign nations, ARPA, and the
National Historic Preservation Act.458 The tribes have argued that
there is a lower burden of proof for demonstrating a religious and cul-
tural interest in the remains that would give them standing to partici-
pate in the development of the study plan, as opposed to when the
Native American status of the remains was being determined.4 5 9
They are concerned about the additional damage to the remains that
may be caused by repeated handling by multiple anthropologists and
are seeking to have the remains returned to them for burial when the
plaintiffs' studies are completed.460 In December 2004, Magistrate
Judge Jelderks ruled that the tribes would not be allowed to partici-
pate in the study plan negotiations, a decision which the tribes have
appealed. The tribes' attorney has indicated that the tribes remain
hopeful that they will be able to play a role in the study plan discus-
sions and will eventually have the Ancient One's remains returned to
nor did I intend to imply, once the skeleton's age became known, that he was a
member of some European group." Chatters, supra note 141, at 306.
456. King, supra note 452.
457. Skeleton Case's New Bone of Contention; a Fresh Legal Obstacle Emerges for Fo-
rensic Anthropologists in Their 8-Year Fight with Northwest Tribes to Study a Set
of 9,300-year-old Bones, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at A12 [hereinafter Bone of
Contention] (quoting Corps attorney Jennifer Richman).
458. See Update October 2004; Status: Study of the Skeleton, at http://www.friendsof
past.org/kennewick-man/news/041004Comment.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
459. See Chris Mulick, Tribes Try Again to Control Kennewick Bones, TRI-CiTY HER-
ALD, Sep. 10, 2004, available at http://www.kennewick-man.com/kman/news/v-
kprint/story/5531775p-5467045c.html.
460. See id.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
them.461 Until the dispute over the study plan and its development is
resolved, the threat of additional litigation over the remains of the An-
cient One will continue to exist and the ultimate fate of his remains
will remain uncertain.
The ire of the plaintiffs and their attorneys is also being directed at
a proposed technical correction to the text of NAGPRA to indicate
more explicitly that the remains do not need to be shown to be tied to a
contemporary tribe to be considered Native American. The proposed
two-word correction to the Native American definition, which has
been approved by the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, responds to
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the phrase "is indigenous" as re-
quiring such a contemporary link in order for the disposition of the
remains to be determined under NAGPRA.462 The correction inserts
the words "or was," such that "Native American" would be expressly
defined to mean "of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is or
was indigenous to the United States."463 This clarification was sug-
gested in testimony before the Committee by Professor Paul Bender,
who was involved in the development of NAGPRA and has commented
on how startling the Ninth Circuit's decision was to those who played
a role in that process.4 64 Professor Bender has noted that the Ninth
461. See Order, dated December 15, 2004, Bonnichsen v. United States (D. Or. 2004)
(No. 96-1481-JE) (Magistrate Judge Jelderks' denial of the tribes' motion to inter-
vene), available at http://www.friendsofpast.org/kennewick-man/court/opinions/
0412150rder.pdf; Anna King, Tribes Appeal Bone Ruling, TRi-CiTY HERALD, Feb.
16, 2005 (discussing the tribes' appeal to the Ninth Circuit), available at http'/
www.kennewick-man.com/kman/news/story/6178312p-6151857c.html; Richard
L. Hill, What's New With... Kennewick Man, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 6, 2005, at
C7.
462. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
463. See S. 536, Native American Omnibus Act of 2005, 109th Cong. § 108 (2005) (em-
phasis added); see also NAGPRA Change Up for Senate Consideration Again, at
http://www.indianz.com/News/2005/006919.asp (last visited Aug. 5, 2005) (noting
that the correction was included in a technical corrections bill introduced by Sen-
ator McCain and that it was also included in a previous bill). The Senate Indian
Affairs Committee reported favorably on the bill in a May 12, 2005 report. See S.
REP. No. 109-67 (2005). An additional change to the definition inserts the words
"any geographic area that is now located within the boundaries of" after the word
"indigenous" and before the words "United States." S. 536, § 108. Senator Mc-
Cain was involved in the original passage of NAGPRA. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
464. See Two-word Change to NAGPRA Pending in the Senate, at http://www.
indianz.com/News/2004/004562.asp (last visited Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter
Change to NAGPRA]; Oversight Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs on the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 108th Cong.
(2004) (statement of Paul Bender, Professor of Law, Arizona State University
College of Law), available at http://indian.senate.gov/2004hrgs/071404hrg/0714
04wit list.htm [hereinafter Bender Testimony]. Professor Bender served as
facilitator of the Panel for a National Dialogue on Museum/Native American Re-
lations. See Report of the Panel for a National Dialogue on Museum/Native Amer-
ican Relations (Feb. 28, 1990), 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 487, 492 (1992).
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Circuit's interpretation of the statute, in addition to being "a serious
error of statutory construction,"46 5 frustrated NAGPRA's "important
human rights objective of including Indian governments and groups in
decisions about whether materials are Indian-related and about the
treatment and disposition of such materials"46 6-an important objec-
tive in light of the history of institutions' refusal to share information
with tribes or allow their participation in decision making with re-
spect to human remains.4 6 7 While the proposed technical correction
would not affect the Ancient One's remains and has been approved, in
substance, by the SAA,468 opponents of the proposal have voiced con-
cerns about its effect on the disposition of other remains. The ulti-
mate fate of the proposed legislation in the Senate is unclear, and no
companion legislation is currently pending in the House of
Representatives.
Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the Bonnichsen decision, newspa-
pers have continued to falsely report that the Ancient One had been
determined to have some "Caucasian features" and to present this as
evidence of ancient non-Asian migration. Even a newspaper as promi-
nent as the Los Angeles Times reported, in a story on the Ninth Cir-
cuit decision, that the Kennewick remains were "found to have some
Caucasian features, suggesting groups other than Asians may have
migrated to the continents thousands of years ago."46 9 Newspapers
have also continued to report the Kennewick discovery as a threat to
Native American identity and tribal legal status. The Los Angeles
Times, for example, reported that tribes' "identity as the continents'
'original' inhabitants seemed jeopardized."47o At least some readers,
ignorant of the fact that tribal legal rights are based on treaties and
pre-constitutional sovereignty and property rights rather than on ra-
cial classifications and "first occupancy," view such stories as a justifi-
cation for questioning the legal rights that American law recognizes as
inhering in tribes and their members.
465. See Bender Testimony, supra note 464, at 7.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 9.
The SAA released a position statement on the prior bill that included the techni-
cal correction, stating that the substance of the proposed change "affirms the So-
ciety's position that the definition of 'Native American' was intended to include
tribes, peoples, and cultures that were once indigenous to the United States as
well as those presently recognized as indigenous." SAA Statement on Proposed
NAGPRA Amendment, available at http://www.saa.org/repatriation/nagpra
amendment.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). The Society objected, however, to
the process by which the proposal was put forward, which it believed had not
included sufficient consultation with the Society or other groups who have a
stake in NAGPRA issues. See id.
Bone of Contention, supra note 457, at A12.
470. See id.
466.
467.
468.
469.
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If prominent newspapers still cannot (or will not) get the facts
straight, then it is unsurprising that members of the public at large
make similar mistakes. Furthermore, just as some anthropologists'
heralding of the Bonnichsen decision may indicate their broader oppo-
sition to NAGPRA as a statute that is contrary to their interests, so
some members of the public's comments on the Kennewick remains
have indicated a broader hostility to Native Americans. For example,
one individual reacted to the news on the Yahoo! home page of the
discovery of an apparently very old site of human habitation in Mary-
land with the following confused and error-filled post: "This is more
proof that the white man was in America before the 'native' americans
descended upon America from Asia. Also note the red haired, cauca-
sian feature skeleton found in Oregon that the tribes fought to re-bury
before it could be studied and the truth could get out."4 7 1 The damage
done to the public perception of the case by the media's false reports
cannot be easily undone.
There have already been initial indications of the potential for the
decision in Bonnichsen to have an impact beyond the disposition of the
Ancient One's remains. The decision has been cited as additional am-
munition against the application of NAGPRA to remains that have
already been disinterred and to those located at sites that are cur-
rently being excavated. The Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, for exam-
ple, is involved in a continuing dispute over a mummified human
skeleton dated to be over 10,000 years old that was discovered in
Spirit Cave in Nevada, near its reservation. Although the NAGPRA
Review Committee concluded that cultural affiliation had been estab-
lished between the remains and the Tribe and recommended that the
remains be repatriated to the Tribe, 472 in 2004 the Bureau of Land
Management ignored the Committee's recommendation and upheld an
earlier finding against affiliation by the Bureau's Nevada office. 4 73
Also, in what an article in a local newspaper termed "a possible repeat
of the Kennewick Man controversy," mummified human remains have
471. "Proof Whites Discovered America First," posted by "soldierfor christ_2004_ad"
on Yahoo News message board on Aug. 17, 2004 (reacting to story "Maryland Dig
May Reach Back 16,000 Years").
472. See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Review Committee
Findings and Recommendations Regarding Human Remains and Associated
Funerary Objects from Spirit Cave in Nevada, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,463 (Apr. 10,
2002).
473. See Spirit Cave Man Update, June 2004, at http://dmla.clan.lib.nv.us/docs/muse-
ums/cc/update.htm. For the original Nevada BLM determination that the re-
mains could not be shown to be culturally affiliated with the Tribe and were
culturally unidentified, see Pat Barker et al., Determination of Cultural Affilia-
tion of Ancient Human Remains from Spirit Cave, Nevada, July 26, 2000, avail-
able at http://www.nv.blm.gov/cultural/spirit-caveman/SCsummary.pdf. The
remains are in the possession of the Nevada State Museum but are not on dis-
play, because of state law prohibitions. See Spirit Cave Man Update, supra.
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been found in Range Creek Canyon in the Book Cliffs area of Utah.474
The site is on a mix of federal, state, and private land, but most of the
site was recently acquired from a rancher by Utah's Division of Wild-
life Resources. 4 7 5 Archaeologists and their students have been exca-
vating the site for several years, without notification to the state
Division of Indian Affairs or any tribal officials, and have reportedly
discovered about 225 locations containing artifacts, three or four of
which also contain human remains47 6 Although the site has been
dated to 4,500 years ago, archaeologists believe that further analysis
could show that it was occupied 7,000 or more years ago.4 77 Tribal
leaders, such as Northwest Shoshone Tribe cultural resources man-
ager Patty Timbimboo-Madsen, have noted that ceremonies need to be
performed when remains are found because of the disturbance of the
dead that has occurred 4 78 and that the remains should eventually be
repatriated to the appropriate tribe.479 While the rancher, whose ef-
forts to keep the site secret preserved it from looters, has stated that
remains that are found "should be left where the Indians buried them
in the first place,"48o a newspaper editorial recently warned of the
need to make the site "legally secure against unproven claims" under
NAGPRA, arguing that claims like those in the Kennewick Man case,
in which "tribes nearly prevented scientific study of the bones," were
likely in the Range Creek Canyon situation.48 1
474. See Paul Foy, Secrecy of Ancient Site Upsets Some Indians, DESERET MORNING
NEWS, July 4, 2004, at B01.
475. Elizabeth Neff & Greg Lavine, Indian Remains Spark a Debate, SALT LAKE TmRB.,
July 2, 2004, at Al. Rancher Waldo Wilcox bought the land in 1951 and kept the
archaeological site, which is spread over thousands of acres, secret in order to
protect it. He sold it to the Trust for Public Land in 2001, which in turn sold it to
the Bureau of Land Management, which sold it to Utah in 2004. Since the loca-
tion of the site became public, some artifacts have already been stolen. See Kirk
Johnson, Long Secret, Ancient Ruins are Revealed in Utah, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2004, at Al.
476. See Neff & Lavine, supra note 475, at Al. Some remains have, however, emerged
on the surface through erosion. See id. For a description of Utah state law on
Native American remains, including a requirement of notification and provisions
allowing tribal claims for remains found on state land, see id.
477. See Foy, supra note 474, at B01.
478. See id. Melvin Brewster, the Skull Valley Band of Goshutes' historic preserva-
tion director, has made similar statements. See, e.g., id. ("They need to bring in
the traditional spiritual leaders .... It looks like all this noncompliance went
on.").
479. The Paiute Indian Tribe's Tribal Chairwoman, Lora Tom, has stated that "any
bodies should be repatriated out of respect.... Once we are at a point where any
remains are discovered, I think that someone from the surrounding tribes should
be there." Neff & Lavine, supra note 475, at Al.
480. Karen Peterson, Pristine Ruins Preserved for 50 Years by a Rancher's Silence Are
Being Unearthed in Utah, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 4, 2004, at Bl.
481. Protect Ruins, Verify Claims; Secure Site Against Threats, RocKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, July 11, 2004, at 7E.
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In addition to encouraging anthropologists who have chafed under
NAGPRA to resist compliance with its requirements, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision to side with the plaintiffs in the Bonnichsen litigation
against the DOI and the tribal claimants may make it more difficult
for tribes and anthropologists to reach agreements for the study of re-
mains, perhaps on a short-term basis, in situations in which the inter-
ested tribes are not averse to at least some analysis by
anthropologists. In the case of remains found at Buhl Quarry in Idaho
that were dated to be over 10,000 years old, Shoshone-Bannock elders
gave permission for measurement and study of the remains and for
radiocarbon testing, which ended up delaying reburial of the remains
and associated funerary objects for over two years.48 2 J.M. Adovasio
has also written about his experience of the positive relationships that
can be developed between Native Americans and archaeologists 48 3
who are willing "'to move from the ethics of conquest to the ethics of
collaboration." 48 4 Particularly in cases where it is relatively easy to
establish ties between human remains and contemporary tribes that
even the Ninth Circuit panel would accept under its re-writing of
NAGPRA, tribal cooperation can give anthropologists an opportunity
to study remains that they would not otherwise have. It is not diffi-
cult to envision, though, that in the aftermath of cases like Bonnich-
sen, in which the plaintiff anthropologists and their supporters
displayed negative and even contemptuous attitudes toward tribal
perspectives and claims, requests for tribal permission to examine re-
mains may be greeted with a less enthusiastic response than they
might have received in the past. As a result, anthropologists and ar-
chaeologists themselves may ultimately come to conclude that the
Bonnichsen decision was not quite the victory that at least some of
them first believed it to be.
V. CONCLUSION
Between the arrival of Lewis and Clark and today, Indians have fallen off the
map .... Lewis and Clark passed through the homeland of a real, living,
breathing society. But we've become just an exotic backdrop to someone else's
story.
- Roberta Conner, Director, Tmastsklit Cultural Institute,
Umatilla Indian Reservation
4 8 5
482. See ROGER DOWNEY, RIDDLE OF THE BoNEs: POLITICS, SCIENCE, RACE, AND THE
STORY OF KENNEWICK MAN 121-27 (2000) (describing the discovery of the re-
mains, their study, and their repatriation); see also Green et al., supra note 302,
at 437. Thomas Green and his co-authors noted that they "greatly appreciate[d]
the cooperation and tolerance of the Shoshone-Bannock tribes of Fort Hall,
Idaho." Id. at 452.
483. See ADOVASIO & PAGE, supra note 21, at 252.
484. Morell, supra note 315, at 5 (quoting Martin Sullivan, director of the Heard Mu-
seum in Phoenix).
485. Nickerson, supra note 1, at A23.
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Although the tribal claimants have so far been unable to save a
man whom they regard as their ancestor from being treated as the
representative of a dying race-a sort of archaeological "Last of the
Mohicans"-they continue to themselves prove wrong the nineteenth
century predictions of Native Americans' imminent extinction. Mem-
bers of the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, the Con-
federated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, the Nez Perce Tribe,
and the Wanapum Band continue to live their lives in the area that
has supported their people for millennia, and to value the ties of kin-
ship and community that bind them together as tribes. Like the An-
cient One himself, whose identity as a Native American has been
denied by the federal judiciary, the Wanapum Band continues to lack
federal recognition of its existence as a tribe. If the Band were to sub-
mit to the review process established for tribes seeking federal ac-
knowledgment, its members would be likely to encounter the same
focus on biological connections as the basis for ancestry that they and
the other tribal claimants did with the Ancient One. Like the tribal
coalition claiming descent from the Ancient One in Bonnichsen, the
Band would, in effect, have to extract from the government an admis-
sion of failure to either exterminate or assimilate it. If the govern-
ment were to acknowledge the existence of the Wanapum Band as a
tribe, it thus would be acknowledging that it had failed to destroy the
Band as a political and cultural entity and to absorb its members fully
into the dominant society.
The tribal claimants clearly do not stand alone as survivors of the
nineteenth century assimilation process and as proof of the falsity of
the dying race theory. Moreover, the higher population growth rates
of Native Americans as compared to white Americans provide addi-
tional evidence that Native Americans continue to prove nineteenth
century anthropologists wrong. Between the 2000 Census and 2003,
the Indian and Alaska Native population grew 4.6% and the Native
Hawaiian population grew 7.1%, while the number of non-Hispanic
whites increased only 0.9%.486 Moreover, the Native American popu-
lation tends to be younger than the white population487 and to have a
higher birth rate. In South Dakota, for example, the 2001 Native
American birth rate was twice that of white residents of the state, as
486. U.S. Census Bureau, Press Release, Census 2000 Shows America's Diversity,
Mar. 12, 2001, available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/
archives/race/001839.html. The Native Hawaiian population figures also include
other Pacific islanders. The percentage of whites as a whole (i.e., including His-
panics) increased 2.8%. See id.
487. In July 2003, for example, the median ages of American Indians and Alaska Na-
tives and of Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders were 28.9 and 28.5,
respectively; the median age of non-Hispanic whites was 39.6. See id. at tbl. 2.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the white birth rate in the state continued its twenty year decline.488
These figures may be threatening to non-Native Americans, who rec-
ognize that where tribal sovereignty is concerned, there may be
strength in numbers. Alaska Senator Ted Stevens, for example, has
implied that the higher birth rate of Alaska Natives compared to other
Alaskans is one of his reasons for resisting the sovereignty of Alaska
Native villages.489 Inadequate health care, along with other factors,
however, have continued to present challenges to the health and lon-
gevity of members of Native American communities. 490 Thus, while
Native Americans today may not suffer catastrophically from the dis-
eases brought by Europeans, like influenza and small pox, that deci-
mated their communities in the past, the failure of the government to
provide the health care in consideration of which tribes ceded territory
continues to take a toll on their communities. 491
The recent opening of the National Museum of the American In-
dian stands as a testament to the survival of the indigenous peoples of
the Americas. The long-awaited opening of the Museum marks a pub-
lic rejection of the dying race theory of the nineteenth century, despite
the Ninth Circuit's rendering of a decision that is consistent with the
theory, and gives those Native Americans who are involved in its de-
velopment the opportunity to present their understanding of their
past, present, and future. Stephen Cook, the head curator of the
488. See Wayne Ortman, Birth Rate Continues 20-year Decline, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS,
Jan. 27, 2003, at 6, available at 2003 WL 3277678.
489. See Jerry Reynolds, Silent on Housing Rider, Alaska Senator Denies Slur Against
American Indians, INDIAN CouNTRY TODAY, Oct. 22, 2003, available at 2003 WL
72623162. Stevens had been reported, apparently incorrectly, to have used the
term "breeding" when he discussed the Alaska Native birth rate. See id.
490. See, e.g., Ortman, supra note 488 (noting that the median age at death for Native
Americans was 57, compared to 80 for whites); Health Statistics; Motherhood in
South Dakota on the Rise, WoMENs'S HEALTH WEEKLY, Feb. 5, 2004, at 63 (noting
that the infant mortality rate in South Dakota in 2002 was 14.4% for Native
American infants and 4.7% for white infants, and that Native American infants
died before age one at three times the rate of white infants); Eric Newhouse, In-
dian Kids Dying-Too Many, Too Young, GREAT FALLS TRIB., Feb. 7, 2003, at 7A
(noting that the death rate in Montana for Native American infants was 88%
higher that for white infants, and that death rates for Native American children
aged 1-19 were 58% higher); Brent Walth, Tribes Turn Tide Against Infant Mor-
tality, Series: A Place Where Children Die, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 8, 2003, at A07
(noting that infant mortality continues to take a heavy toll in Native American
communities in the United States but that strides have been made in dealing
with high infant mortality rates on the Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon).
491. See, e.g., Peter Harriman, Indian Health Worries Shared, ARGUS LEADER, Aug.
25, 2003, at 1 (noting Oglala Sioux Tribe Council member Dennis King's com-
ment that health care was owed under treaties and that a U.S. Civil Rights Com-
mission report on Indian Health Service funding had concluded that it was so
"fiscally constricted" that it could not provide basic health services to its user
population, let alone address the specific health needs of Native American
communities).
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Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center, has commented
that "Indians more than anyone else are really aware of the past, be-
cause of the damage it's done .... The Vanishing Indian is gone.... It
doesn't exist. It never did .... Not only have we not lost our past, we
are not going to lose the future."492 The Museum does not have an
anthropology department, because this discipline is not intended to
play a role in defining who Native Americans are or to be the final
arbiter of what will be included; rather, the Museum looks to tribal
communities themselves "'as authorities about who they are."' 4 9 3 In
his remarks on the opening of the Museum, President Bush spoke of
celebrating "the legacy of the first people to call this land home" and of
remembering "Sacagawea's presence with Lewis and Clark."494 Link-
ing the past and present of the tribes with their future, he commented:
The National Museum of the American Indian... affirms that you and your
tribal governments are strong and vital today and provides a place to cele-
brate your present achievements and your deepest hopes for the future....
Long before others came to the land called America, the story of this land was
yours alone.... The... Museum... affirms that this young country is home
to an ancient, noble, and enduring native culture ... and as we celebrate this
new museum and we look to the future, we can say that the sun is rising on
Indian country. 4 9 5
The Museum stands as a gathering place of once-condemned but still
living cultures, a far cry from the museum of skeletal remains and
artifacts of extinct peoples that past anthropologists anticipated
would soon be all that remained to document the existence of the con-
tinent's pre-Columbian inhabitants.
While the new Museum welcomes visitors in Washington, D.C., to
experience a glimpse of the past, present, and future of the indigenous
peoples of the United States, a different encounter, which is also both
time-laden and timeless, is being played out in the territory of the An-
cient One. The path of the Lewis and Clark expedition is being trav-
492. Brian Lyman, Museum Celebrates Survival of American Indian, NORWICH BULL.,
Sep. 22, 2004, at A3. The Museum has met with mixed reviews, however; Ameri-
can Indian Movement leaders Floyd Red Crow Westerman, Dennis Banks, and
Clyde and Vernon Bellecourt, for example, have commented that "The museum
falls short in that it does not characterize or does not display the sordid and
tragic history of America's holocaust against the Native Nations and peoples of
the Americas." Jodi Rave, Mixed Emotions: Indian Museum Evokes Varied Reac-
tion, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Sep. 26, 2004, available at http://www.billingsgazette.
com/index.php?id=l&display=rednews/2004/09/26/build/state/40-mixed-emo-
tions.inc. For information about the Museum, see National Museum of the Amer-
ican Indian, at http://www.nmai.si.edu/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
493. Joel Achenbach, Within These Walls, Science Yields to Stories, WASH. POST, Sep.
19, 2004, at R01 (quoting Gerald McMaster, a deputy assistant director of the
Museum and a Plains Cree).
494. President George Bush, Remarks on the Opening of the National Museum of the
American Indian, in 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2105, 2106 (Sept. 23, 2004).
495. Id. at 2106.
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ersed by a group that wishes to commemorate their journey on the
hundredth anniversary of its launch from St. Louis, an effort that is
supported by a presidential proclamation designating 2003-2006 as
the "Lewis and Clark Bicentennial."4 96 The individuals who have as-
sumed the roles of members of the Corps of Discovery have come to
find that not all Native Americans are as welcoming to their visits as
were most of the tribes whom the original Corps encountered, and de-
pended on for survival. Although some tribes, including the Nez Perce
Tribe, have had representatives involved in the planning of the re-
enactment via a "Circle of Tribal Advisors," in order to try to ensure
that their perspective on this commemoration is not ignored,497 other
Native American groups and individuals have organized protests
along the route. To these protestors, the re-enactors are "re-enacting
the death" of their people. 498
Viewed against the sweep of history, however, whether contempo-
rary Native Americans are welcoming to the re-enactors or hostile to
their presence seems less significant than the fact that they are here
to react to the reenactment at all. Whether the visit of the Corps of
Discovery is viewed as simply the beginning of regularized contact be-
tween Native Americans and Euro-Americans, or as the prelude to
conquest, or even to genocide, the fact remains that Native Americans
have survived to have an opinion about the visit of the original Corps
and that of its modern-day imitators. Moreover, despite concerted ef-
forts to suppress their cultures and assimilate them into
Euro-American society, they have survived as individuals and as
tribes. They continue to disprove the predictions of nineteenth cen-
tury anthropologists and government officials that they are a race
doomed either to physical extinction or to cultural extinguishment.
While the Bonnichsen decision represents a new form of acceptance of
the dying race theory, and a rejection of the tribal claimants' cultur-
ally influenced perspective on history and kinship, those who wish to
preserve the integrity of NAGPRA must hope that it is an aberration,
and that future decisions by federal courts and action by Congress will
correct the mistake made by the Ninth Circuit in its misinterpretation
of NAGPRA.
496. Presidential Proclamation of the Lewis & Clark Bicentennial, July 1, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.whi+ehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020701-5.html.
497. See About the Circle of Tribal Advisors, available at http://www.lewisandclark
200.org/index.php?cID=639 (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
498. Seth Tupper, American Indians Determined to Stop Expedition, DAILY REPUBLIC,
Sep. 20, 2004 (quoting Wounded Knee veteran Carter Camp), available at http://
www.mitchellrepublic.com.
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VI. POSTSCRIPT
As this Article was going to press, several of the Bonnichsen plain-
tiffs, along with a number of other anthropologists, were given the op-
portunity to handle the remains of the Ancient One. Examination of
the remains began on July 6, 2005 and lasted ten days.499 A Smithso-
nian Institution anthropologist prepared a new reconstruction of the
skull that looks very different from the one that provoked speculation
about the Ancient One's origins and that has features similar to those
of other Paleo-Indian remains.50 0 The tribal claimants have contin-
ued their appeal of the district court's rejection of a tribal role in for-
mulating study plans for the remains, in the hope of having some say
in the remains' ultimate disposition.S01
As the tribes struggle on in their efforts to obtain respectful treat-
ment for the remains of the man whom they understand to be their
kinsman, the government continues to distance itself from the tribes
and from the DOI's own NAGPRA determination. The Bush adminis-
tration has publicly announced support for the Ninth Circuit panel's
decision in the Bonnichsen litigation and opposition to the proposed
statutory clarification of NAGPRA that is pending in the Senate.5 0 2
Where the Ancient One is concerned, the government has thus re-
gressed to the role that it played in the nineteenth century, acting as
the servant of "science" at the expense of Native Americans' human
rights.
499. See Timothy Egan, A Skeleton Moves From the Courts to the Laboratory, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2005 at F4. Preliminary results of the new studies are expected
to be released in October of 2005. See id.
500. Id.
501. See Anna King, Kennewick Man to be Studied in Seattle, TRI-CiTY HERALD, June
20, 2005, available at http://www.tri-cityherald.com/tch/local/v-printer/stroy/6626
748p-6512469c.html (noting a tribal official's statement that the tribes had filed
an appeal with the Ninth Circuit and that they expected that plaintiffs' study
would continue despite their appeal).
502. See Bush Administration Opposes NAGPRA Amendment, at http://www.indianz.
com/News/2005/009562.asp (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
